Private law analogies in international law by Lauterpacht, Hersch
jhtehJj
• ’•:   ' ;  '
The
BRITISH LIBRARY
ofPOLITICAL and
ECONOMIC
SCIENCE
Rerum Cognoscere Causes

ft*
? p i v ® V © I m w
In ini&rn&tloyal
BRITI8H LIBRARY
OF POLITICALAND
ECONOMICSCIENCE
ft21S 1 O f5 1 ft.8
law*
Xbw mmXogi&m to. %m
*lth ap®©IsX M M S i to &Bi®2wttom3l we*—
toltvwtlefw
,•populi respectu totlus generis husnani
privatonun locum ootliient'• '
tirotlus,Mare Liberum,Gap. V,
"The Law of Nations Is but private law ‘writ
large** It is an application to political
coirsiunitiesof those legal ideas which were
originally applied to relations of individuals
Holland,Studies in International Law,
pass.
This monograph, which the author submits as a Thesis
'i
" *f.
for LL.D. degree of the University of London, deals with a
controversial subject. In fact, the problem of application
of private law in international law is so controversial that
in the course of the writing of this thesis doubts were fre-
quently arising in the mind of the author whether the subject
ought to be dealt with in & University dissertation. These
doubts have rather Increased than diminished since he decided
not to confine himself a a mere registration of opinions of
publicists and writers of text-books, but to examine whether
the current opinion is in accordance with the practice of
states, and whether it has been really incorporated into the
science of international law.
How# "the current opinion” certainly does not encourage
any deviation from the well-beaten path of a whol e al e /
regAstion of analogies to private law. It has become
customary for publicists writing on important guestions of
international law to base their argument on the assertion
that the contrary opinion, which they attack# is a result of
• ' • • ' . . - A '   , . , ‘ ' . • '
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a misleading and mischievous analogy to private law, The
monographic literature on the theories of state secession
and of state responsibility is a lucid example of this
V' .-; -'.V.-' / '.’  ; ,' . .
procedure# It is accepted as a well established fact that
II.
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the recourse to private law, which was, perhaps, justified
in the formative period of international lew owing to the
prevalent patrimonial conception of state, has subsequently
impeded the growth of international law, antiought to be
discouraged* ,J,hemodern positivist tendency which excludes.^' '.
any other source of international law except custom and
treaty is, of course, chiefly responsible for the acceptance
of this view.
Is this rejection confirmed by the practice oi states
and by the history of international law? Or is it an a
priori interpretation in terms of a one-sided theory* ’ ‘ h.ese
were the questions vshichthe authoriset himself to answer.
It ogcured to him that the recourse to private (and k mmi
law is not only a.characteristic feature of the fom&tive %
period of international law, and that there is something v
more in it than a peculiarity of one historical period*
k critical examination shows that the use of private law
exercised, in the majority of cases, a beneficial influence*.
'O   •" •<   i' v • 1
which lasts until to-day, upon the development of international
relations and international law,- to mention only its influence
on the theories of acquisition of territorial sovereigrtty#of
the freedom of the sea and of the rn sppneibtlity of states;
. v \
that ih other cases - like prescription# succession, the V
measure of damage® arising out of an international tort **
Ill*
i ,v •'   - _ . '  .•  . - :(
1   . ... ' • . . . • ; , ,A . \
international law ultimately sdopts solution® given by
private law, without paying regard to the so-called ‘^special
character of international relations*; that it adopts, even
nos, notions of private law - as sale of territory, lease,
• . r •     .  J ' • V:- .-,v V
mandate - whenever exigencies or international life seem to <’
demand such a solution! that in .Internationalarbitration
- the recourse to private law on the part both of states and
of tribunals Xti a frequent, one would say permanent, feature
of the proceedings and -so far as the arbitrators are
concerned— in a great deal of cases of the awards themselves.
It is especially in these arbitration cases that the
inadequacy of the positivist treatment of the problem comes
clearly to light. States and tribunals have recourse to
analogy because international relations give rise to such
analogies, and because international law is not developed
enough to supply & solution in such cases* But the science
of international law gives hers no guidance to judges and
. V 1 Vv’s>
arbitrators* became it,rejects, under the influence of the
positivist theory, any analogy whatsoever. l±hiOsassehappens
when in a treaty the parties use conception of private law.
£he positivist method of the international law of to-day does
not render, in such cases, &ny assistance to the work of
interpretation, simply because It refuses to acknowledge that
recourse to private la» ever takes place.
If, on on© hand, the practice of states &xs&the history
of international law did not seem to the author to confirm
the so widely accepted view, he had, on the other hand, no
hesitation in rejecting it in its character as a postulate
Of the positivist school* International law of to~day is
no longer under tbeexclusive domination oi'the positivist
school, which needs must share the fate of Use modern doctrine
of sovereignty^ And this doctrine is to-day, to say the
least, in the centre of s searching and vigorous examination.
Neither can the positivist doctrine remain unaiiected toy
those new tendencies in legal philosophy which aim at giving
a fresh impui.se to the creative work of juristic interpretation
Ihe conviction that he is engaged in the investigation
of an important part of international law, hitherto obscured
"bya powerful, obdurate and, it Is believed, now vanishing
doctrine, helped the author in a work which almost equalled
that of writing a treatise* l'o r there is almost no part of
the international law of peace which is not affected by this,
problem. On the other hand, the undertaking to illustrate
the subject end to verify the propositions put forward in
** • ' . • • • ’ . V v •;>.--V ”i£V:
the Shesis by reference to the judicial settlement of inter-
national disputes nearly resulted in the writing of a digest
of international arbitration.
Ihe author saw clearly, in the course o f his work, that
he is liable to make himself misunderstood by advocating the
/
V.
recourse to analogy to private law whenever such a course
seems practicable, ansi by discussing the subject from the
point of view of this general proposition. But he took the
risk - in the hope that a careful reading of the dissertation
v?illshow: a) that such a restricted application of private
lew is not a postulate of interpretation only, but a rule
put forward In accordance with the practice of states and
the development of international lasr;b< that it is by no
means intended to show that international law in all its
parts is or ought to be shaped in accordance with the private
law pattern*
ihese few introductory remarks may also be regarded
v I
as a statement on the part of the author ‘"inwhat respects
his investigations appear to him to advance the study of law",
Whatever the merits of the dissertation may be, he ventures
to think that It represents an attempt to deal with the problem
' - i
of private law analogies in Its application to international
-law as a whole, and not to this or other particular question.
Even if the vltw presented here Is not accepted# the dissertation
\ '
is bound to prove that a further detailed and Independent
study of this problem will greatly assist the judicial work
of international arbitration and that of interpretation of
treaties* :  
*he *beais '‘embodiesthe results" of the authors nown
research"* but he is indebted to his advisor In studies,
X>r„Arnold £* McBair for friendly advice and helpful
V i
suggestions*
\\
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(Private law analogies as a problem of the science
of international law, - tluiplan of the monograph. )
There are, broadly speaking, three classes of cases
•' Vv.': ' ' '':'i
in which international law comes into contact with private ^°*nH 5f of contact
law, mere are, firstly, those instances in which rules betweeninternat-
> ' ional and,
governing the relations between states as?political entities private
law.
endowed with attributes of rulership are shaped in accord-
ance with a private law rule* then the question of sovereign-
ty over a given piece of territory is decided by the appli-'
cation of the doctrine of prescription; when the extent of
political rights of a stekteover a part of its own territory
' ' - ' '« i/ '-
  . . . / :•     ! • "
is defined in accordance with the alleged existence of a servi-
tudes when before an international tribunal the conduct of a
. / y -. ' . . . •fifa 1 \s
state is judged according to a private law rule of evidence;
when the question of payment of moratory interest for delay in
payment of a war indemnity is decided on the basis of analagous
private law rules - in all these cases the usually so called
public character of the respective rights and duties is obvious.
There are, secondly, instances in which states contract
economic business with each other without any direct relation
" C •  ' ' ' ' -" "  
to the exercise of their political rights of rulership, for
instance: when a state grants to another a loan, when a purely
economic servitude is granted or when one state acquires for
economic purposes property within the territory of another-
in all these cases there is, naturally, a possibility of private
law being applied.
The third class includes cases in which private rights
of individuals are determined in a public treaty, for Instance,
when subjects of one state holding leases in perpetuity from
(1)
another are granted freedom of taxation, and the ques-
tion arises as to the meaning of the particular rule of pri-
  \
vate las defining private rijats.
In the last two cases states enter into relations
which but for the fact that the parties to it are states would
belong to the domain of private law. «bat private law is to
be applied in these cases? Hie question is, obviously, not
one of analogy. It is either a question of a choice between
this or the other system of private law, a choice in accord-
ance with clearly defined principles, or a question of a
general private law, a kind of a modern ius gentium based on
-J.*
comparative law ami logical deductions,
Th© problem is different in the firs**and, partly,
in the second instance. The following question arises here:
- % •' *.*v /
D See~TX — "'ireatyof Commerce and navigation", of April
iLa Hetweei Japan and Germany (Martens, Treaties, & R.h. III. ,
ser/vol. 23. p. 269): for other instances Kuegger (cited
| f ° L ^ - dfnol belong, however, to international private lawj
for an exposition of these principles t ftuegger, Privatrecat
Uche Bel?iffa im Voelkerrechte, lUemeyer*s Z . t . IJ L . ,
pp. 462-502. /
way private law rules be introduced at ail in mis field of re-
• '3?r1Vate
lations so different from those obtaining between individuals law in
inter-
under the reign of municipal law? M a thesis, which is con- nation-
al-puh-
cerned with the relation between private la* and international lie law'
i •• ••' v-}i
public law is primarily devoted to the inveati&ation of this
aspect of the problem. - Mow, there is hardly a question of
greater practical and theoretical importance to which ham
systematic attention has been paid than the question of the use
of private law concepts in international public law. I say;
• * x ;; A.'
systematic attention. For civen the close relation, historical
and logical, between the two branches of law, it was impossible
for internatlonal writers not to define occasionally their views
••‘ ’ , ‘. V „•: :
on the admissibility of some particular concept of private law.
But even then their investigation remains restricted, in the maj-
ority of cases, to the application of Roman law rules.
And yet,the question occurs repeatedly in the frantingof
international law as a science, In the Interpretation and the con-
struction of treaties, and in the judicial adjustment of controO
versies between states. It is not on ly the vast subject of
treaties and the analogy to private law rules governing their for-
mation, validity and termination (the juridical nature of treat- v
iee, influence of fraud, error and duress, rules concerning the
'- •’' ' ' -• i 's. -V-7>
pacta in favorem tertil, the'clausula rebus sic stantibus,leesio
enoreais,the ru lm of interpretation)! and not only the theories
of acquisition of territory ( the Roman law rules of possession
' ' #
and occupation ). There are few branches of the international
-4« 'r
law of peace which are not affected by this problem. The inter-
national law of tort and the theory of state responsibility; the
measure of damages* the question of interest* moratory and com-
pensatory5 the theory of succession; the doctrine of prescript-
ion; quasi contracts; international servitudes; leases; inter-
national mandates of the art. 22 of the Sovenant of the League of
Nations; the private law rules of arbitration., procedure and
evidence, especially those of estoppel* of res iudicata and of
the burden of proof - they all come within the scope of the prob-
lem. To those instances cases may fairly be added in which rules
originally created in close contact with Roman and private law ,
developed subsequently without leaving any visible trace of their
private law origin* ( the historical influence of the concept of
property on the formation of the theory of sovereignty, the influ-
ence of the Roman law rules of possession on the conception of the
freedom of the sea, on the theory of the maritime belt and of the
sovereignty of the air). Hay these concepts be introduced into
international public law and if so, may the rules emanating from
them be applied in the same manner as they are in private law?
The problem is closely connected with the conflict be-
tween the positivist and natural law tendencies. The reign of
the positivist school at the end of the nineteenth century is
undisputed. It is predominant;we may fairly say - to-day. The
modern reaction against "theTdevastating domination” of the
-- '’ ”• .~ A. -
purely positivist frame of mind is, comx>aratively,of ip.re-
cent date and is confined to the application of municipal law.
-5-
And although there are most clear Indications to the effect
that this modern tendency of philosophy of law Is gradually
extending Its influence to the field of international law,
the positive character of the latter cannot be questioned V
The chief postulate of the positivist school can he
expressed in one word; self-sufficiency.. It rejects the
taking over of rules and $&acept8 from sources other than
International custom and treaties. Such borrowing, it js
alleged, destroys the independence of international law and
hampers its free development. That this independence has
in fact been threatened by the gigantic edifice of human
thought and experience embodied in private law, is obvious.
Hence the uncompromising attitude adopted by International
law writers rejecting any permanent and organic connection
between the two branches of law. ?he same forces which were
fighting the influence of the law of nature advocated with
vigour the purification of international law from its private
law ingredients. This attitude is made less conspicuous
only by the fact that the majority of writers do not deal
with the question as a problem in itself. Only occasionally
does the positivist disapproval of private law analogy find
a more or less lucid expression.
There are only two groups of writers of whom it can
be said that they face the matter in a general.and corapre-
r r On the modern revival of the ’'naturalist" tendencies
: in international law s. following chapter pp.
The prob-
lem is
closely
connec ted
with the
controver-
sy between
the pos-
itivist
and the
natural
law ten-
dency.
-6-
hensive manner. fhe question has been dealt with in ertsnso
by the most representative publicists of the German (and Ital-
‘ '• ''§?|j
ian) science of International law during the last decade of the
nineteenth century,,notably by Jellinefe,Triepel and Mppoldj
   '''S'
it has been answered, on the other side, by English writers of
the authority of Manning, Fhilliraoreand Westlake who discuss-
ed with great thoroughness the relation between Roman law and
the law of nations. * v
This does no - mean that the controversy is of recent date. Hie pro*
' loroin t-
The modern text-hooks of Sterna clonal law convey the impression the for-
mativem
that Grotlus, his fore-runners and his successors in Uie seven- period 1
GenUXlc
teenth and eighteenth centuries were usin^;private and Roman divided
attitudf
law out of a mere inability of perceiving the differences
between the two systems. This is not so. Hou only did they
apply private law5 they applied it after having faced the pro-
blem of the admissibility of such a procedure. Ho less a per-
son than Albericus Gentilis, Grotius*most scientific predeces-
sor, is confronted by the problem and, it seems, does not shrink
from answerinc it. That he makes considerable use of the civil,
*)
notably Homan, law is to be expected • But he defends his meth-
od by what seems to be a vigorous attack on the - even not yet firm-
T1 I'altenborn,Die Vorlauefer des Hugo Grotiua, 1848, p.231s
Holland, Albericus uentilis in "Studies in International Law , p.22j
Vinogradoff: Historical types of International Law, fclbliothoca
ViGceriana, Vol. I., 1&23.,p. 565 also Phillix>sons The Great
Jurists of the Soi'ld, Gentilis, Journ. of Comp. Le^isl., August,
1911.
-7-
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ly established - historical— positive school. He argues the
2)
case with great lucidity in the Advocatio Hispanica. He says
in the chapter " On holding to the civil law in appeals from a
judge of the Admiralty" : ” everyone submits to the civil law as
to a sort of law of nations". He cites autSiorsin support of the
contention that the principles of the law of nations come from the
Roman civil law. But it is interesting to note that a little later
on in chapter >7111 - he is overcome by the anxiety of many future
writers, and when answering the question ’’whetherthe purchasers
of plunder may keep it for themselves",, he urges gravely that
civil law must not be cited rashly and that "what applies to a
if3)
suate must not be extended beyond the state absurdly. He ex-
plains this attitude by pointing out that while the ancient world
constituted a single state the world of to-day is divided into
"separate jurisdiction or principalities". We snail see that
those two Alberici - the forerunner of the positivists and the
defender of civil law meeting the objection of the positivists
tJi8 pg aa statement of a true jurists pacta nos non quaer-
iraus, ex factis ius constituimus, sed ex lure examinamus
I ) Be i'urebelli, b'TT.,c.lt; b. I., c. 20. where he opposes
the "nuda historiarum recitatio"; - in b. I, c.3. - *...ius
etiam illis prescriptum libris Iustiniani, non civitatia est
tantum, sed est gentium, et naturae, et aptatum sic est ad nat-
uram universam, ut imperio extineto,*et ipsum ius diu sepultura
Bnv*raxerittamen* et in omnes Be effuderit gentes humanas,
surrexerix. amen, translation by F.F. Abbot, 44*e
the*Classics of International Law, ed. by J. B. Scott, p.110;
also introduction p. 19a. ,
V
facta • are typical of the position take**up by his sucoess-
li   '
ors.
The father of international law is only a too lucid ex-
Kejection
ample of this confusing dualism. There is almost no chapter of Homan
and civil
in the three hooks on the "law of war and peace” in which he law anal-
ogy by
does not reject this or the other rule, because it belongs Orotius.
2 )
only to the ci^il law and not the law of nations* Aext«*iiOQks x
quote eagerly his refusal to acknowledge that "the contracts
of kings and peoples are to be interpreted according to Roman r
law; except wnen the Roman law has been accepted as belonging
3)
to the law of nationsj which is not lightly to be presumed”.
His view on prescription is cited as another example of his in-
dependence in framing the rules of international law. %q sl^ali
have to examine whether this independence can really be express-
ed in the terms of ohe modern rejection of private law analogy.
But be it as it may, the problem - if not in its substance, yet
certainly in its form - was answered in the negative in his
great work. Here, as in many other questions, he ij*vean in-
spiring lead to future writers.
It would not serve any useful purpose to follow the opin- .
4)
ions of the numerous body of writers in those two centuries.
 stt por r,]-ieuse of private lav/by Zouche: p,71V of holland s
introduction to the translation of "luris et iudicii fecialis
explicatio ”, Scott’s ed.j by Wolff and Zacharia : Bulmerincq,
Die Systematik des Voelkerrechtes, 1858, pp. 36 and 106, res-
I)° f,i.y k.II.c. tV.s. 10,12,13 J c. V.s. 7, 10,lo,£9; c.
VI.s. 1.2.4; c. VII.s.1,2 a.s.o.
3) L. II.e.XVI. s. 31.
4) For these s. Bulmerincq op. cit.
-9“
But it is of interest to note how much the utterances of the
most representative publicists of this period remind one of
the way in which modern positive writers deal with the subject*
The Influential expounder of the law of nature in its appli-
cation to states and the commentator of Grotius* Johann Gout-
fried Helneccius,opens his great treatise "On the law of nature
and notions" with a proface solely devoted to a vigorous attack and by
lI)Heineoc-
upon Roman law as a source of authority in international law: ius
2 ) " v|
"Ea tamen nihil auctoritatis habit*® sit in deflniendis tn-
te£rarum £entiuralitious et controversies, enuippe, quae inter
se non alio iure, quam quod ipsa nature inter homines homines
parleque constituit> re^untur, quod in foederibus, pactioniburs,
conditionibus populorum*.* versator*" And it sounds like a
translation from the leading German popi<-ivistof 160 years
3)
later > when objecting to the application of Roman and Canon
law* he sas’s: "Qui voro si £«2is quaedaracum Turcis, vel Sinen-
4)
sibus, vel Japonibus de violatis foederum logibus expostulat ",
Bynkersaoek states coolly, without entering upon a
theoretical discussion that the Homan law " will not decide
51 and by
questions which belong to the law of nations"! n® ar«u®8 Bynkershoek,
f)— ia^menta iuris naturae et eontlum,” translated into English
in 1789- the learned translator did not, however, deem it
necessary to translate the preiace ’because it is principally
designed to show that Roman law can now iia.veno o^Uer authority
in deciding controversies between independent states* than as it
is founded upon principles of natural equity".
Z) •*iurisprudentia Homana, 3) Comp* riepel, Voelkerrecht
und jLandesrecht>p* 223-.
4) Praefatio, VIII%
b) m dominio raarisdissertatio,c.
-10-
1) ^
In another work from a purely positive point of views "The
Roman and pontifical law can hardly furnish a light to guide j,
our steps| the entire question must foedetermined by reason
  . - 'j
and the usage of nations. I have alleged whatever reason
* .' "1
can adduee for or against the question; but we must now see
what usage has approved, for that must prevail since the law
of nations is thence derived.”
The positivist milltans of this time Moser is con-
sistent to the end in his antagonism to Roman law. It is a
ridiculous petitio principii - he says - to decide disputes
between ffceepeoples according to the law of lustinian .
the object of the attack changes in the nineteenth Re^ cUon Qf
century bo far as Roman law is replaced by private Ian in
general. The positivist sci.ool on the continent, and es- ernpoeit, ^
peeially in Geraany, shows an ever-growing tendency to el- / , |
imlnate it altogether as a source of international law. It :.!
begins with warnings against exaggerated use of analogy. It
does not yet okelude it as a matter of principle, as some-
thing essentially different from the system to which it has
now to be applied. Moreover, writers explicitly admit the
possibility of ouch an analogy - within certain limitations.
Keyor says in his "Abschluss der Staatsvertraege *: The
$ $ / i « * • also Triepel p. 216.
3) 1374, p. 36,
-11-
rules of international law arc often only abstractions from
W> •''•• i:-’V N ’ .I
private law. Such application of private law rules to the
legal intercourse of nations is to be found notably with re-
gard to treaties.” And he adds: narguments from private law
are per se permitted, although they ought to be used with
I )
caution,” Of the same opinion is Bergbohm (he concedes only
a conditional identification of international treaties with
2)
private law contracts)1,
The rejection,, however, of private law on the ground of
general juridical principles is already at this time beginn-
ing to be advocated by such leading writers as lioltzendorfand
Bulmerincq. The first rejects not only Roman law "the anal-
3)
ogies to which are more misleading than enlightening”, but
«
also private law analogies in generals Methods of private law
cannot per se and in all cases be applied to public internat-
4)
ional law". And he adds, referring to international law:
"It can hardly be maintained that international law in decid-
|ing disputes between states (which areindependent) can follow
the analogy of private relations between individuals (permanent
5)
ly subjected to authoritative legislation)" .. Bulmerincq is
even more emphatic} he urges that the adoption of private law
1 ) loc. cit.
2) Staatsvertraege und Gesetze als Quellen des Voelteerrechtes,
3) Handbuch des Voelkerrechtes, XB85, I. p. 72,
4 ) op. cit. p. 126 . ; 5} loc» cit.
\
Meyer
'7
p. 79.
doctrines by international law liasimpeded the growth of the
latter and should never have been tindertaken. There is an
essential difference between the two branches of laws the
difference of the subjects of the respective legal relations.
15esee here already the beginning of a more systematic treat-
ment of the problem. But.there is no attempt yet to explain
what appears to be the crux of the problem: how do, after all,
conceptions of private law come and remain in international law,
and how does it happen that even the most sweeping positivism is
' ' . ' ' v i
unable to eliminate them; for instance, the vast field of treat-
ies?
There - as in many other directions - the important step mgjy^l
has been made by Jellinek. This great lawyer used to make only ersal in-
stitutes
casual excursions into the dotaainof international law. But
where he did so, he succeeded in effecting far-reaching changes reason of
g) , the thing
in international law theory. He rejects in principle any Jellinek.
analogy whatever. There is no justification - says he - for ,v
applying conceptions of a self-contained system of law as a  
ius cogens in-a quite different plane of law. Analogy - he
says - can only then be permitted when it is expressly recog-
' ’ ' *   ' . -.i ^
nised as a source of law by a given system of law. But how
T)-- Praxis and Theorie "der Kodifikation“des Voelkerrechtes, 1874,p.l30.
2 ) Els theory of self -limitation was,,l.i., one ox tae laostinflu-
ential doctrines in modern international law.
3 ) Rechtliche Hatur der Btaatsvertraegej 1880, p. *>1.
to explain the actual similarity of rules, for instance, that
1 - ' ' '
between the law of private contracts and of international
treaties? The explanation rests in the fact that both private
and international law contracts are "universal conceptions of
law", conceptions of general jurisprudence to which by the
very nature of tilingssimilar rules must apply. But these
rules are not taken from private lair% although private law
i has raised the universal elements of contract into the scien-
1)
tific consciousness
This view was not an original one. It had gs=£? been ex-
pressed as far back as 1845 by H.B* Oppenheim in his "System
des Voelkerrechtes “Private law analogy is to be reject—
2)
ed or when used .... to be ax^pliedcum grano sails ” But -
he adds - this does not apply to the relation of international
law to the philosophy of law. The notion for instance, o^ ,
property cannot be altered, no matter who is the subject of
this right. Also the nature of contract cannot be different in
i
international law, for instance , the rule that only a free
declaration of will constitutes a binding obligation} the same
relates to the rule "pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt" or
3
"nemo plus iuris in alterum transferre potest quaraipse habet".
- \  '•
15 loc. cit. " £3 op. cit. p. 8 .
3) We shall see that even these obvious rules of logic and
sound reason" are disputed by modern positivists.
' -14-
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But it needed Jellinek’s authority to establish firmly this
Qppenheim
theory of the legal universality of some notions common to
both branches of law. Uippold follows closely this line of
argument, and, adopting Jellinek’s view on the question, he
concludes the cliapteron the relation between international Hlppold
and private law with the following strong words* It is an
obvious task of the theory of international law to discard
' ..i
the looking over to other branches of law,,to constitutional
or private law, for tillsis equally as unjustified, as the
artificial filling of the unfortunately small building of
1) - i
international law with natural law ideas or political maxims *
As a precaution and a remedy against this mischievous borrow*'
ing he advises the creation and an adequate development of a
general legal science, of a general jurisprudence, including |
conceptions common to all branches of law. From this source
could International law draw the necessary reinforcements with-
out having recourse to private law analogy.
But it was left to Triepel not only to put into discredit ,|
the private law anal ogy/but also to banish it almost completely
as a problem of the international law of to3day. Be does not
deny that the theory of international law lias,in the x>ast,
taken over large parts of private and esx^eciallyof Roman law.
In common with other writers he explains it as
I) Der voelkerrecht liche Vetrag,seine Stellung Im Rechtssystem
und seine Eodeutung fuer das intern. Recht, 1894,p.91,
2)
: - : • "#   <ffI
being due to the dominationsor the natural law tendency In the
..., . - - -  \ - . •-
formative period of international law and by tho fact that the
Homan law - the ratio scripta - wass regarded as approaching
very closely the law of native. But he denies that internat-
ional law of to-day has accepted those principles. This was
undoubtedly the case in the international practice of the time
in which the patrimonial conception was predominant. But this
j V <.-T, , ,
conception is not only unworthy of our time - as Bluntschli
says- but it simply no longer exists* there remain only, he
continues, those cases in which states stand in economic re-
lations to e&ch other.,for instance, vthenvhey lend money to
one another, ^hen they take over a collective guarantee for a
loan, when they are in actual economic partnership and so on.
that rules are here to apply if treaties do not provide for them
and if there is no custom forthcoming to fill up the gap?
Iriep&l denies that there is any need toapply any of the ex-
isting systems. Neither does the Roman law form an exception ,
k to the general rule. Why should it be resorted to when one
or both parties have nothing or little in common with that
system of law? It is better not to adopt any rule at all,
than to proceed according to discretion. The damage is not
great. There remains always that eternal source of all law*
V T XXT%oelkerreehtl£^ss und Landesrecht (translated into French
in 1920) 5 s. esp. the chapter dealing with the rece|>Uon of
private law, 210-225,
2) for instance s. pp. 222,3.
'•'•ivr . •- . .. . . v • - • ,   . • • , - . . - , \
: ..  ‘ >, •/.:•. ;;, .. ' \ -  . .'-, ;r ur- -...•| j:*'k;>v•*  *’ '' .• .•-,r,y..  - .
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? reason and moral!ty, on which we way fall back whenever the
necessity arises. The reason of the thing is such that when,
for instance, private la?.*rules of contract and international
law rules regardin£ treaties happen to be identical, they are
not so as a result of analogy or reception, but in consequence
» i
of the very nature of things, Okie "universal law institute”
of Bergbohm, lippold and Jellinex.... This is also essentially
the view adopted in modern text-books. “International law - says
Liszt - is an independent branch of law ...j that does not
mean that the rich spiritual output of private law can not be
used for the purposes of international law. What really takes
place here is a developing of general notions and principles
*   1)
common to all law (£eneral jurisprudence) The recent writers
of the positive school, still predominant to&day in Germany, do
not fail to support their views on this or the other contested
subject by referring to the devastating influence of private
law. It is a commonplace to speak with regret or the damage
2)
done to international law by obsolete private law analogies.
Y) Voelkerrecht, 19181 p. 3as comp.“"alsoAllman, Voelkerrecht,
1908,p.24S. (treaty as an universal institute); also C. Hofer,
der Schadenersatz im Landkrieg, 1913, who devotes a whole eiiapter
to the influence of private law% the author, however, marches
the well-trodden path adopted by the text-writors, pp.16-23.
2) Strupp, das voelkerrechtliche Delikt, 19£Q,p.l37,n*l.j
Memeyer, *?/oelkerrecht,1923,pp. 126; Ruegger op.cit.p.427;
Schoenborn, Staatensukzession, 1913 throughout; Keith quoted
belows Anzilotti, Besponsibilita, quoted below.
TileEnglish publicists writing in the nineteenth century
, , x Roman la?/
confined themselves to one part of the investigation only; to adopted as
a source of
thau of the value of Roman law as a source of International internation-
al law by
law. But, within these limits, their answer to the English
wrjters
question is - with scanty exceptions - in the affirmative.
They adopt the private law of the Romans not only as a source
of international law in the historical sense,,as an evidence
of the part played by Roman law in the building up of the law of
nations, but also as a source for filling up its numerous gaps.
Unlike the continental writers they never discarded the idea that
Roman law is the source most likely to contain the reason of the
thing on any question of international law. From Wiseman
writing in 1656 on the "Excellencies of Roman law" to Westlake,
writers are almost unanimous in their opinion regarding the in-
herent capacity of Roman law to serve as a source of inter -
national law in all cases where there is no customary or con-
ventional rule at hand* It is regarded, indeed, as that general
or universal science of law which the continental writers con-
sider to be an urgent task of the jurisprudence of to-day.
William Oke Manning, one of the early writers of the nineteenth Manning
century, sees in the revival of the study of Roman law a guar-
antee for the future development and systematic ordering of
1)
international law in England. does not hesitate to explain
the fact wof the systematic writers on the law of nations having
l ) commentaries of the Law of Nations, 1839, preface,p.VI.
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all been foreigners*1 by the absence of a well ordered study
1)
of Roman law. Sir Henry Maine is even raor©emphatic .
He writes in 1856 in the Cambridge essays: "Englishmen
will always be more signally at fault than the rest of the
world in attempting to &ain a clear tfiewon the law of
nations ... There cannot be a doubt that our success in
negotiations is sometimes perceptibly affected by our neglect
of Roman law." liedescribes it as an absurdity that England
giould appear on the stage of international affairs unequipped
with the knowledge of Homan law. - Sir Robert Phillimore speak-
ing of the reason of the thing as a source of international
law pays a weighty tribute to Roman law*.. iO all nations,
whatsoever and wheresoever, this law prf;sentsthe unbiassed
judgment of calmest reason tempered by equity, and rendered
perfect, humanly speaking, bv the most careful and patient
industry that has ever been practically applied to the
2)
affairs of civilised man.'* Roman law is for him the
reason of the thing. It is a direct source of international
law. He goes so far as to assert the admissibility of re-
course to Roman law in the case of the interpretation of
< - ,   '’ _ -
Pj— xt is interesting to note how closely the idea of an
universal jurisprudence is being connected by Manning s
editor in 1875 with the affirmative view on Roman laws It
may be expected that one of the indirect consequencesof the
revived study of Roman law in Fngland and of Aha growing
desire to have the Law of Nations republished in a systematic
form, will he the introduction of a common language of
universal application in the wording of treaties. (p. 1*9.}
2) conmentaries upon International Law, 16/9, I.p. 34.
1)
treaties between European and Asiatic nations. Westlake
enumerates as sources of international law: custom* reason
and Roman law. He says; ” the rules whlc,.flowed into inter-
national law from this source are now incorporated with the
customary law of nations, and such is the respect.still gen-
erally entertained for Roman law which has been called written
reason that this part of the customary law is never contradic-
2)
ted even by the seekers after international right. The?epub—
licists may fairly be regarded as representative of the general
attitude of English writers on this question. The inquiry, inter-
esting from many points of view, how and why writers of a nation
having so little in common with Roman law remained staunch advo-
cates of its applicability to international law can not be en-
larged upon in this connection.
I 1 * 1'A
The American writers do not seem to iiavedevoted much attention
to theoretical discussion of this siibject,but they share, on
the whole, the view of English publicists. Chis certainly
applies, for Instance, to Taylor who thinks it is impossible
to comprehend what is now known as international law without
some understanding of Roman jurisprudence” for the simple *faerie an
reason that it is the philosophical basis of the entire writers.
3) ,
system ”, and to Halleck who, like Manning,connects
the problem of Roman la* with the demandfor a universal
Qp-gnr 2) InternT Law.I.p.15.
3) A*Treatise on Intern. Public Law, 1901.p.*0,21.
jurisprudence. 7He says: ”11 will generally be found that the
deficiencies of precedent, usage, and express international
authority may be supplied from the rich treasury of the Roman
civil law. Indeed,,the greater number of controversies between
states would find a just solution in this comprehensive system
of practical equity which,furnishes principles of universal
3.)2)
jurisprudence applicable alike to Individuals and states .
We are. so far, confronted by two opposing views: (a) by
the positivist theory rejecting in the name of independence
of international law every use of private law analogy and, gen-
erally, of Roman and private law, (b) by the Anglo-American
view which, taking into account the incompleteness of positive,
international law, regards Roman law as a kind of general juris-
'' • •'* >-i•.\ M
prudence to which recourse may be had for filling up gaps, as
well as for the purposes of construction. Neither of these
views may ultimately prove acceptable, but it must be admitted ^ ?rQnch
that both groups try to answer the question as a whole. This r^ Q^ lian
^cannot be said of the French school, Bonfils , Despagnet
H Baileek, Intern. Law, 1903,-p.i,0  „ , ^ ,ciri
2) Recent writers are, however, more criticalj s.i .i. iAi"rflJiey*0A
Essentials of Inter. Law,p.24.n.14.; or Fenwick,Int.Law, 1924,
Tralte*ni922,up.65.; he discusses the relations to polit.
} economy, to comercial law, to eeoeraphy, mathematics and
41 CoursC°i®io.pp.55. *>in th© monographic literature the intran-
} S t attitude of the positivist school finds, however, able
expression: s.f.i. Gidel, cited below; Merignhac, rraite, 1905,
pp.79. ^
and ©there deal at length with the sources of international
law and with its relations to international private law, to
constitutional law, to morality, to international courtesy,
to politics and diplomacy, but no mention is made of private
law proper. The same may be said of Uie Italian writers,
although notable italian publicists like Ansilotti and Cavag-
lieri, strongly deprecate any use of private law analogy, the
first in his theory of responsibility ojL states, the second On
1) '
his monograph on state succession, iiiisis only natural when
we take into consideration the great influence exercised by
German positivists on the Italian school of international law.
That, on the other side, the influence of the English con-
ception is not confined to English speaking countries may be
seen in the work of Rivier, the only French writing publicist
who deals with the matter in a comprehensive manner, lie
seems to accept the application not only of Roman but,gener-
t
aLly of private law rules - although he advises caution in
th$ procedure; “II faut proceder avec prudence et mutandis
mutatis, en tenant coraptetoujours du motif de la regie et
des conditions qu'elle suppose, ainsi que des obstacle que
peuvent raettrea son applications d'autres principes admis en ,
droits des gens." In dealing with themeunin^ of the phrase
wgeneral principles of jurisprudence" used in arbitration
Tt— Anzilotti” cited beiowj so also Cavaglieri (Ch.IV.)
2) Principes de droit des gens, 189 6,p.34,vol.I.jp.1^3,vol.II.
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treaties he is clearly of the opinion that in the absence of
the declared will of the parties, the rules of Roman law, being
common to various peoples of the international community must
1)
necessarily be applied.
The demand, so successfully put I'orwardby the positive
Under what
school, for the "splendid isolation” and the independence of conditions
) can the re-
international law from private law can be regarded as well- jection of
private law
founded only under the following conditions: (a) It must be be justified
shown that the writers advocating such independence are able
to maintain it in their own systems of international law without
introducing the rejected private law in a disguised form or
under a different name; (b)that this refutation corresponds with
the legal conviction of states as manifested in treaties and
in the practice of states; (c) that the judicial settlement of
> ’ * \•
international disputes takes place and is possible without any
^resort to private law rules and analogies. For, should an ad
hoc examination of the writings of publicists show that this
iconoclasrais only a matter of form and not of substance, and
that it is opposed to the practice of states and international
tribunals, then, obviously, the theory is as inconsistent with
the very principle of the positivist teaching as it is mislead-
ing, This chapter is devoted to the examination of the first
IT 11,175,; corap.on the other hand, $ys,I,p.206.;Calvo,Droit Int.,
1896, vol. l.p.165.
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of the three questions; it will also indicate the manner in
which the following chapters will deal »JLththe two other as-
pects of the problem.
No attempt can toemade here to give a dogmatic - historical
acoaunt of the use of private and Roman law in the formative per-
iod of international law. This task, although it cannot be per-
sued here, is certainly an urgent one. The usual sweeping state-
ment to the effect that the early writers profusely and indiscrim-
inately made use of private law does not convey any notion as to
how far in individual cases this analogy influenced not only the
writings of publicists but also the practice of states. What is
intended here is a critical examination of the attitude of some
 * «
representative writers who advocate or are supposed to advocate v
the elimination of private law.
We foealready pointed out how Gentilis the first writer
of recognised influence and the forerunner of Grotius is by no
»
means in the position to maintain the position of one ’’whobroke
iaway ft»omhis predecessors ... in giving up largely the attempt
1)
to c ast the law of nations in the mould of Soman civil law °
It is, however, Grotius himself who is most frequently
Grotius*
quoted as havin^ first drawn attention to the dangers of pri- attitude
examined ’
vat© law analogy. We have seen that a long and convincing
series of proofs in the form of extracts from his writings can
2)
be produced in support of this contention " But there is, on
\
V '
1) "P.F. Abbot7 Int»od7 to the trans'lationof the Hispanlcae Advocationis
llbri duOj Scott’s ed.£>.19a.
2) p. 8.
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the other hand, no doubt that his work "bristles with anal-
1)
ogies”, and C-essner’s statement to the effect that Grot-
ius* chapter on treaties reads like a Roman private law
2)
treatise mixed with natural law ideas is being approvingly
cited by marjyauthors. But this contradictory attitude is
amazing only when we lose sight of the fact that his warnings
are directed not so much against private law 4»wtas against
civil law, the two terms being by no means identical. Neither
does he mean by it Roman law as it is ccmmonly understood in
English speaking countries. What ue means by it, is municipal
law in contra-distinction to the laws prevailing between
nations. We soe that at the very beginning of the work when
he speaks of the "civil law both that of Rome and that of
each nation in particular"; or when he speaks of ambassadors
who are "not bound by the civil law of the people among whom
3) His civil
thev live "• and of the "representatives of provinces, towns, law not
J 9 to be cor
and others who are not governed by the law of nations but by fused
4 ) with
civil law” * or*when he mentions civil law pardoning certain either
* 5) Roman or |
crimes committed under necessity. It is obvious therefore private
law.
1) Dickinson, the Equality of States in Intern. La?/,1920,p.50,
2) Holtzendorf, III,p.11.5 Walker, A history of the Law of Nations,
p. 168,334.
3) L.II. s. XVIII.c.4.
4) L.II.c#VIII.8.4.
5) L.11.c,7X1V.s.111.
that those numerous statements by Orotius - and they appear almost
in every chapter, if not in .every section - in which he repudiates
the use of civil law cannot have the meaning attributed to them
now, that of rejection of private law as such. He used civil law
in thesense of municipal law,,of rules aiming at the "tranquillity
of one community". And for this civil law he could have no use
in his law of nations by which he understood rules applied to /
the intercourse b e t w e e n states and peoples.
But the most important consideration is this; Although he
did not identify the law of nature with the law oi nations# he
most certainly regarded the first as the oovious source from
which we may fill the gaps of tne “instituted B law of nations.
And the gaps were certainly bigger than the actual rules* In
this light the blunder of the earlier writers in imputing to
Grotius the said identifiestions^aftar all, not so misleading.
And what were the sources of this natural law? They, in turn,
were in most cases identical wit.athose rules or private and' His unre-
served
esoecially of Roman law which appeared to him of a sufficient-acceptenc#
of private-I
lv general character, and at the same time as suitable for the^a Roman /
law as-an
purposes of international law* He did not accept private lawevi^enCQ of
as having per se an obligatory force in international law but nature. ~ V. j
he certainly was taking over • under a different name - Its
rules and teachings whenever he doomed it to be an evidence
of the law of nature applicable to the given case, «na- -he
right hand of the buildeV of a more positive,system formally
rejected, the left hand of the treat expounder of natural law
'    ‘ V
1)
of justice and convenience was adopting with pretty far-reach-
ing thoroughness,
* * ‘
,We haye noticed how closely Bynkershoek followed Grotius in
the rejection of Homan law. But the same Bynicershoek is, on the
other hand, justly recognised as one whose recourse to Roman law
was/infrequent. He does not fail to supply an explanation of
this apparent inconsistencys BMon quod in iis quae sola ratio
commendat a iurs Romano ad ius gentium non tuta sit collectio"
Hatural law or the reason of the thing becomes thus the form in
which reception of private law takes place. "Quamvis non de
V. . >> /
populi Romani sed de gentium iuris prudentia agamus, non abs re v
taraenerit de iure Romano quaedam praemonuiisBe, cum qui id atidit
2)
vocem fere omnium gentium videatur audire *
'•, \
In a much more difficult position did those positivist
The "gener
writers find themselves who rejected not only private law but al juris-
prudence
also natural- law. Consistency would have led them to very con-of the pos
Itivist
f siderable cuts in their systems of international lavr.But nat- school,
urally enough, they could not afford sucn a consistency. They
put in the place of the emphatically rejected natural law "the
reason of the thing," "the demaj^ of logic" and "the principles
of general jurisprudence." It is not without good reason that
those writers who are anxious to eliminate the application of
private law regard it as essential for the development ofin-
ternationai Iasithat a science should ^e created which should
1 ) Q,uaest.iur. publ. L.I.c. IlTT
2) Be foro le&atorum, c. VI.5 fhillimore 1, 31,
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embrace the general concepts of law common to all systems,
international and municipal, private and public: this science
to be called general jurisprudence. We u&ve man that is
from this source that they explain the identity of the rules
1)
governing international treaties and private law contracts.
So far so good. There remained, however, the danger that this
general jurisprudence ndjht become a purely abstract philosophy
of law - the very natural law fr-ou.which thay wish to purify
1 ¥
the science of international law. General jurisprudence must
therefore., runs the argument., be an empirical one, drawnvby
means of a generalising Induction from the existing systems of
law. But here the real - and insoluble - difficulty begins; a
system of general jurisprudence meant as a generalisation froaj
existing systems of law, national and in -<rnational, has only
a meaning, if there are inexistence developed systems of law -
private and international - which can can form the constituent
elements of the higher synthesis. But is is obvious that in
eases in which international publicists resort to the so-called
general jurisprudence, international la*1does not contribute
anything towards this synthesis $ it simply draws from this
source when it finds - and it finds it very often - that its
own ru3.es, which it was called upon to develop in a compara-
tively short time and in conditions'where the border line be-
tween law and mere force is often not'distinct enougn, afford
  \
no answer. When# for instance, Liszt says that the sedes
i) p. a 'i
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materiae of condition (treaties under a condition) it?general
^Jurisprudence,ho needs must mean general jurisprudence of
private lav. When in international disputes rules of general
jurisprudence are referred to - what is meant is that not a
rule of one particular system of private law is to be applied,
but such a rule - necessarily a private law rule - as has gained
recognition by t l W^ ^ ^ r^ f civilised nations. This is so simp
ly because international law has not, in the particular case,
developed any rules of its own. This is pretty obvious. For
there would be no need to have recourse to general jurispru-
, \
dence, if there were an international law rule ready at hand.
The natural law performed, in the older days, the function of
a bridge between international and private law. The law of
nature was the cover under which international law drew from the
rich source of private, notably Roman, law. In the days of the
predominance of the positivist tendencies it is "general juris-
prudence" which is fulfilling this function.
Wow, general Jurisprudence is a very useful and necessary
notion for the pi:rposes of International law as science and for
the purpose of judicious settlement of international disputes
so long as it remains clear that what we understand by this con-
ception are rules which international law as such does not yet
contain, but which have actually evolved in the various systems
of municipal law. Naturally enough it is ruUss of,private
law of which we think in these cases; we do not think in this
connection of general £>rinciiJlesof criminal or administrative
V -
’general
jurispru-
dence”
meaning -
less and
confusing
unless
adopted£
as genera
jurispru-
dence of ,
private
law,
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law. Any other meaning of the term is liable to cause con-
fusion and to be grossly abused. Is the notion of succession
a general conception of all jurisprudence? What may safely
be said is that it is a general notion of municipal, notably
of private law. Its application to international law is de-
nied by a great number of positive writers of to-day even by
1)
those who regard it as a universal concept. The principle
res transit cum onere suo is regarded by the great majority
2)
of writers as an obviously general principle, but this is
doubted by some positivist publicists} and the radical
opposer of private law ii.B. Oppenheim would be surprised to
hear that the application of the principle neraoplus iuris in
alterum transferre potest quaiaipse habet, which even he re-
garded as a clear example of necessary juridical logic, is of
doubtful application in international law. It has been put
forward by a venerable generation of jurists that treaties
being contracts - a universal le£al conception derive their
rules not from private law* but irom general jurisprudence;
it is now seriously alleged by a leading authority that there
Z)
is substantially nothing in common between the two conceptions
It would seem that freedom of consent is a condition of valid-
ity of contracts in International and private law which must
be recognised by every legal order but this Is almost unan-
imously rejected by international law writers. And although
1) Schoenborn] op *cit•pp.3* 2) Oppenaeim l.p.
3) Memeyer p.
the prevalent opinion concedes the vitiating influence of mis-
take and fraud - precepts of general jurisprudence - there arel
writers who deny that the reflective private law rules are appli-
1)
cable to international treaties. The recognition by a
Hague tribunal of interest as a general mode of fulfillment of
obligations to which in appropriate cases ther esponsibility
of states is reduced, has been severely criticised by positive
writers - although other positive writers allege that modes of
payment and fulfilling of obligations are general - and not
private law - forms. Prescription regarded by the majority as
a general legal precept common to every community is denounced
by others as a purely private law notion. It seems that the
rule of the onus of proof resting upon the claimant party should
belong to general jurisprudence # but this rule - according to a
widespread opinion — is in international law subject to the j)rin*
ciple that the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges some
measure of restriction of the sovereignty of another state.
Recently again the notions of necessity’'and ’’self-help”are
described as conceptions of general jurisprudence., or order i>o
avoid the unpopular analogy to private law. - These instances
show that “general jurisprudence" either amounts to a general
jurisprudence of municipal and specially oi private law, or
where it assumes a different meaning in the intention of those
using it,results in a discretionary attempt at a modern natural
law with all the vagueness of the old but without its appeal
to our sense of right.
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t It is, however, the practice of states as expressed in con-
ventional and customary international law tiiatis beet suited
to give an answer to the problem in question. To the examin-
ation of this conventional and customary international law will
be devoted cnapters III, IV, and V. of this monograph. The
attempt will be made to shows (a) how, historically, the devel-
opment of international law has been facilitated, ifcay,made
possible by its close connection with private law; (b) to what
extent international law of to-day draws its strength from this
source. In particular, the theory will be examined which ex-
Conven-
Dlains the great influence of private law by the patrimonial tional an<
* customary
character of states in the formative period of international internat-
ional law
law The question will be examined whetherthe causes are not to be ex-
amined.;^;
deeper and whether they do not obtain to-day with an undimin-
ished force.
The classification of cases in which analogy occurs is
a difficult task, as there is almost no part of the internat-
l
ional law of peace which is not affected by them. .Themost
Bui table arrangement seems to be the following:
(a) We shall discuss firstly those cases of private law analogy
which arise in connection with int rnational treaties, especially
those instances in which a term of private law is used in a
treaty and the answer has to be given as to whether the rules
applicable to this term in its proper sphere are also appli-
cable in international law. Tim Instances will cover such
%
ccncopts as leases, mandates, due diligence.
(b) The second class embraces cases of private law analogy out-
side treaties: The influence of private law on the theory and
practice of acquisition of territorial sovereignty, on the de-
velopment of the conception of the freedom of the sea, of the
maritime belt, of the sovereignty of the air, of prescription,
of succession, of private law rules applying to interest and to
the measure^damages, to quasi-contracts,
I
(c) Thirdly, instances will be discussed in which there are
applied private law rules of procedure, as estoppel, res iudicata,
rules of evidence and arbitration.
The treatment of the subject is often being obscured by
reducing it to an instance of more historical interest. The
writers agree that private law notions and rules have been
applied by states in their dealings with each ocJier,but they
affirm at the same time t..at these cases belong to a period,the
political conceptions of which have now become i.otallyobsolete.
#2here is certainly a great deal of truth in thla statement,
itessionsof territory in the wav of gift, deposit, sale, ex-
change, pledge, marriage contracts and testamentary dispos-
itions as practiced In the seventeenth and eighteenth centur-
ies are no doubt largely the outcome of discarded conceptions.
Take, for instance, the treaty of partition of 1700 which dis-
tributed among various states of Europe the dominions of the
Spanish crown upon the demise of its monarch .
/
rj see c. T; 2 ] see philllmore 1. 269-27G.Trlepelp. 221
fxfior»tbr»r*.i\4±v>c\n. Vr*. vr>1 tt 1F^
Such and similar treaties can certainly be explained by the
patrimonial theory of this time. But it cannot, on the other
hand, be denied that the sovereign states of the nineteenth
century have by no means discarded soma of these ways of deal-
ing with each other. Sales of territory are as frequent at
the close of the last century and later as they were a hundred or
1)
two hundred years ago. In addition, a new private law form of
acquiring rights over territory has been introduced in thecourse
*of the last thirty years into International law; the lease of
territory. The importance of this Is not impaired, it will be
attempted to show, by being regarded by an overwhelming majority
of writers as examples of simple or disguised cession. On the
contrary, we shall have to examine whether this simplyfying theory
is justified as a le&al or even as a political construction.* The
practice of states adopts conceptions the justification of which
is otherwise strongly contested by a number of writers. frhebound
ary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela (1897) leads for
^instance to the adoption of the principle of prescription as a
guiding rule for the tribunal. And as recently as peace treaties
»
the practice of states again makes use of a typical private law
term in order to effect what some writers again call a disguised
cession: the conception of mandate. These and similar instances
l"} See for instance^the sale"of '’dominion"and "sovereignty*
over tiieWest indies by Denmark to the U.S. (ch.4. p. )
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ere frequently obscured by the fact that writers - or politicians-
regard them as deprived of any legal meaning, and destined prim-
arily to smooth the way of diplomatic negotiations. It is$>how-
ever, the task of a strictly le£al method to elucidate the
'juridical - not only the political - nature of these and similar
conceptions and to establish how far private law did supply In
a given case the elements of development of international law and
the new forms of legal relations necessitated by the complicated
| _
requirements of international life. ZS2-4
t. But the roostinstructive instances of the firowingin- Internatlwial
porbanco of the problem and of the need for its systematic arbitration
treatment are offered by the cases of International arbitration.
In the same measure as the municipal courts of law pass judement not
only upon the claims of the parties but also - Incidentally
upon the soundness of this life, so there is no better oppor-
tunity for testinc the practicability and justification of
certain international la* doctrines end conceptions than those
» cases of international arbitration which come into contact with
those conceptions and doctrines. Now, it is safe to say that V
there are very few case* in the judid al settlement of intern-
ational disputes in which the tribunal is not called upon to
deal in this or other form with this question.
The long array of oases illustrative of the problem in
question starts wit h the British - American arbitration comm-
issions cons tituted under the Treaty of 1794. The chief issues
in the deliberations of the commissions - the measure of
damages and the right of the tribunal to pass over its own juris-
diction - receive here a solution for which it took a century to
become recognised as an established rule of international law,
'Themost important cases of minor arbitrations in.the nineteenth
century were dependent for their solution upon application of
private law analogies. Croft, Yuile and Shortrldge, Colonel
i
Lloyd Aspinwell, Fabiani, Canada and ‘“illuimmay be mentioned
as arbitrations in which the questions of interest, damages,
1)
prescription, admission and estoppel played an important part.
It is, however, in the big and well-known arbitration cases that
evidence in support of tne general proposition put forward on
those rages will be sought. The Geneva tribunal in the so-
called Alabama arbitration of 1871 had to &eal not only rith
the meaning findscope of due diligence'* as applied to states^
and with the relative importance of the different forms of
culpa: the question of the meas\ireof damages, of the admiss-
ibility of interest and of the burden of proof in international
law proved of no less importance for the decision on tliemain
issues of the dispute. In the Behring Sea arbitration of 1892
between the United States and Great Britain, the question cf
the application in international law of conceptions of possession
and property, as applied to the possible object of an International
right, was widely discussed and answered in the judgment} the
theoretical problem of the development of international law 5^
H s, chapter VIII. ’ ' “
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in it© relation to private and natural law occupied Counsel for
both parties to a considerable extent, as did the question of
damages, of prescription., of the burden of proof and, partly,
of estoppel. In 1859, in the British Guiana Boundary arbitration
between Great Britain and Venezuela the doctrines of prescription,
of estoppel and especially of the Rowan law rules of occupation
played a great part in this lengthy case. In the Fious Fund Case
q£ 3_qq2 between the Unitsd States and Mey.ico ohe questions of
^prescription , of estoppel, and of the extent of the application
of the maxim of res iudicata in international law were the main
points which the court had to decide. In a series of decisions
of the commissions adjudicating, in 1903, claims of nations
against Venezuela the problem of interpretation of treaties,
which, indeed, occurs in almost every arbitration, and the appli-
cation of the private law rules of interpretation, as well as the
question of prescription, of interest and of damages are discussed
in the individual cases decided by the respective commissions,
i in the Venezuelan Preferential Claim Cane of 1904 the application
of private law rules of bankruptcy, of hypothecation, of negot-
' lorum gestio, of estoppel and - in a smaller degree - of causa
and consideration, of the onus of proof and the meaning of
"equity" seemed to he of paramount value in the arguments of
the ten states taking part in the proceedings. The general pro-
blem of the applicability of Roman law in international law was
discussed at length in the cases and arguments of several states.
In the arbitration between Japan on one side, and Great Britain
France and Germany on the other side, m 1905, the tribunal was
again called to decide on a question belonging primarily t0 the
domain of private law - the question of leases. In the Alaska
Boundary dispute of 1903 between the United States and Great
Britain the problems of prescription, of private law rules of
evidence, of interpretation (merger) and of the authority of
Roman law were argued at great length. In the Orinoco Steamship
Company arbitration of 1910 between the United States and
\ Venezuela private law rules regarding the nullity of judgment
and essential error were the real point at issiie. The Grisba-
darna case between Norway and Sweden decided in 1909 afforded again
an opportunity of discussing and applying the problem of pre-
scriptionand of Roman law rules of _ossession. The important
case of the North Atlantic Fisheries arbitration between Great
Britain and the United States (international servitudes) showed
*
again - both in the arguments of the parties and in the judgment
of the Hague Court - that the queBtion of private law analogies
}in international law must be dealt with in a systematic manner.
The Russian Indemnity Case between Russia and Turkey decided in
1S12 by the Hague Court is a classical instance of a deliberate
application - not only in the arguments of the parties, but also
by the tribunal - of private law rules, especially those govern-
ing moratory interest; the case itself was decided by appli-
cation of a private law rule amounting virtually to estoxspel.
Even the Casablanca arbitration of 1903 between France and
Germany - apparently lying totally outside the domain of public
*38
law - gave rise to a discussion on private law analogy with re-
gard to the meaning of self-help in private and in public inter-
national l&Tf.In the Island of Timor case of 1914 between the
Netherlands and Portugal the principles of interpretation as
applied both in private and international law were discussed
and the respective rules included in the judgment. In the first
judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice i^n the
case of Wimbledon.* of 1923, the question of servitudes once
more occupied the tribunal in.the determination of the character
of the Carman obligation to grant free passage to vessels through
the Mel Canal, Of special interest is a number of instruct-
ive cases decided by the American and British Claims Arbitration
Tribunal constituted under the convention of 1910. They will be
analysed in a separate chapter. Some of them may be mentioned
here: The Lindisfarn© (damages, interest, admission, William
Hardman (estoppel, equity, sources of international law nnd
use of private law ), Eastry (estoppel) , The King Robert
(estoppel , interest, assignment in international law), Yukon
Lumber (estoppel), Union Bridge Company (damages, lost profits,
applicability of common lav?rules of trover and trespass), The
Frederick Herring (possession, property), The Favourite, The
Wanderer, The Kate (estoppel, damages for prospective profits),
The Tatlep, The Sidra, Lord Nelson , Kewschwang (damages, pro-
spective profits)  - The Mixed Claims Commission between the
United States and Germany constituted under the agreement of 1922
furnishes soiaointeresting Instances in this connection, as docs
also a nuiHfaerof cases decided by the f-jipreaseCourt of the United-
States.
These-instances to be analysed in the subsequent chapters
show sufficiently that the problem is not of a purely theoretical
character. But they show also- tfe may say ^tartlyin anticipation
of the results of the analysis - how unjustified and superficial
is the attitude of cautious warning or of wholesale rejection
of private law as a source of decision or an eleinent03 de-
velopment in the law of nations.
87.
part of the law of land, ami those Acta of Parliament which
have froiatime to time teen, made to enforce this universal
lew**,are not to be considered as introductive of any new
rule, hut merely as declaratory of the fundamental constitution
of %&mkiagdomj without which it must cease to be a part of the
civilised world’*. it has been fully accepted by lord Mansfield,
8)
sruotingan identical decision of Lord lalboi; it has been
accepted by almost all English and American writers whd deal with
**ihlsproblem (Phillimore, Kent, Holland, Wharton, Wheaton), and
3)
by innumerable decisions of Courts. Should the notion of the
exclusively declaratory value of respective rules of municipal
law be taken in the meaning which it obviously purports to
convey then it is the best expression ever uttered of the sup-
remacy of international law and its ulti .ate unity with mun-
icipal law.
It is now, however, accepted » expressly on the continent,
and tacitly in England - that the rule applies no more. It mm
glriepel who, in order to Illustrate the complete independence
of both systems of law from each other, attempted to prove with
great learning and thoroughness that'the rule has been t&romn
overboB»d at least so far as Great Britain is concerned.
He availed himself especially of the well-known case of "Frankonia”
in crde? to illustrate his contention. What is, perhaps true in
this argument , is that that part of conventional international
X™' ’GoiSntaries:on''the""l^'^ofT^nglind,ISth ed. 1809.p.SO.
%) frieket et al.b* Bath, Scott*s cases of International law, X&2B p.3.
3} l‘orsos® instances see Triepel p. 138. 4} op.cit.p*134.-155*
£>8.
which alters the rights of British subjects will not feeenforc-
ed by British Courts before its adoption by Parliament. But to
customary international lav?the old rule applies with undimin-
ished force - provided always that the respective generally re-
cognised rule has also been recognised by areat Britain.
It is interesting to note how this subjection of the state
to a higher legal and moral purpose - and not its identific-
ation with these values - finds expression in the laostrepre- Its place
in polit-
tentative expounder of the Hegelian * idealistic philosophy of leal
state, T,E* Green. Me says In his "Lectures on the principles
of political obligation*** The .wrongresulting to human society
from conflicts betseen states cannot be held to be lost In a
higher right which attaches to the maintenance of *th@ state as the
institution through wMch alone the freedom of mm. Is realised.
It is not the state, as such, but this or that particular state
nhioh.by no jseaaasfulfils its purpose, and which might perhaps
be swept asrayand superceded by another with advantage to th®
theory.
* nc'\$for Milch the true state exists, that needs to defend its
1)
Interest by actions injurious to those outside it. le note
tlifisiaportantadvance faadeupon KegpX fs central idea. I'laa
state has.# it is true* the highest legal and moral v&lue# as
Its ultimate objects, but it is not Identical witn them. "Hence
there is no ground for holding that a state ia justified in
doing whatever its interests seerato require, irrespectively of
•40
C H A P T E R II
IHffiSMTIOmL tAV and PRIVATE LAW
The moral sense of hmanity, which fre-
quently underlay the much misunderstood "natural
law", Is asserting itself, and "'reason**to use
lestlake’s term, is shGviingitself increasingly
as a source of International law,,both as a
test of p r inc ip le for the rales established
by custom, as well as for the adoption of new
rules demanded toythe exigencies cf internatio-
nal life,”
Higgins, preface to the 8th edition
of Hall, 1924, p. VIII.
I?
%) ‘Cheduties and rights of states are only
the duties and rights of the men who compose
themn
Westlake,
Collected Papers, p. 78*
The doctrine of sovereignty appears in international law \mder
two aspects; (a) as the theory of positive interna.tion&l law, in
the meaning that it is custom and treaty as expressing thew ill of
states which are its exclusive sourcesj (b) as the conception ,
of state as being,of an absolute legal and moral value, summuia
genus in politicis, for which international law esisls lawfully
%nly so far as it is subservient to its self-preservation and
development. The first is a formal statement to the effect that
the wJll of the state is in law the highest category, the prima
tiietwo
causal the second defines in terms of values the ultimate eu&r- aspects of
* the doc-
acter of this formally highest entity as standing on a higher govereign-
legal and moral plane than ordinary human interests. t,y.
The theory of International law on this question stands
to-day on the whole at a point at which it has been left by
Hegel with nis conception of the state as an absolute end and
D 1 • • , : j
of international law as an external municipal law. The state
2) ' jQ•
is to him the realization of the moral idea, Tae object-
Hie absol-
ive spirit through which alone "the individual has his object- ute value
S)
ivitv, his truth and his morality, K "The state is the
march of God in the world. Its foundation is the power of
reason, realised as will* To form an idea of the state we
must not have in mind particular states or institutions but
4)
consider thoroughly the Idea, the real God* But this real
God stops short of the frontiers of the stales there is no
general rule of the international community. "With regard to
the relation of states among themselves, their sovereignty
is the basic principle* they are in that respect in the
state of nature in relation to one another, and their rights
\
are not realised in a general rule so constituted as to
have power over them, but their right© are realised only through
their particular wills5’.
X} Tt is inaceurate""tofcringBodin*s~theory of sovereignty
into connection with the modern Hegelian concept. Bodin’s
theory does not, in its essential part, clash with a working
interna.tional law - which carnet be said of that of Hegel.
Comp. Verdross op.cit.pp, 13.
2) Philosophy of mind (Wallace s translation ) p* ^63.
3)ibidp. 314* - . .
4) p. 320
5) p. 427; s. Dugait, The Law aridthe State,in Harvard Law
review, vol 21, where Hegel's theory is discussed in detail.
of the
state.The
state sub-
ject to
law only
so far as
it is
identical
with its
purpose.;
Hegel.
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The people as state is the spirit in its substantial reason ana
1)
its direct reality, it is therefore the absolute power on earth,
There is therefore no ouher law for one state as the purpose of
its own self as a whole, and the treaties concluded bv it can be
h)
valid only so long as taey correspond with this l»w. Here
is the origin of this famous saying of hggel that,the relation
between states is a relation of nindependencies'* which stipulate
^ between themselves but stand at the same time above these stip-
3)
ulations, - It will be observed how those two tendencies:-
i
the formally highest status ifcaderivedfrom any other authority
and the super-value and heterogenity of the state as compared
with ordinary human interest - support and supplement each other.
It is this latter aspect which is stressed in a pictur-
esque manner by Lasson who influenced the German political Lasson.
4)
theory for over fifty years, "The moral person which we
call state is at the same time a sovereign person. It Is
an aim for itself,,, It is simply unbound and unlimited with
regard to everything outsir-deitself,.. The state can not.,
therefore, be ever subjected to a le^al order or, speaking
generally, to another will but its own... It is an unbound
and unbridled will of selfishness". The problem of order
 A-"
between states is for him not a question of law, but of mechan-
ics. MTwo states stand to each other like two physical forces.n
X"J Grundlinlen der Philosophie den Hechtes, 1691, par, 258.
2) Op, cit. par. 331? par. 336,,
3} Edit.p.191., to par. 330
4) Das prinzip and Zukunft des Yoelkerrechtes,1871, 5) Op, cit.p.15.
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There is no doubt that it..wasespecially in Germany • Bosanquet
that these theories gained almost universal recognition, but
it would be a mistake to aasume that it had no influence out-
side Germany. The influence of Revelian philosophy upon
English political thought can not , X itiink,be disputed.
This is nowhere clearer than in the most typical represen-
tative of the English idealistic philosophy, Bosanquet,es-
1)
pecially in his "Philosophical theory of the state" -Uis
theory is, of course, based on whe '‘will’*,the general will,
the objective spirit which is sometaing quite different from
the volition of its agents or its subjects. It is, legally and
morally a supreme body not only in relation to ius citizens,
but also in relation to everytuinfc.outside itself$ its acts
are public acts and cannot be judged by values of private
"organised morality**  wIt liasno determined function in a lar-
ger community, but it is itself the Supreme community} the
guerdian of a whole i^oralworld, but not a factor within an
organised world. P.oral relations presuppose an organised
life* but sucita life is only within the state, not in re-
* 2) The moral
lations between,states and other communiLiea«'; The same sovereignty
of the
applies to the sphere of law, or, rather, there can be no state,
violation of law by the state. Because "an act which vio-
lates it© own law is not an act of state. And the state is
3 )
not subject to the law of anj;other scate*
 jjHJ1923, ' 2) op.civ*p.308• «3) p.303,n.<s*
• >
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That there could be such a th ing as international X&w - a law
binding .upon the state and independent of its will -is not oven
mentioned. How could it be if its publie acts are acts “of a
supremo power which nas ultimate responsibility for protect-
ing the form of life of which it is the guardian, and which is
not itself protected by any scheme of functions or/relations, s
such as prescribes a course for the reconciliation of rights
•1) I
and seeores Its effectiveness*? / ,v
Ho writer, however., expressed this view with more ,frank-
erich
ness than Erich Kaufinannin his monograph on the clausula’rebus Raufmaim
2)
sic stantibus. It is on lj tlm sincerity and consistency with
which he draws the logical consequences from the Hegelian
dogma that might, perhaps* appear appalling to sortiejthe
substance of his argument, the adoption of t,heclausula not
only as a result of superveni^n^impossibility of fulfillment
or of the fulfillment of an express or implied resolving con-
dition' s common to almost all writers on international law.
Kaufraanndoes not nee any possibility of a law between co-
ordinated entities - ho means states - unless the principle
3)
be adopted that only he vao has the power., has the right.
Tne state must stand above its treaties} the law of co-ordin-
ation which is the'basis of international law turns otherwise
4}
into that of sub-ordination.
lis t MMD des Voelkerrech.tes und die clausula rebus sic stantibus,
19X1. 3) op*Ci t.p.151. 4) p.153.
International treatiesfwhich are.baaed on the interests x>^th«r.(;'\ v
\ *> \
contracting parties^ must also bo determined by these interest^.
!\
LAh’X* \ ;>
rV X,
The only objective rule is the right of self-preservationwhie
the criterion of the international conduct of states; the
, -;Theright
right of solf-pre.BQarvatl.Qa can never coxaeinto conflict with ,=!$0fself-
[preserva-
international law dimply heo-.'uns international law is based onltion as the
primary
it. Hence the absolute validity of the clausula? treaties . source of
' *'- * e 1V; *';  internat-
should be binding ami are binding only so long as the con- ional law.
ki>  'ditions of power aridof interests nave not changed in such a /„ ’
siannerthat the essential provisions of the treaty are no more
in accord with the right of self-preservation of the contract-
2)
ing parties.
It is also according to Jellineic,the greatest German
’Jeilineis A
jurisconsult in the doiaainof public law, the will <5fthe state,
that through the process of self-limitation creates internation-
al law. It is not possible, nor is it necessary, to discuss ' ,
here in detail Lis theories. file,are Hegelian in essence and
* based upon the will of the state. They nave influenced in a
powerful raannernot only German jurists, but international
publicists of Italy* France and Great Britain. We way best
characterise them in Jellinefc's awn words defining the notor-
ious clausula: "Whenever, upon investigation, international
law is found to bd in conflict with the existence of the state,
' L. , , i  
the rule of law retires to the background, because the state
Is put higher than any particular mile of law.•.Intermitlonal
1)
la« exists for states maA not states for internistlonallaw**
fillsis Mis t&eoretlcal basis of'sodera international
law* It is not surprising that its eapoundera did not view
with sympathy any larger reception or private law* it sugg-
ests subordination to an objective rule and not a loose co-
ordination of sIU# it suggests interests valued by law and
laeasuredby it, but certainly not constituting the iornal ' V
S>
source and the ulticiatelegal foundation of its validity* it
suggests largely economic interests for the satisfaction of
•f
largely economi wants, and not interests of a pubiic, higher,
why this $ 
absolute value; It suggests# lastly, an loosing and manifold madam
conception
body of legal rules, legal thought antilegal experience always of inter*
national
ready to supplement a still undeveloped and rudimentary ays- law canno
favour an;
ten - and not a self-sufficing organise of la*, jealously larger
adoption 1
guarding its own npositlvityu and restricting tliesource of of privat
law.
its validity to certain historical events evidenced by the
“n-"5. .. ‘ •' 1tI,
^ will of states:- to custom and treaty.
2 }
X* “Source of law - says Oppenhciia- is the name for a his-
  ) » .•}'
torical fact out of which rules of conduct arise into exis-
tence and legal force.1* This may be readily admitted. But
there is nothing to indicate why these historical facts should
be limited only to such expressions of the-legal conviction
1}""System^ p V i) u < i u l $ op. cit.pp. 126.
2) vol. 1. p. 20* 5 He follows here closely Bergbohn, ^urisprudens
und Reohtsphilosophio* 1892. '  ..
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•‘"' ’ ' '•*’  . ’ .i
©i*states as custom and treaty Natural law, principles of The post-
. tivist
justice, general principals or law are also historical facts theory and
XJthe prac*
with a Tore© no less, soaaetiroes,than other objective events# tic© of -
states*
m shall soo, in the course oivthe analysis of modern arbi-
tration eases* how constantly the "principles oi justice and
Hths general principles of law," which are in reality gener-
a l l y recognised pri;ciples of private l**f*sip#applied both
by states and by international tribunals* The practice of
J>applying tbflflfti'ules is so unifona and constant t h a t i t
© a n b e s a i d t h a t t h e r e i s a c u s t o m a r y
r u l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l I a n t o t h e
e f f e c t t h a t r u l e s o f l a w q u i t e i n & e -
p e n d e n t o f o u s t o m a n d t r e a t y a r e t © ,
b e r e g a r d e d a s b i n d i n g i n i n d i v i d u a l
c a s e s * ihis sounds p«i*adoxical,hut it is the only way in
*vhichthe practice and the legal conviction of states can be put
within t e accepted loimula* Only with the proviso that It is
a eustonary rule of International la® that objective inter-*
national law saaysupplement the will of states, and that this
\ ) s. KeTsenT”clted belo% pT' WI ~~
gj TfoT eiaplfireferences with regard to the practice of atate®
see csstberft#ha competence <iestribunauaeinterneticmaux,
K,D,T*UC«, IM S * m * ~ w h Verdes# quoted belo»»
pp 1&0-1&&; Salvioli, La corte permanent© di 'guist
intemasion&le , Eivista di dir . int** 1924, 276 et
®@&*1 Koster* he*fonderaontsdu droit des £:en»* v
Vlsser* 1925, vol IV,pp»158-131* esp* XbO-181*
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objective International 1m contains Mining ra les never espress-
ly accepted by the®, only than, it is subttitted,may the tradit*
itional formula be accepted. Otherwise it is impossible to grasp
not only, as stated above, the practise of states, but also the
main doctrines of the positive school of to-day*
this may be sfi^n#for instance in the jsaannerin siiiclij?sod—
e m internalional law deals afltbt3s&eas-eor state entering into
tbs family of nations* Is It ask®a to consent to the existing Oppenhel#
rules? Jag it repudiate all or a part oi!t&ea? oppenheirars tlve bind**
answer - and that of the dominant doctrine - is quite clears "It Winter-
is not necessary to prove to r every single rule of intimation- law*°na*
al.law that every single raeiafee?of tilefamily of nations con-  '/•.
ccnted to it* Eo single state can say on its admittance into ttae
family of nations tiiatit desires to be subjected,to sucb.and
1) 1
such.rules of international law and not to the others0• n0n
the oilierhand - liecontinues - no state itbiehis a q£
the family oi nations can at sosac-tiia®or anot&er declare tbat
It will in future no longer submit to & certain recognised rale
of tiae law of nations*1* ffeef® is-cei-.;talnlyno on© sho would
dlsggpse witlitliisstatement. But it Is obvious, I submit,
1) vol."'$* 1p#‘" V i f""sl^aiso Jj£s'-mf€lcSk in Mieiaayair9sEt* vol*
f§*#*©, where he says: a rule is also then a rulv.ol general
international customary law, if all states which have cogs*
into the position of-applying this ruleiiave reeogniaed;it'
by custom, and VM& the nu®ber and.ih& importance ol*tbese
states is so great that one j&ayisnoi that cogent interests
of the international coraraunityare in the background of
tiiierule * - Quite the same is the opinion of lestlake* nTte&
consent of the international society to the rules prevailing
that the consent of states is Ifes no longer j^g&rded as the
accessary condition of the continued validity of an intimation*
al rule.- The consent of a new state isnot asked «t all,.It
cannot repudiate even one rule* Thisis raetby the fiction that
its consent is implicitly given by the fact of the application
for recognition* But this is no laorethan a fiction resorted to
in order to conce4 the objective binding force or international
law independently of the will of the particular state*
t The same principle ia thus expressed by Bluntaehllt 11It
y ' v..\
does not depend upon the discretionary will of the state whether ‘
it should respect or reject international law*** If Internation-
al law were only the product of the free will of the Individual
Bl&ntsch*
states, then a n International law would really be a law ofcon- 11.
tract;which means that no state would be under the obligation to
another state to respect international law where It&rules are not
sanctioned by a treaty* It la not quite clear why treaties should
-Zi
y|
bind states even after they have changed their will, why not every
1)
change of the will Is not a change of the law ”j or by 4s §§§ksI
' li.-
/i
-
:ti
in'li is'Wljbns^nt" oFthtFrnen who''are the ultimate reembersof
that society. «.henon© of those rules is invoicedagainst a
state, IV i* not necessary to show that the state in question
has assented to the rule either diplomatically ©r by having acted
upon it, though It Is a strong «rgu»sestif you can do so* It
Is not enough to sho* that the general consensu© of opinion
within the limits of European civilisation Is in favour of the
rulen( Collected papers, P»?8}| ort»«.even protest and resist-
ance m y be too feeble to prevent general consent from being con-
cluded fro© a widely extended practice ( ibid. p*33}2
1> p.60*
reffter: ’’I'her© Is namely a lww of nations emanating from the
heffter
inward necessity and not requiring therefore an express recog-
1)
nition fti or by Malls ‘'The ultimate foundation of internat-
ional law is an assumption that states possess rl^its and are
Hall
subject to duties corresponding to the facts f their postulated
2)
nature•"
ih© impossibility of maintaining strictly the positivist
hisat
standpoint of modern publicists is clearly shown by Liszt, the
author of the widely read text-book. He is a convinced positi-
vist, and his positivism find egression in the generally accept-
ed statements *international,law is contract, not law.* And yet,
when he comes to speak of those fundamental rights mentioned by
iall, he is compelled to have recourse to 11the conception of
different stales standing beside each other with limited scopes
of authority1*,to “the very concept of the family of nations",
to the n.logicalprinciple of the excluded third”, in order to
j
deduce frontthem a series of rules determining the rights
and duties of states* But nevertheless he repudiates ex-
pressly the Idea that the fundamental rights are natural law
f
fallacies* only - he says - without them international law
would not be possible at all. - This is even mox-eclearly the
4)
vic>wof bonfilSj Philllmore and Westlake; ” Reason is
[
a source of international law not only for the seekers after
international right, who will appeal to reason as a cheek on
x n j^ ~ W T T : — ’ s) 1924.p.50,
H) 1916.p.59 . 4) 1922.p.22.
b) vol.l.pp.14*
,) si*
custom, but tor all*Jf
Let it be stated quite expressly* what is bere submitted
is not that states are so connected with e*eh oilier &nd so
inter-dependent that, In their oa» interest, they needs must
acknowledge the objectively binding force of some internat-
ional rules# 1'bfttwould be a .merelysociological inter-
pretation oX interstate relations* 9>hatis urged is that
modern positive international law is not in the position to
build up a positive system in the restricted weaning usually
attributed to it* shy this is impossible ano why inter**
l .' ’_ <;l : . .
national law (as Indeed all law) must be and is based on an
objective rule, is being shovm with vver-growing clearness
by a number of leading publicists* 1 shall reier here to
Kelson, Krabbe and I-u^uit,the influence of whom upon the *;odern eet%
theory of international law is even now consid rable* It
will be examined, on t o other hand, in what degree the visttheory
essence of this tendency is contained in tbs classical
English doctrine that the law oi'nations Is a part of the
law of the land, in the meaning that the respective mm* , V
icipal rules have only a declaratory value.
It is generally accepted - says Kclsen - that it flows , :
from the very conception of international law, that it con-
stitutes a community of equal states* wi’heconception of the
co-existence & f many stipes » M &h$ notwithstanding the actual
differences in size, members of population and real power, are
of the sarselegal value and united in one coi.Juunityof a v
higher ordor, is an essentially moral idea*** but it is possi-
X) VO*l*pp*14i
Lble only with the aid of a juridical hypothesis* that ebove the
ooramonwe&lthdescried as state there is a legal order which de~
tines the r spective scope of power of individual states toyfor*
bidding the encroachment of o m into the sphere of another. a
legal order which regulates the relations of states by means of
rules equally applicable to alls InWntotion&l las does this -
but only when its supremacy over the legal systems of individ-
ual states is recognised, when - to speak in the usual descrip-
tion - it is contemplated as a legal system standing above the
states, that is when the legal systems of individual states are
regarded as component parts of a universal order embracing them
1)
aU. "
Thus, we see, the state ceases to be an absolute legal osderj
it becoxaesa l.gal system derived from the universal rule of law*
It is subject to an objective rule of law, although not necessar-
ily to a super^ate in terms of a coercive system, 'ahis is the
central position from which Kelson attacks the traditional dogma
of sovereignty. But his teaching interests us here only so far
as it expresses the idea of a state, whose legal value is not
absolute, but subject to end originating from the existence of
an all-embracing international law.
the doctrine basing international law on the sovereign
Xy'rr,'15er'~Begr.ifftieroduveraeniiaet .und "die Theorie des VoeUrarrechtes,
. l S 2 0 . p . 2 Q 5 . '
2) Attention may be drawn here to the strictly normative way in which
SsXsen deals with the qu stion. It is w&%ftsociological,m*0 xmn% .
in terms of social solidarity (jpugult)or the innate sons® of ri^ t^ ^s /
or of a•real world-severeign endowed with actual force (Lansing)
upon which he bases his theory of the supremacy of international
law. He admits that, in juridical logic, international law rules
• '• . , ’•   ,   '  ” . •" .
sill of the state is no less vigorously attacked by Dugult *
who denies both the real perse*nality and the *grill” of the Duguit
state. He points, in an argument
almost identical with that of K i lsen,toU^ fact that the theory
of fundee ntal rights, whieh reconciles the doctrine of sover-
eignty with the necessity of an international 1m 9 turns in
a vicious circle. f,Inorder that the personality should he able?
to have subjective rights it is necessary that it should be in
relation to other personalities^ it is necessary that there
) X
should he a society subjected to an objective law* Itis im-
possible to explain objectiveinternational law by theexis-
tence of fundamental subjective rights of states, because such
rights cannot exist without there being a society of nations
1)
subjected to an objective international la*. lierepudiates -
in accord e»ithKelsen and Krabbe * the idea that rules of inter-
national law are addressed to mystical entities called person-
ified states. They ere addressed — he says - to persons* to ison,
to individuals $ho are delegated by the state la® to periorxft
2}
certain functions * The will of those persons is not the ere-
) ' ' .
ating cause of a legal relation, but only a condition under
3)
which an objective rule comes into application. this ob-
jective sup^rnational rule is based n on the international
legal consciousness, that is, on the conviction oi s&assesoi
rmtis - ' *   :_
and”tKiHBiad’iajj force of treaties deduced also from the will
of the state and its constitution* Xt is for the jurist to choose
on© of tine two fundaisent&l hypothese&i that of the supremacy ox
state law or of internetional law. Both ere possible, it is how-
ever, impossible to adopt both. - £rm the point of vies? of the i'or-
m&l Kantian principle of unity of sclent ific method, upon which his
theory of pure jurisprudence Is based.
1} U’r&it©da droit eonstitut. 1921,vol.1*PP•100,5&9j
• 2) op.cit.p.560. S) pp. 662. et seq.
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men belonging to different states and entering Into relations
with each other, that It is just that a certain mor*>lor econ~
im
 mXc rule should be ssnction&dif necessarytoythe use or force*
It is the same tendency which ftr&totoehas developed in his
two fundamental workst Me meets the classical doctrine of
the will of state as the exclusive force of international law
4)
|fiththe unanswerable objection* If this doctrine is true
then international law "would SjKftediatelylose its validity for
5)
any state which revoked Its sanction to it*” He finds the
T) op. clt* p.105. fhis part of fcuguit*steachingis quite inde-
pendent of his rejectionof the juristicpersonalityof the state*
co$$» here the preambleto the declarationof the Eights and Duties
of nationsadopted by the American Instituteof InternationalLaw,
January 8th» 1916, (r*Whereas,the nation is a moral or juristic
person, the creatureof law, and subordinatedto las as Is the
naturalperson in politicalsociety) with the coM^nt of B* Hoot,
in addresseson Internationalsubjects,1316, pp.416 et se^f*
2) cojop*also the modem natural law theoriesof Kelson,Rtchts-
®i*tsensehaftohne Recht, 1917*1 and Maussbach;
5) &ouveraenitaetdem Kechtes,1906, anti"3?hemodern idea of
statef (translation) 1919*,
A) ihe saiT<equestionis put with great fores by Kelsen,Buguit,
* ' Kelson ana by Bar (Grundlageund Xo&ifikationdee Voelkerrech-
tes, Axchlv, f* Rechts-unci*irtseh&ftaphllosophle,VI, 1912,
pp.148^
binding force, of" international law •in the amm source m that of
national l«w » in its spiritual m txim and in the fast that it is
1)
a produet of sum *3 sense o; ri&ht *International law is $is~
tinguishad f r w natlo&sJL law nov in respect *o it® origin aad
foundation, tout In respect tv;the extent of the eoisuunity to
2)
®h±®h its seaaands apply-. Uhis view is rewritable beemtse of
th© thoroughness of xrabtouf» &tte»pt to destroy the cession and
well established fiction of the obligations of the state as being
l!>
quit# different from Use obligations of particular individuals 0
called upon feyconstitutional or international law to fulfil cer«*
tain functions# .Kho is the. subject of international obligations?*
“If they are' of public interest* then those who are entrusted by
constitutional law with the care of -these interests are the subjects*
for eiaf^le, e judge who by virtue of a treaty has to validate the
subpoena of. & foreign court#•* Coes it have » hotter sense, if the
stats' as a eon unity of Interests Is regarded as the subject of
such obligations? #«*$bere have been states wi thout a judiciary,
without legislation* without a postal service#** New Interests
appear eftMm the field of lew* old interests* such m religious
ones i 'a re -veao ro*-from i t w# I t U m% t jw ques tion o f sub jec ts o f
international law which upeotally reeomNftftds its-If here to our
-I ' - ‘  •• ' , ‘'' v ''   \
attention 4 It is the searching analysis of the Amotions of a
state and their expression in terns of ordinary human interest
T T “ b1 6™ ~~ jST" 114,1 5) p,fe41 .
56.
and obligations, detached from the absolute conception of a
state standing shove tbs law * It Is not surprising therefore
that lieprefers to speak or a s«per-national la?^’1since it
esspressesthe idea that we ©re-dealing sith ftlasttibicfcre-
gulates a eomunlty of men embracing sever®! states and which
possesses a correspondingly higher validity than that attaching
to national law. a X) 2)
) these are the mod rn forriuletionsnot only of lolfffs
eiviias lafctlma,but also of a still older theory - of the
classical English.doctrine of the m m declaratory character classies,'
doeferineo f
of tiaose parts of municipal law which give effect to intern&t*-lnternati©»
, ml 1m m X
ional law* It la the idea to which Blackstone has given great part of thi
law of the
ami lucM ejsprescions8**. The las?of nations... Is here adop- land,
ted In Its M X extent by the common law, and is held to “bea
ij '''p.'^ 4o*'" "
2 ) $‘hereis no doubt that the science of international law
is no longer satisfied with the sweeping rejection of what is
called "natural" or noh^ectivewinternational law* The general
criticism of the doctrine of sovereignty tends naturally to
destroy the theoretical foundations of the purely positivist inter*
inatlon&l law* - See, f.i.,as an illu trative example? l& Fur, he
droit natural ou objectIf s fetend~ll nux rapports Internetionaux ?,
1925, 1-8, pp. 69-^ 0. 'Wm article is written as a
reply to a question,submitted toyProf. Mieme^er to & number of
Jurists. *fhefirst fart of the question is* Is the theory of nat-
ural law as taught ’toyOrotius in application to international la#
and as applied in,the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still
in force- that Is have international and national tribunals , as
well as arbitral tribunals, to follow the principles of this theory
3m order to supplement and interpret intemstionaljjositlve 1m
as created toy.the will of the states? le Fur *i^rsde eide&ly in
the affirmative* " /V
m *
pm?tof tb# law of iisjaS,smd of PfcrXissa&stekloii
£«© £$m fcfm to t£a» team®#m m to ®rd'®?m m u m X vmm l
not to to oo«sM®i?ei| mm In tro d rn t tm of mm
iftalo*tsat m £®qZ®v8%&&p of tis®fm%3&aeatalconfttitnfeliBsi
of’Um kliigttoiwithout *bioh it mat o$$s$ to im & Mfi of the
1)
eiviiisod $or24 • it to h# Lonf a^sli@M*
u^otlag #u Identical doel&Iori of ta*& l&lfeotf It im® t»«&
soeepted ijgr&teost a&l Hgg&isl* fcsdA®©ri©a» tir&tors ill cte&lstiUi
(PhllllffiOt^iKHlst*xiOXi&llCi*i^tSS&JPtfSEI*W£jfUi&OIl|*8£ld
isgrIrnasmamm* deeisioKm of G&m%m+ gtemldttbe notionof the
MUQP»t 0if voluo of respectiverolas of mmlvlp®X
is# im Mcft& in Use ihiob it o&vioaalypurport®to
mamm$ %mn it is tin teot,<sx*uw8*lor*w p uitoredof tlm aap**
r^mojr of'iaituxmiiooal .sadit» ttiU #.teunity «ISIk *
ieip&X law*
It is sbf 2 » A cc e p t e d - «s|>FCsalyoa th« coatisMsat,
«ad tueiti^ in lagisad - tt*& tho ami® wiles no « . It was
~yri&p&%W&&0 l» ordor to fcllwatiMUt&s ecsepi.ftt©
<*rfcotfc.syatos*m tem f»m *$*& o u w # to p m n m
grtot Xosrn&ng tb*& tbttrtil*z&*«*to&snitan
4)
oi»rfeoi8»int Xta-t $o fiijpa® &r»eatiMltmin $»
s» tfcte^M1oe^ciai&f #f Us® e&ce of
$m m&m to his « « M | S 8 | ft£*t Is, |>*£&W iK t in
tM n m$mm& * io um% t*km%pm*t of mmmmk&mmX tn U rm t iom l
! T we 5^ m S iF i is ’,m l^ ^ s E wH rl^ S iB 6 # VM i m *
£i trioket at &U&* *s*tte»Scott#amm& of is^ mtioimX x**f
For so» featws aoo t rm m l F« 138* 4) «^ *oit#|»*Ui**M§#
a&isfc the rl^it.• of British «»fej*«ur t U l not br &nfor©~ '
e& feyBritish aortas before its adoption fey *a*lUmx&+ But to
oustaaary S&t&rmtimmZ im the o M a»u1a agpltea with ttfgUalo*
ia&e4 iloro® - piwldcd &lsjky* tlmi the r&epdotira gaMroaXg i*~
«o*£Bloeairule has also l*s^s roeogjsiaed by ( MAI firltfttiu
- . '.;».':v-'
It is ifi&srostirigto xiateliostMs mibjttotioaof tihaatsi#
to a kilter logoi aad jokpsIpurpom *•& M aaotIts ideatlfio*
„&tiou with U^se values - Qxpeeaaian. in itoemat repi^** JQtepl&s#
j lii
©esst&tivo«apou®&®rof Uw - Idealisticphilosophyof leal
at&toy t*ll*Orson* 3a a&ya in &£$ "Lecturer 00 til©prlaalfOUM*
Of political obligation** ffe» arxtang reailting tohwmm society
Xrom eossfiiets fcetwen statos ««nnot fee J&&M 10 \m lm% In &
feigim*rig&t «iiioh»tt#«boato lim sftalntananeoor -Xlm state m tfcs
institutionthroughiM«h alone the?freedomof turnis raaXiaad*
It la not the st&to, a© aucb* toutthis or that particular atfcte
a&ioh by no mans fulfils its s>urjR*ao# isMch jatgjhtpas&ap#
He $»©$i as*ay •$»& su£&rea&o& by another witii advaatagi* to ttm
JmsAm lor « M tlso trus state- exists, ttot mw&& to gtfftoaaits
interest % act-lone injuries to those outs to* it. Be
%km important &$v&nm mdm -upon U®mXrm oantral M#«* 3&*
at®to ts&o* it ia tn»» t o fef&Mftttlegal au$ antral vfclu&a m
it® ultfe*&£o ofejaota* !m& it la not lasntic&l wiV; tlsesi*&mwm
thwm is no @r<mt& for holding » state &a justified in
cioliigafe&taver its Mflragt* aoeta to raqulsv* irraspvstlvttly of
I f
mms-' i jag®
"0 .: /^ r
m .
x)
of effects on other mail*n“ Westlake's r.ormulsuAon - quit© a
Kantian one - Is only a variation of this conceptionjh When
ftstate has to avt although a rule is wanting, it ought as far
as possible so as to act that a rule might be ir&med on the pre-
2 )
ced«ntM There is no right o f action flowing from the alleged
absolute character of Use state; Hneither in violating the
rule nor in acting where a rule is wanted is a state at liberty
consider only its particular case, without reference to the
conduct which would b© best suited to the causes which most comm-
only arise^ S) ‘'J
lj ps 173s comp. Hobhouse ~'uThe metaphysical theory of state”; pp. 118.
g) p. IS.
3) ihere is, perhaps, no writer on international law who surpasses
Westlake' s broad , universal1stic- one would say, pacifist- point of
view* Discussing the srgum&nt that the special character of the state
as an indispensable institution puts it higher than the ordinary stan-
dards of law and morality, he says* ttBut although it is certainly in-
dispensable for the welfare of w©n that they should be associated in
some tie, it does not follow that their welfare imperatively requires
the maintenance in its actual limits, and with resources entirely un-
impaired, of the particular state tie in which they happen to be en-
gaged. 0 (p.113,Collected Papers} .- 4?td this is his opinion on the
^ H ght of self-preservation1*? it (seIf -prem w ation) is no doubt a
primitive Instinct and an absolute instinct so far as it has not toeen^
tamed by reason and law, but one great function of law is to tame It.
( ibid. p.118) . - this conception of the state as a moral being subject
to legal and moral rules is given clear egression by the American
«oolsey (introduction to intern, law, 192.sec.15fi) "It would be strange
if the state * that power which defines rights and tm&m them, real, which
creates moral persons or associations with, rights and obligations, should
have no such relations of its o&n— should do a physical, and not a moral
entity1’.- fhere is nothing in this rejection of the moral and legal value
of the state pro ford extarno which necessarily involve® the rejection of
its ultimate authority pro foro Interne, within its borders and for the
purposes of its municipal law. The sovereignty of the state is quite
acceptable if it is understood mb a quality conferred by international
law, by the highest X*$eX order. Tim sovereignty of the state is in
this case a delegated power, fihis.ia, for instance, the conception re-
cently developed by Verdross (Die Binheit des rechtlichen Veltbildesi
g|j|  .•- Y ' i ' ' 1 . - , , *, 'V ' ; .J1 - ‘ , ' ' ' 'V : • "•' t’ *'
:m
§0*
SWU* aurwy o f some of the modern-and less modern-*tenden-
cies In internation&l law nmi political theory was nsoessary,
t % .
fo r the purposes o f the proposition put forward on these pages*
in order to establish (a) that positive international law can
be accepted only in the broadest meaning as ©xprtfaaizit^he
le^al conviction of the international community, but not as
restricted to certain historical forms(!«#* treaty an*ieue-
toa) in which this legal conviction of states finds its ex-
pression or, to put it again in the terms of the current
theory: \here in « customary rule of internetional law to
the effect that the actual will of statesas evidenced by cus-
task and treaty may and imisthe supplemented, when necessary, toy
such rules and principles, until now unrecognised, miIch cor^~
•^espondto the nature of the legal relation, to rules of justice
im r iiedocs not speak o i the supremacy of international law$
he prefers to speak of one world-embracing legal order with the
rules ox interational law at its topj although it must be ad-
mitted that sovereignty in the meaning of a quality conferred
by a hij^herorder conveys a contradiction* Tne sovereign power
cannot, in law, be delegated. This sovereignty would have to
be qualified as *’internalsovereignty-11 In'this case there is
no need, for the purposes of international law, to have recourse
to the attests (s.Laskis problems of Sovereignty, Foundations of
Sovereignty) at & total rejection of the legal position of the
state within the borders of a historically given community* if
states cannot be regarded as sovereign creators of ixitcrn&tional
law, they can be regarded as indispensable units, with special
coEEpctoncc,of the international community.
4} it scornsthat the present tendency is to develop the English
political theory, especially with regard to international re-
lations, on the lines both of the imiversalistic conception as
given egression by Blackstone, and of the sociological rather
than the idealistic-hegsllan theory of state. Professor Kobhouse*s
^iSetaphysicaltheory of the ot&ten wiUt# it is believed, rank as
one of the most powerful works in this direction.
ihe func-
tion of
private lai
as supply-
ire the
legal form
wg neral
principles 1
of lavr’and
principles
of eciult?/.
and to general principles of law*,-ie Shall #e« itel1those
rules of justice and geatnl principles of law are, in the
overshejUung majority of eases, clearly lormlated toyrules of
private la**.
here lies its it^portance.• It Is lor no other patrpose
that the question or the positive character of International
JUm »as discussed here at eemsid:ralue length than to r the
sake of illustrating tho view that- given once "equity"
justice" , "reason**,nreason o£ the thing®, "general princl-
pies of law’*as recognised rules of international law- it is
private las which gives shapesand definite form to those gen-
eral sources, here lies the organising and ordering pafct
played by it* ihose ^general principles" threaten otherwise
to degenerate into altogether subjective natural la* or le&al
philosophy. In the general principles o f the universally
applied private law the* find, in theory and in practice, a
system ox rulus built upon experience and upon infinite intell-
ectual labour. It may or m&y not be accurate when some
authorl-sa„ that, £or instance, the adoption oi rules govern-
ing fluvial accretion is not analogy to private law, but simply
application of common sense,, hut even granted the accuracy of
the statement, it does not say anything elsethan that it is a
rule of private law which embodi©s here a principle ol cojamon
sense* (Most rules of lav embody a principle of com*on sense.*
  ‘ \ .
hut it takes sowotiaa&ayears, or centuries, of wars and waste
to give to an obvious principle of eoim&onsense the authority
;
VMi-
of a rule of iM« International law furrnisheammy instruct-
ive instances*} Private law supplies its forsaullion, its
definite shape, Its justification in the world,of experience•
ih&t is just itB functio <as a.source of legal reason*
(b) ’ihutthe asfcsphysiealcharacter of internalional
relations as placed above the law, because Identical with Sfc®char-
acter of
txiowsovereign will® of the state/is toeinggradually dls- internetion*
carded, and a marc,huaan and more direct relation of rules
of internetional 1m to the moral and legal im.lt3, that is
al relation!
to the individuals responsible for giving effect to these
rules,is gradually toeingadopted* In this plane the appli-
cation of private law does not appear to bo of a demoralising
or confusing influence upon the "public lar*character'1 of in-
ternational law. Because the possibility of private law
playing any part at all in the development of International
law ie conditioned by the acceptance of the view that acts
of states and of their organs are fictionsof nen, for ordin-
ary human purposes, governed by standards of Justice, moral-
ity and obedience antiaccepted by states and their peoples
in their dealings within ti*eirterritory. It is conditioned
by the recognition that the interests of states are only in
a certain degree different from, those protected by other
collective bodies or even fro& those relating to individuals*
For, it is submitted, there is nothing in these interests
ahioh is inherently different from the interests protected by
law, by private Ian* pihey&re not of the highest order* It
might -besaid that individual interests are chiefly econoid®,
isfcereaethose of the states ere politieui in their character,
but'even if this is so, It «% ht not to be forgotten that, as a
rule, the*political activities o.fstates in the fielA of intern-
ational relations are primarily devoted to the safeguarding
of the collective economic interests - no matter under which
disguise they happen to appear, $hat gave to them- and still
gives** thin mysterious aspect of absolute hetero£enity, of
supremacy*'is their inde-endence from tbo&© evtrmon standards
of law and right nhich govern the relations o£ individuals
and groups of individual® under the s^.y of municipal la»*
In the measure in «?hichthe necessities of international inter-
<* x
course o p - sometimes- public opinion f ree the governments
to give up this postulated ind pndence trsm the reign of law—
in the earn measure international law advances and developes.
XT' lion greet is the"'influence "o't'this co^ -on concept ion of t M
public cimr«ct r of international la??, and of the necessity
of establishing dirf© ent standards-r legal and moral - for ibe
purposes of internetional law, can be seen from the following
opinion of a leading legal authority: H.*fco think of the moral
respfcmsibil ty of the British Empire in t«x6ms of the mormX-
autieaof a single man. ,* is to put juorals in terns of lass, not
las? in term of morals, as we did in the classical ere. In
truth & mral order among states is not the simole matt©!? «bteh
the analogy of the individual mind has made it appear. ffcera
are numy difficultlee, psychological,economic and biological
that --&$%• the analogy of politically organised society to tin©
imividi^ i human being itwholly misleading "{l,cscoe Pound. - .
rhilosophical theory and International l»w#Mbl. Visser •,vol*XI*,
p*79) *- It 1® submitted, with r^eat deference, that this la
just the view, which underlies the modern theory of inter»a*io 2sai
last and the results of which .are, also according to Dean Pound,
by no.means reassuring* Tt©ought certainly to put law in tei-iaa'
of Uior&ls/but to put different standards of morality for. In-
dividuals acting as such, and for individuals acting ua Mjators
of a family, of a corporation or of a state, is destructive
both of those moral standard* and of the legal value of prin-
etpx®8 which are derived £***,.Unm. n * m3.8l reaporatbiuty
^" -v-^vO'Vr .. VV-.;.   ^ * •
Along w ith tills,the?conviction mist gain is strength that
' between.individuals,autonmao-usgroups and states there Is
a legal diffemnee of degree onXy*
It is-especially neceasar^ to discard the uncritically
accepted and n&slea^ing notion that whereas private law is above
the subjects of law, International la* is % law between them*
and that* therefore, cmsry analog is inadequate* Both inter-
national and private law are composed of external rules of
conduct Khich, once given their formal existence as law, are
independent-in las, not, of eourae, on the plane of facts- of
the will of the parties or the subjects of la#; it is a law.
above them-in both cases, it is true that there is a differ-
ence in the mm m r in which the rule of law la created* In-
dividuals give their consent, on the tfhole,through the mach-
inery of ssunioipallegislation! states, 'theirnumber h«.ins
small* give their consent directly, in treaties, particular
or general, But even this is not always the ease* In « great
number of cases they are subject to international rules in
the creation of thich the;?have no part whatever* States are
of’a i i B s i V oo-QXtoiiisiVe'iritis'tiisatoral responsIbility of
i,:elr citizens, or of those elected by them* It is a moral
responsibility of vmn. This was Just the great historical
function of the classical international las and of its ex-
pounders that “•••it appealed to imn and took account of
iaen*»*Its obligations were the obligations of personal sov-
ereigns as individual men and its rules were imposed on
those sovereigns in their capacity of individual mn f*( ibid,
p*?6«) » fl*hemodern positivist theory discarded this appeal
to mn for the sake of the' higher right of isaper^onal states*
certainly oo-or<Sincted legal sntilies. Th%$ mm& tli& t even if
eights Ere not a«tuaXXjr •quftl'« tftfc?w e neverth*..-less
1 lj
equal .beforeth# le$r» But this co-ordination praa^pposoa
logically a ammn subordination to a hlgbev rule, 'lh«ttwo
things nre equal manns simply that thoy are equal in relation
to an objective t$1w* In private Mis the individuals are
egi'al-tfcatmeans that tl»y arc equal in .alotion to the lea
which la above them* This is also the case in relation to
st*t8&»«$hia is the second fuM&rasntal point o f view ftrotmwhich,
it is submittod, tho question or private law analogies in intern
tional law should be regarded*
X)$e®'.»icfcIniS'ja, o $ u e i £ « j p p *
J'
xx.
Private 1m in application to tiU S& rm t parts oi inter
national lag?*
CHAmB III.
Private law analogy in application
to treaties.
, 1.
23. Uhis chapter is primarilyconcernedwith application
of privatelaw conceptionsto contraction and interpreta-
tion of treaties. Its first task is, naturally,to answer
t
the question: Hew far floesthe conceptionof treaty it-
self constitntean analogy to the private law notion of
contract? Internationallaw - both theory and practice-
standshere between two conflictingtendencies: the
tendencyto base the conceptionof treatieson the solid
foaridationof a consensualobligationas developedin
privatelaw; and the tendencyto dispensewith the two
essentialelementsof the privatelaw conception: with
the free consensusof the parties (admissibilityof daress),
and with the objectivelybinding characterof the obliga-
tion (the clausalarebus sic stantibus). Both theoryand
I
practiceadhere to the positiverale of Internationallaw
that the essentialconditionof the validityof contracts\ ,
in privatelaw, the free consensusof parties, is not
essentialin internationallaw; neither has the predominant
, /
doctrinediscurdedthe principlesconnectedwith the clausu-
privstela?
contracts  
and inter-
national
treaties.
£heirlegs3
nature and
the "spe-
cial char-
acter of
internatioj
al law1*.
r
n.
la. It is this seconfitendencywhich ernbo^iesthe so calleS
Their
legal
Uenfcity
in theory
Bfii
law, which gives objectiveforce to internationaltreaties.
It is, legally,not of the slightestimportancethat this
' 1
objectivevalidity,now independentof the discretionary
:  l
will of one party, is in one case sapportefiby asternal
force,and in the other not. Neither is it relevantto
' .'I
say that the contentsof the two legal transactionsare , i
- V, i
different. One mast not he mislea “bythe statementthat
a treaty is an act of legislationin the sphere of inter-
nationallaw, whereas a private law contracttloe©not rise
above individualinterest®.
* =r:':; ; ; V ... . § I , , . ' •• -
There is no aoabt that Orotias*treatmentof
in the
"promises”,"contracts”, en& "treatiesana sponsions” science of
internation?
Mlows closely the lines of privatelaw. Shis is - al law.
as we have seen - ohscsregby the fact that he him-
"specialcharacterof internationallaw".
She fandamentalstructureof privatelaw contracts
anS internationallaw treatiesis essentiallythe same.
®he aatonomoaswill of the parties,both in contractanfl
in treaty,is the condition^hich gives rise to a legal
relation,which, 4$Tthe moment of its creation,becomes
independentof the discretionarywill of one of the
parties. It is the law of the state which gives ob-
jectiveforce to a contractin privatelaw, it is the
rule pacts sent servants,the fundamentof international
self oft©iistresses She $ifference between civil and Borsanlaw
ana the law of nations. Bat thee© exceptions - numerous
as they are ~ relate to points of minor importance, Al-
though it has 1)60011® a eonsnonplsoeto Marne Grotios for
this strict adherence to the private law pattern, it is
obvious that no writer is in the position to fiiscarcithe
snalogy. She analogy is the starting point; it is upon
its foundations that authors develop &istincfcionswhich
seem to them important.
"It is unnecessary here to enter into the general
principles of the law of contract” - begins Westlake the
chapter on "treaties anfiother international conventions41.
"What is important fo r os is to notice the points in which
contracts between states present any exception to those
principles or any particular application of them”. lj.”As
the ten&eney is to apply so far as possible the analogies
of private law, when the validity or construction of inter-i - t . .
o
national compacts are in question, it may he saia that just
as private contracts are void when contrary to public policy
as aefined in municipal law, so are the first names when in
conflict with public morality as defined in international
2) !.
law” - says Taylor . : 1
1 - • * '
- -’. S'-(;!tA[ • . 1 ,....'>*%-.,*• '
a) Vo l. 1 . p . 890.
&) p. 365.
•\. ’ ‘•- :: 'v” ‘ ;• -' '• ’»'' ' ~ • ‘
i  ;::'.-y.-V.v-'" • ,    ,'" . '
again Bonfils~Faschille• elementsessentialsdes
trait®®internationaax©out couanepoar lee contrat©entre
particnliers"1^ or Pradier-Fodere•*Lestraiteset les
conventionssont lee contratsdes Stats; lear objet ©seen
tiel est de prodair©generalementdes obligationsreeiproq«es
©t des droits eorrelatifs*2). Similar is the attitadeof
the generalbody of writers.®).
We have seen that the positivisttheory,while
acknowledgingthe admissibilityof souseanalogy, is empha—
tic in the denial of the privatelaw characterof the in-
stitationof contract. It belongs- says the theory- to
general jurisprudence. it has been shown in the first
chapter that this term is in this connectionno more than
a form of speech. Shere is, on the whole, no general jaris-
presenceto which Internationallaw has mad© any noteworthy
contribatlon. In this particalarcase, however, the term
t
seems to serve a good parpose. It parportsto solve the
otherwiseansarmoantable difficalty: how is a oontract
possiblewithout the free will of both parties being an
essentialconditionof the validityof the contract. She
requirementof consensusis simplyredaced to an instance
of privatelaw analogy - which,of coarse,mast be rejected
as quite inapplicableto staterelations.. it is most
ITISis, p.S&8. — ---— ---------------- — -----
2 ) par. 888.
3) Fiore, par.971; Phillimorevol.S.p.75; jfenwickp.317.
7*'JL*(v ' "• . •*' ‘  v '
Instrsotiveto note how Ulppoia,for instance,the positivist
and protagonistof ’’generaljarispraaence",denouncesthe pre-
valent opinionas ranningcoanter to a clear principleof
general ^arispraaence. !Ehemeaninglessfallacyof this term
when detachedfrom the mother soil of privatelaw, cannotb©
“betterillastrated.
24. Bat he this as it may, there are few qaestionsin inter-
nationallav;in which there is such a measare of common agree-
ment as this - that Varese? so far as states are concerned,
does not invalidatea contract. 3Jhismay safelyhe described
as a sottlearale of positiveinternationallew. And yet, it
is sabmittea,this floesnot affect the view presentedhere of
the fundamentalidentityof contractsana treaties,as well as
of the inherentanalogybetween the two branches of lew. It Is
soEmittedthat the analogy fails here so far as international
law is an undevelopedlaw. 2he analogy fails here becaase - y
i ana so far as - internationallaw has not yet achieved its goal
on the way frompositive morality"to law. It may safelyhe
saiS that when internationallaw will become l a w - with-
out qaallflc&tionsana reservations - the analogywill holfi
andispatedforce. Ehe writers,tfhllelaying down this positive
rale, regara it as their obvloasaaty to explain ana to jastify
it. they regarfiIt as a malam necessarian*,the absence of which
\
woaia certainlytena to perpetaatethe state of war amongst the
anorgsniseasocietyof nations. «hey agree that the rale is a ,
positiveone, bat they are far from aseamingthat it Is
Disregard
of the
vitiating
influence
of fiaress.
beneficialto She i&ea of law. Moreover,it seems that some
of thesewriters are apt to acknowledgethe binding force of
treats® conclnaeaanSer aaress only in thosecages in which
the state exercisingcompulsionfloesit In the name of law an$
in accordancewith it, - as the arm of law, as it were. To pat
it more clearly: they flisregarSthe invalidatingeffect of
aareasonly to these cases in which it may "beregardedas the
executionof internationallaw, of jast - if the "bolfiworflis
permitted- internationallaw.
Shat Grotias - in his age of wars - was apt to sacri-
fice a legal principlefor the sake of peace, shouia not b© a
esose of snrprise. j&xpeclitrei pablica© at sit finis litiaia.
wAs 1>srthe consentof nations&ra role has "beenintrofloceflthat
f
all wars, connectedon both sides by authorityof the sovereign
power, are to he held jastwars; so this has also "beenestab-
lished that the fear of each a war is beia a justly imposed
fear, so that what is obtainedby soch means cannot be demanded
bac&” .^ Shis is a bold statementon the part of the great
JeristEwho took pain© to distinguishbetween bellam iastumana
IniBstam. it is not made clearerby the previoasargsment
that "Be who gave cause why he shoald stafferforce, or be com-
pellet by fear, has himself to blame for what happens; for an
involentaryact arising from a voluntaryone is held morally
for a voluntaryon©."8*. $hen what aboot the attac&edwho
1} £. II. c.OTI. s.19
2) L. II. e.XVIX. s.19
did not give cause "that he shoald goffer force"? And yet -
although in the chapteron ^promises”lieis "entirely-of the
opinionof those who think, that, gettingaside the civil law,
which may either take away or diminishan obligation,he who
ha® promisesanythingunder fear is boundw, he is eaatioas
enough to state in the same section:’’hatI also think that
this is certainlytrue; that if the promise®has produced
a fear not ^ast,bat anjast*even though slight,and if the
promisewag occasionedby this, he is bound to liberatethe
promisorif the promisordesires it1*2-*. Shis cannot be
regardedas a refutationof his view in the main question,
bat it is certainlyillustrativeof the difficultieswith
which he had to cope.
Even more instructiveis Vattel. He lays down with Vattel
his usual clearnessthe rale that "a sovereignesrnot dis-
pense himselffra® observingAfesta treaty of peace by
allegingthat it was extortedfrom him by fear or constraint".2^
He gives them the asaalreasons for this proposition. Bat
then comes the importantlimitation: "if ever the plea of
constraintmay be admitted,it is againstan agreementwhich
does not merit the name of a treaty of peace, againsta forced
sabmiseion to termswhich are equallycontrary to Justiceand
to all duties of humanity”.
in. Ti. G.xi. s.7“""" — - - — — — — — —
2) Book XV., eh. 4. par 37
3) loe.cit; comp.also Ayala, Law of war (1582) Carnegieedit*
franslationp.60.
Anfihe proceeds#after havinggiven some historicalinstances,
with the impassionedargamsmts "Jtlthoaghthe natural law pre~
Iserihesfidelityto promisesss a means of peering the wel-
fare as® the peace of nations, 11 fioesnot favour oppressors.
J  
All of its principlesare direct©ato proearingthe greatest
\[goo& of mankind; that is the great end of all laws written
ana anwritten. Shall he who himselfviolatesall those
principles^ tiiohIsiBflsocietytogetherbe allowed to invoice
the alS of them? If it happens that the plea of constraint
is ftlbttMUana is offerefifcya nation as a pretext for re-
voltingwithoat jast eaase m& renewingthe war, it is better
to rislrthat ill than to farnieh asarperewith an easy means
of perpeteatingtheir injusticesnd establishingtheir asarp-
atioB spos a solia foanfiation. Bat when it is soaght to
preacha &octrim which is contraryto all instinctsof homan
nature*Where shall hearershe £o*mS?" it has "been&eeme&
|jexpedlentto cite here this lengthy argament,lecaase it gives
a most aisleexpressionto the legal an£ practicalconsiderations
anaerisingthis fundamentalqaestion. It recognisescompalfeionx
onlyWhen it is in accordancewith law, Vat then, it is sah&ittefi,
compulsionno longer falls anfierthe category06 tinrecs.$M   
same view is expresse-lft $@nr8 -latert*y%£$&&&& ^ ftfcA j_{^rg
sapporteain a strongmmmv hy the authorityof Prac!ier-ir’o&ere.s).
1). French ea,1 8 6 1 p.184. (She consent is free if it is not extort©a
hy an aajast violence),
  2). par,107-6j'also fwiss pi.385.
  w i j K i & r .»r ? fy : *:> .* ' ; ...., \ • * * ! Y
If is Indicative e?ea of the pres©ml position of the feeation
that a thoroughly positive write? expresses* In 1924, the
following opinionI ^^ sen, thesgfere,it is said ihet in txiter-
natlanal law f H w and intimidation.arepermitted means of
obtaining re-Sressfor wrongs, and it is impossible to look
upon permitted means as violating the agreement made'in
conseqaenee of their esc* the statement can ho-acceptor
'only as expressing a rule of law-in so far as the recog-
nition of the agreement by third states is concerned, not
as implying that the agreement creates the obligation of good  
faith*.**. &K
I K Fenwick p.388; see also Hanning, Int.L.Sea* i&ios(1875) p.lB4*
nevertheless, thoRghtlifeset (a treaty of peace imposed by force)
really Qualifies the actual cogency of such treaties* it toes not
qualify their legal cogency in the minatest degree- coi&p,also
the 'note doctrinale!?in the croft ease, in Eecaeil des arbitrage
Intern,, Laprsdell® et Politis, 1924, Y©1.II pp.36,3?.
3). The following recent instance rmy be useful for the appreciation
of some of the aspects of the question; in May 1915, China*
acting Bnder the threat o f an ultimatum by Japan accepted the
so called twenty-one &emn&8 impairing severely her rights as
an independent state. ”fhe ChineseGove. tment, isaaedlately
after signing the %reeisent, published a formal statement’
protesting against the itgreee&nts which she had been compelled
to sign.., { illoiighby, China at the Conference, Statement of
the Chinese Delegation, p.285). fhe Shines® delegation,, at the
Conference at Washington 1921, raised the question and demanded
the cancellation of this *»greesr«ent.In reply to the assertion
Of Japan, that ”the insistence by China on the cancellation of
,v these instruments would in itself indliafce that she shares the
view that the compacts actually remain in force and will co$-
tinse to be effective, unless and mtll they are cancelled
i’feeChina delegation stated that "the Chinese people had arrays
regardedthese agreementsas peculiar in thea&c&esby reason of
the elrcemstamee under which they had been negotiated, and that
the conditions arising from them were only <tefacto and without
®»y legal recognition upon the part of Chi na. p. 253.
All these views So not seriously affect the estab-
lished rale, which no doubt remains unshaken, They show,
nevertheless, Its inherent weakness. ISventhe great
majority of writers supporttrigthis role do not deny that
the lack of analogy with the corresponding principle of
private law constitutes an exception to the rule of law,
an exception due to the unorganised character of the inter-
national society. 5he analogy fails here, it is submitted
once more, so far as International law is not yet law. In
the fully developed international law; real,not fictitious,
consent will be required for the creation of a legal obliga-
tion.
Analogy is
lacking so
far as inter-
national
law is an
undeveloped
law.
25. This "special structure of international law” thas de- Clausula
prives the conception of treaties of one of the essential
elements of every contract, that requiring the free consen-
sus of the parties. But it deprives it also of another,
,equallyessential, element - by the doctrine of the
clausula rebus sic stantibus, the doctrine that a state
may lawfully rescind a valid treaty, if there has taken
place such a chenge of circumstances that the fulfillment
of the treaty would dangerously affect its vital Interests.
She mistake is often coismittedof seeking the origin of the
clausula - as represented in internetional law - in Homan
law, - Nothing could be more misleading than this inference from
rebus sic
stantibus.
1s i Schmidts Die voeikerrechtl.clausula rebus sic stantibus,1907. p.IS.
the Latin foam of the ru le*
It is wll- Snow that p*i*>ta law samite the possibili-
t y 0f the aissolntlon of a contract Wo r e Its falf«***»•
5hlB takes place especially to cases of ssperTentog imposs-
» m ty of perforce. 1*- « • el.Bsal. to intentional
Xaw oonia he hased on this formaatien - »e it has. to fact,
"\een aone by some writers 2» - prorWofi that an objective
test for the impossibility of fulfilment ooBia he found,
the role oonia,secondly, he based on the will of the
partlee, to the waning that a resolving condition was
expressly or implicitly attachea to the contract . Shere
U nothing to the notion of contract that compels - *•
assume that .otsse aiseeneas to the only way to which it
oan te dissolved. Bat it to an ehselate negation of the
term to assome that it may he dissolved at the accretion
, of one party. This is. however, the gist of the clausal*
to international law of to-aey. Ihere would he no object-
ion against assuming that the threat not only to the tode-
. penaence. hut also to the progress *) of the state may give
t0 it. to law, a right to demand a toleration that a treaty
1r¥7“^7lC ’gerrninOoSeT—r— — — — TyFTa7a. serman ^
«: E^ siS! 2 S-6 8 *kfiT* S&*
4). see f.i. Hall, Oppenheto. Saylor.
has become abortive. Bat that this declaration may feemad©
by the interested state - this?idea is as topical of the
prevailing theory, as it is repugnant to the idea of law.^ ^
Only las, or the ;jaridicalorgans of the ins, can dissolve
the vincnlam laris. 2?hetendency of international Isw srs
a law goes in this direction. If the Covenant of the Its elimi-
nation..
Lsagae of Nations may he regarded as an expression of
international law then its nineteenth article marks an
important step towards the abolition of a doctrine as
mischievoas as contrary to law* It provides a means -
a very inaSegoate means - towards the necessary re-
vision of the existing law, and it excladee thereby the
admissibility of a one-sidea withdrawal from a treaty.
It is an indication of a tendency, as is article X, which,
in its extensive interpretation, excited©s the admissibility
N .1" -•/,f
of daress so far as the independence and territorial inte-
grity of a state is concerned. In both eases the analogy
to private law means - assimilation to law.
1). Neither is it, in fact, the creation of the practice of
states - . ^hie has been clearly shorn by Schmidt. She
instajieeswhen it has be«m invoicedare, in fact, few;
it has never been recognised as a legal rale by the in-
jured power. It is rather the theories of writers, than
the necessities of internetional life, that gave prominence
to the doctrine.
2). Becans® of the retirements of ananiaity* see 0ppenheim.I*p.299.
26. While the theory of internetional lew rejects the sss» Error
s333^-' .., 3 3 ;.'   '-3 :3^ " 3';- 3 3 J:"'' and
logy to private law with regard to duress it does accept it fraud.
with regard to frand and error* It is agreed that while
error renders the treaty void, fraufiexercised by one of the
contracting parties renders it at least voidable. x$. ilnd *
yet - there is no doubt that, from the juristic point of view,
all three oases - duress, error, fraud, - stand on 4ih©same
level; In all of them there is no real consent on the side
of one of the contracting parties, '’neitherdoes freedom
of consent exist inherethe contract is concluded under false
impressions prodneed by the fraud of the party benefited* -
21
says ffaylor
3 . .:,3  ' v *3,- ' ,.3''. 3 - . "
A study of this part of text books reveals the fsct that
with on© insignificant exception* -there are no historical in-
stances of fraud or error in the conclusion of treaties.®).
What writers say on.this point i© no more than analogy to
private law. Sfhepractice of states affords no Instances, and
It cannot afford them. She monotony with which publicists
I K Mppold p.i?6j Heffter p.190; Westlake I. p,£9G: Bluntsehli,
par.408-9; Klaeber, par. 143.
8K p. see.
3). Wharton digest. par.ISO; Phillimore vc^.ll.p.?6; Kivier.vol.S.p^SS.
Die na. p.372.
repeal;the instanceof forgedmaps is appalling, ffc*elaborate
manner in which negotiations are confiactea,the long tim
between the signataeeof a treaty anflits ratification- ex-
* * "* '*' .
cluiieevery reasonable possibility of frsai!anfierror. It
is, hoover, this conception of the treatyas a contractin
which real consent is an essentialelementwhieh in#acesinter-
nationalpafcliciststo assign to frawfiand error a place in
the systemof internationallaw, irrespectiveof the probabili-
ty of the applicationof the principle. Bat thereare writers
who Seny even the vitiatinginfluenceof frasfiand error, fhey
explain it by the Improbabilityof cases of seriouserror ana
fraud ever arising,anflwith the impossibility - owing to the
lack of afleqaatetribunals- to determinewhetherthey have
taken place. 2he vast majority of writers,however,is adopt-
ing this analogy; it cannotfiootherwisewithout fiestroying
the very conceptionof contractanfltreaty.
27. 3?hismeans, on the other han$, that each rales as are fhe lirifs
of
not dictatesby logical cons!derationsor by the general legy.
genee of right, but which owe their origin to peculiar-
ities of spacesat time,aee£ not s^eeesamar b# applied.
Bat where is the test for this logicalnecessityor gkfcthe
general sense of right? It is certainlynot easy to find
this test. We have seen that the essentialelement of con-
tract,the free will as destroyedby aeress, fraua or error,
is by many authorsby no means regardedas inaispensabl®.She
S^
’'' — • ' i . >
"logical necessity" way “bemade entirely dependent upon
the notion which is ohosen as a starting point (that for
instance not consent, tootonly the declaration of consent
is a constitutive element of contract or treaty), and the
sense of right may lead in practice to very different con-
clusions. But there is no doubt that such a test is
necessary ana that it exists - for all practical purposes.
It lies in the actual universality of a rule. If a rule is
confined only to one or only to some systems of private law
then, clearly, it oaunot be used as a suitable basis for the
process of analogy. Shis bocosiesobvious when such rules as
thoses relating to lesion (laesio enormia), to pacta in
' to
favorem ter tii and/the interpretation of treaties are taken
into consideration.
According to Roman law, a contract of sale could be Lassie
enermis.
rescinded when a thing was sold for lesr than half of Its
actual value. This was the case of laesio enormis. fhe
role has been included in the law of some modem countries.
It it unknown to others. $o incorporate it in the system
of international law, as has been done by some publicists
* X -
in the early stage, is obviously inadmissible, the rule
not being a general principle of law. The reason of its
being a general rule or not lies not in its conformity with
a preconceived idea of natural law or legal philosophy. It
depends upon its inclusion in possibly all or many systems
of private law. Here again the modem opinion is noite
'  . 7 - , ' -<      !.- :   , > -  
f/,
justified in repeatlag this cage of analogy V.
ffhesame consifierations apply to pacta in favorem Biota in
f avorem
tertil. 5?herespective soles differ so largely in various tertii.
systems of private law that any shaping of rules of inter-
S )
national law on the ground of analogy mast be misleading,
fbere Is no reason for the prevalence of one system of
private law ofrerthe other. In this particalsr question
international law can an3 cloesdevelop its own Seviees -
i.e. accession and adhesion - for extending the possible
advantages of a treaty to thirfiparties.*^. £ny use of
private law analogy - unless it he a mere figure of speech -
is here quite unjustified.
The same applies to the question of private law analogy Inter-
preta-
with regard to the rales governing the interpretation of tion of
treaties
treaties, fhere are bat few publicists who have not succumbed
to the temptation to formulate a more or less lengthy list
of roles of interpretation - without, however, alleviating
the task of those callefy'in inaiviaual oases to interpret the
meaning of a treaty. ”2?heimportant point is to get at the
real intention of the parties, ana that enquiry is not
shacl&eg by any rule of interpretation which m$y exist in
irr i5n n s& H T j> rs^^ $©br© Digest vo l. 2 .p .s i.
8).Boxburgh: Internal;ional Conventions ami third states, p.6~18;see
also Dlena (Plan eines neuen interoEeanischen Kanals in Nicaragua.
Ulemeyer’s geitsohrm. DCV.p.lQ) who9 curiously enoagli,after a©pre-
oatins the application of this or other rule of o n e municipal lew
construes art.1.8.1.of the Hsy-Pauneefofcetreaty as a pactum in fayorem
3} .Eosbnrgh op. eit. p.45. x tertii.
a particularnational jurisprudence'batis not generallyaccepted
in the civilisedworld."*0. To this ©pinion of Westlake,which
is in total agreementwith the argumentpresentedhere,may be
added that - with the exceptionof the English-Americanjuris-
prudence- the rales of interpretationof contractsare very
few in most systems* For, toothin private and international
law, all rales of interpretationcan he reducedto this
fundamentalrule - that effect has to be given to the de-
claredwill of parties. Even rales of Homan law cannot claim
in this regardgreaterauthoritythan those of any other system
of municipallaw. The historyof state controversiesshows how
much rules of interpretationtakenat random from one system of
privatelaw have been abused and chosen to suit very contentions
assertions.
Even rales of Boman law. For there is a marked tendency- fhe
authority
notably in theEnglish and Americaninternationaljarispru- of Koman
dence - to attrlbateto Boman law the qualityof thosey n -
eral principlesof law” to which the continentalschoolhas
so frequentrecourse. Wfthave seen that some authorslike
Phillimoreand Westlakeregard Roman law as a direct source
of internationallaw. 5fhismay be true from an historical
law.
1). vFestlakevol.l.p.
point of view. Koreanlaw, the "ratio scripts" gspplicd the
foundation stones for the rising "brailsingof international
law and it certainly exercised a great influence upon it in
the subsequent stages. Bat to attribute to one system of
a particular time and space qualities of a universal law, and
to use it as a vehicle of development of international law,
must obviously resalt in checking this development.1}. 3?his
applies not only to Soman law roles of interpretation but to
all cases in which a role of Boman law is not corroborrated
OV
by an identical development in modern law. *.
2.
fhe
legitimate
occasion of
application
of private
law in
treaties.
£8. It has been shown on the Instances of lesion, of pacta
in favorem tertii and of interpretation of treaties that the
use of analogy ie unwarranted when the rales to "beapplied
are not common to modem private law as a whole, featonly
to some systems of municipal ^urisprndenc©; it has keen
urged, on the other side, in this and the preceding chapter,
that where a legitimate occasion arises to apply a private
law principle common to all systems of jurisprudence, the
conception of international law as a system of 1 a w and
of states as subject to the rale of law requires that anal-
ogy should he made use of. But when does the legitimate
TK £omp.fere'1ieiyj lethode dUnterpretationet soaree©en droit privfc
positif, 1919, esp. the chapter: des conceptionset constructionsen
droit remain,pp. 171 et.secj.
2}. On Bomanlaw with regardto tli®rales of evidencebefore i&ter-
nationaltribanalsooasp.Ralston*Inten^Arbitrallaw & ^Yccc,<La^e^,/dlpt
*//
occasion arise? It arises specially in those eases in
which an international treaty itself makes use of a con-
ception of private law. The Mindependent character” of
international law demands that such conceptions should he
regarded as meaningless phrases without any definite con-
tents. This is illuetrated most clearly in the institute
of international leases.
29. fhere are two categories of leases in international Internation-
al leases of
law. She first, generally overlooked in the writings of a purely
private law
of publicists, furnishes no difficulties, as will be seen type,
on the following instance*, fhroagh an exchange of notes
an agreement has been reached (January,1905) between the
British and Italian Governments in which "His Britlmnic
Majesty*® Government agrees to lease to the Italian Govern-
ment an area of lane*on the east side of Kismoyu, in the
British last Africa Protectorate, not exceeding a hunt!rea
and fifty yards square, for the erection of a bonded ware-
house or other necessary buildings.*1 According to articles
55,4, and 5, the Italian Government shall pay for the land
leased an annual rent of £1, the lease to be in force for
33 years (subject to possible modifications), and on the
termination of the leas© the bondings erected on the land
to become the property of the British Government. Article
6 provides that no Italian troops shall be landed at Kisiaayu
without the previoesconsentof Britishsnthormes - with
the importantexceptionof ExpeditionaryForceswhich are
permittedto land after previousnotification. Article 8
says: “Kothingin these articlesshall be construedto exempt
either the land leased or the personsresidingthereonfrom
the laws and regulationsin force in BritishEast Africa
Protectorate,subjectto which, however,employes of the
ItalianGovernmentresidingin the leased territoryshall
 feefree to exercise the functionsof their respective
offices” Essentiallythe same are the provisionsof
the Annex 4 of the Conventionbetween Great Britainand
Stance(Jane 1898), concerningthe delimitationof the
possessionsand spheresof infloenceof both countries
east from the Iliger,in which a portion of land is leased
to France on the ftigerfor the parposes of the landing,
storage,and transshipmentof goods, an annual rent of
1 franee to he paid by the drenchGovernment;2^ of
article8 of the conventionbetweenGermanyand France
of November1911 concerningtheir possessionsin
g j
equatorialAfrica • and in some resects of articles
363, and 364 of the treatyof Tersailles,in which Ger-
many leasesto the Czecho-Slovakstate, for a period of
ninety-nineyears,areas in the ports of Stettin^and
Hamburg,which shall be placed under the general regime
TTSirillrPi treaties vbT'15Il?p.669----- ---------- -
2)Mart|n»s Treaties, 2 ser. x m p.126-130
SJMart^n’s 3 ser. V. p.656
Jf*.
of free 20i3egand shall fceused for the direct transit of
goods coming froF.ss& or going to that state1K
fher© seems to 'beno doaht, so for as theory concerns
itself with the ®Bestion, that to this type of leases the
private law rnles of lease are applicable. The lessor re-
tains the sovereignty over the leased territory. The legal
relation between the lessor anilthe lessee remains the same
as in private law. it is hardly necessery to add that those
2)
agreements belong to the domain of international pnhlic law .
30. This is not, however, the case according to the almost "Political”
leases.
cnanitTiOGsopinion of writers in the instance of "political"
leases, as those granted by China in the years of 1898 and
'atj 4^ Q) f. \
1899 to Germany. Eessia , ingland and France*',
ffheyagree that the "pretended leases arealienations dis-
guised in order to spare the susceptibility of the state
7’)
at whose cost they are made^ "
1). Herstlet’s treaties, XXX. p.2£7
£J. Schoenhorn, &.¥. VII.p.438-445
5). Martin’s B ser.vol. XXX. p.336.
4). McMurray: treaties and Agreements concern! ^ China, p.119.
5). Eart£n*s q ser. vol.32 p.90.
6). Mc&urray. p.124.
7),. Westlake l.p.136.
<i7.
and they singly enumeratethem as one of the ways of acqui-
sition of territorialsovereignty^ K It is submittedthat
this theoryis neither correctin 1am, nor warrantedby the
practiceof states.
Accordingto all these treatiesChina retains the
sovereigntyover the leased territoriesand parts “in Disguised
^cessions#
order to avoid conflicts"with the exerciseof her and the
practice.
sovereignrights for a limitednumber of years (25
4
years in the case of Port Arthur, 99 years in other
cases); the lesseeswere eitherprohibitedfrom sub-
letting the leased territoriesto anotherpower,.or
bound to obtain for this the permissionof the lessor;
in the ease of Port Arthur and Yal^enwan,China retained
the jurisdictionover her subjectsfor crimes committed
in the leased territories/'^, and within^ the "walled
city of Weihaiwei* the jurisdictionof Chineseofficers
had to continue.®^.
1). To the same classbelongs the 9Argumentbetween the U.S.
of America and the Hepubiie of Cuba for the lease to the
y.$« of lands for Cuba for coalingand naval stations,
auly 1903®, lartgn*svol.34.p.338.; Strupp,Grundaueg©
des positivenVoelkerrechtes,p.53.; Liszt, p*93; Lawrence
p.177 (*»theattempt to separatepropertyor sovereighfeyon
the one hand from possessionon the other,by the use of
phrases taken from the lew of usufruct,ia in its very
nature deceptive, the terms in questionare mere diplomatic
devicesfor veiling in decentwords the hard fact of territorial
cession; WestlakeI.p.135, 6; Bespagnet,1810, par.385.
g). Willoughby, loc. eit*
3). see also &orff, Russia in the 3?arEast, Am. 3 .2.L.1923,p.265.
By the treaty with Japan, of Xteceiaber1905, Ghana ex-
ercised her rights of sovereignty by giving consent to the
handing over of the leased territory from Kussia to Japan 1 \
and again, in Article 1, of the treaty of May 1915, to the
extension of the teriaof the lease from 25 to 99 years2);
she gave consent in the same treaty to the rights of Ger-
'Vt.. V
many over Eiaochan being transferred to Japan.3^. After
her declaration of war,%ainst Germany, she consulted inter-
national lawyers as to whether, by this act, her agreement
to transfer the German rights to Japan has not become in-
operative, and, according to Dr .John C.J?erguson*s report
before the Committee for Foreign affairs of the United
States Senate, a number of international lawyers of eminence
.... , ' , ’' i*• r • <  
gave the opinion that he**4declaration of war against Ger-
many, notwithstanding her contract which had been made with
Japan already in 1915; of itself vitiates not only the Ger-
jman lease, but also the treaty with Japan.4^, In the course
©f the Washington Conference, in December 1921, Hr* Koc, the
leader of the Chinese delegation,declared: "While the measures
X) Marten*a II, ser. vol.34., p. 748; this right has been ex-
pressly recognised in art. 5 of the Peace Treaty between Japan
and Russia of September 1905, Uicilurrayloc.cit.
2).Mc,iourray p.1221 .
3)»Mc.Murray p.1216.
4)-Willoughby;Foreign rights and Interests in China, p.592.
*1.
and extent o f control by the leasee powers over the leased
territories varied in different oases, the leases them***
selves Here all limited to a fixed period of years* Ex-
pressly or impliedly they were not transferable to a
third power without the consent of China* though the
exercise of admrtotrative rights over the territories
leased was relinquished by China to the lessee psmer
during the period of the lease, the sovereignty of China
over them had been reserved in all eases* The leases
were all  ere&tures of compact, different from cessions
hoth in fact and in law*^. ti&’/
• " , ' i ,     • '      '•
This legal position, as expressed by the Chinese
delegation, has been partly given recognition by the
fact that, with the exception of the Liaotung Peninsula
held by Japan, the powers declared their readinessto
agree, under certain condition, to an ina^ddiatetermin-
ation of the leases contracted in 1893 and 1899^3. All
these facts do not seem to speak in favour of the conten-
tion that those contracts can he regarded as Instances ©f
*    /' '  U     ’r '        >  '  3).
acquisition of territorial sovereignty hy cession.
/ . •' V ' :„.Y V , . V ; * - • " • w
^ , Tffifinn i'n iifi-Iifr.f ifi|T»)iifii'wiiinw(ini-rrtVrrnn-n iiiifV ir<«w>ii.mn»ii»ilK^ rn rr ftr-ir i i n r iJ-jh : : i i um ii-   -____
1) *see i&as©* A History of the Peace Conference in Paris, ffiiantung
at the Peace Conference, TOUVI. p.377; Godshall, The international
aspects of the Shantung question* pp.131, 140-142*
$) Comp*also resolution fto*7 of the ^ashingtos ^onfcranes repardinR
Radio stations in China (s*4]U
3) ,Covup, U.&»i?or.Re!.1900,pp«387• in which Secretary4 Kayrs view is
expressed to-the effect that the reservation^ of Chinese sovereignty
at least "cuts off possible future claims of the lessee that the
sovereignty of the territory ,ispermanently vested in the lessee3*
to’
31• The publicists put this construct!on upon the above-
mentionedtransactionswith the avowed intentionof grasp-
ing the real facts of international life, and not their
legal appearance; not the declared, but the real inten-
tion of the parties* But this, it is submitted,cannot
be the task of internationaljurisprudence. Its task is
not to supply a politicalinterpretationof facts - in
this case a very doubtfulinterpretation- but to classify
and explainlegal transactionsaccordingto the declared
will of the parties. It degeneratesotherwisein a descrip-
tive science of politicalfacts - a task which may be use-
ful, but which is not an interpretationof law. Under no
circumstancesshouldthe weservatioisentalisof one of the
parties to a treatybe made the foundationof interpreta-
tion. By no means shouldthe scienceof internationallaw
give encouragementto a deletingof differencesbetween
legal terms. “Conceptsof law are sharplydefined,and
the merging of one into anotherwould mean the end of
science,the end of legal life... What utter danger for
life, family and propertywould it be to assert that the
border linesbetween individual legal transactionsare in
state of flux* for instance,the differencebetween sale
and hire, between marriage and concubinate, between murder
and manslaughter . ’Shisis ^ust the essenceof law that it
She task
of inter-
pretation.
?/.
defines in rigid terms the fluid relations of life"1*. The
same idea is given lucid expression by a recent American
author; * It is the oaatract which is the subject of inter-
pretation. rather than the volition of the parties. It may
be that while certain expressions are used in a particular
sense, a contradicting state has in fact given its consent
with the design of accomplishing a purpose hostile thereto*
Proof of such an intention is not decisive of the rights
o f the parties under the agreement0 2),
Two states use in a treaty a concept • obvious®
ly taken from private law - the meaning of which is general-
ly accepted and without ambiguities. There are differences
of opinion as to the right of the hirer to sublet, as to
the effect of the accidental destruction of the object of
the lease during the term of the lease, as to the rights
of both parties in the case of improvements effected by
3)
the tenant ; there may even be some doubts with regard
to the real or contractual character «£ the reciprocal
rights and duties of the lessor antS^he lessee but
no one would seriously challenge the statement that “the
lessee of the land is he who rightfully possesses it, but
does not own it, and that the lessor of the land is he who
the rule
of inter-
pretation
with re-
gard to
terms of
private
law in a
treaty.
IS. .Telline;k„Staatenverdingungen, p.15.
2}• vol»S»p.v)3«
3 K Holland, Jurisprudence, p.294.
4). bollock, the Land Laws, p.145; Salmond, Jurisprudence p.397.
?Z.
own® it, but who has transferredthe possessionof it to
1 )
another*. % And Salmond draws only the necessary
logical conclusionfrom this fundamentalrelationbetween
the lessor and the lesseewhen he states: "a lease exists
whenever the rightfulpossessionof a thing is separated
from the ownershipof it; and althoughthis separationis
is
usually temporary,there/no difficultyin supposingit
permanent*1,2
Now, the mentionedleases are not permanent^ they are
limited to 99 or 25 years* To maintain that these principles
do not apply in internationallaw is to do violenceto the
generallyacceptedmeaning of a term and to deprivethe work
of interpretationof this solid foundationwhich we call the
acceptedmeaningof words. It means also the deprivingof
internationallaw of a new institutewhich obviatesthe
difficultiesand dangers of cessionof territorywhile se-
curingat the same time all its advantages. Why make cession
the only legal form in adjustingconflictingclaims of
territorialsovereignty? Heither internationallaw nor inter-
nationalrelationsgain throughsuch a procedure.
There is, it is submitted,no essentialdifference
between the indicatedtwo kind® of leases,unless it be the
object of the right© exercisedby the lessor. In the first
I K Salmondo.$99,
2)» p.400; Roman law regardseven the emphyteutaas an
encumbrancer,not as an owner.
Its applicar
tion to
leases.
case his jurisdictionis none or limited,in the second
he exercisesfull rights of jurisdiction. In both cases
one state parts only with the exerciseof its rights,
Shere is no difficultyin graspingand constructing
legal relationsbetween states in which not only rights
of propertybut also their counterpartin international
1aw, the rights pertainingto territorialsovereignty,
are made the object of a contractof lease. 5Chereis so
\
need for disregardingthe declaredintentionof partiesfor
the sa&e of a politicalconstructionof doubtful application*
The prActicalconsequencesof the common construction
are abvious. The treatybecomeswhat is usually calledan
executedo ne Hhe legal obligationto restore the leased
territoryto the owner after the expirationof the ter® of
the lease becomes abortive; in the case of war the valid-
ity of the treatycontinues* I'he consequencesare, of course,
differentwhen the rule here put forwardis applied, i’his
rule is; whenever in a treatya generallyacceptedterm of
privatelaw is being used, the interpretationand construct
•’ *'( ' !  '•  '  • i ; '• <{•' *&>£.:i$1 • ' i-i .
.•- I V /; ''   •;
' ' . ' ; : .
X)m Qn the analogy of transitory or disposive treaties to
Conveyances**and ©a the danger of constructing tmex International
I*m by analogy to municipal law” Roxburgh, quoted below,page 108.
tion of the treaty must follow the principles generally re
cognised as implied in this particular tem. 31*
32. The necessity of applying the above rule of inter-
pretation is, it is submitted, shown with ql± sufficient
clearness in the new institute of international laws in
\'-n
the international lan mandates.
It is proposed to deal here at some length with
this question, because, to3ether with "leases", inter-
national mandates offer, it is believed, a m0st in-
structive illustration of the problem under discussion:-
Internation
al mandates
The three
interpreta-
tions.
£ this passion for uniforaiitywMch finds
i , ? 1 cession - open or disguised - an ever-
f°r fra£pinS different ways of
territorial adjustment are clearly illustrated bv the
trSflf^dt h i K |r a e ^ Q v i n a «A great number of writers
treatea this right of occupation and administration as an
relerSnoeTsee N “T 1?51*(J.i»*t.p,9S3for ample
f if fi . ? n*3^») It is not possible to &o bere
into the details of this question and to investigate whether
the rights left to the Sultan amounted to something more that
! e S ! f ™ 8*n f ,U r i" Bay' an- SS- of «* rreetyofberlianwas n o t , in law, a cession, Only the unluridic&i
*° SraaP the political signlficane of the treat^
it appear as a cession* Nevertheless, when in 19d8
S S S I ? “ “ tbV wo p™ *™ ** , there « * '
almost unanimous eonser*usof writers that a clear Dro-
vieion of the Treaty has been broken. But, surely if art 2-5
was ftin international law fta cession, th4n the LnexatioA 1 ,
S f f S ^ U V * find it, for i n S
difiicult to follow oppenhei© when {p .379 . 1) he regards the
(na?liC n°?l“S»f Oef ilot'sillieaBaertins at the kaletime
I »! * s 1 ana?*ations are certainly toSmi
unlawful in time of peace and of doubtful legality in war”,
ff*
£k$«t tendencies can 1)0ascertained in the vast litera-
ture Sealing with this subject:*^ fhere are, firstly, a
number of writers of authority (and of statesmen), t&o do
not attach an? meaning at all to the term ^mandate71used
in the Covenant of the Leagi® o f Hat!one* 3Jhe expressions
"’mandate*and nmandator?* occurring in severs! sectlone of
Article XXII of the Covenant are* according to them, a
euphemism used in order to conceal the fact of a real annex-
ation l?ing at the bottom of the Whole system. Ever? extended
use of analog? to the private law institute of mandate leads,
so runs the argument, to ridiculous consequences and runs soimter
to the facts of international life. She term "mandate* has been
used not onl? in private law, hut also in commsrcial and con-
stitutional lm * In all these branches of law, the institute
underwent substantial changes and it is difficult to see why
Just the private lew conception of mandate should exercise a
preponderate influence upon the analogous notion in international
|*xaw. iot onl? does not the mandant - the League of nations -
choose the mandator? fix the terms of the mandats agree-
ment; it has not the ri|bt to terminate the mandate, or to
exercise an? right of sovereignty over the mandator?, She
expression that the soandateis exercised "on behalf of the
'UUM IS8W«TWIH»*V.U'M -1ill"•"'Or’nr-*
tY i t ip?intended. from obvious reasons, to deal with thfc
Ees tion o S r ”o ter as the general proposition here put for-
wotI is ooneornoa. Sor is it aeeoea neceasarj to r.fer to
the vast literature on the s^set, except to the most re-
presentative writers BSntioneS in tie text.
nthe 15081,8»» mors th« that the league has the right
of euporvieionsad of S eei ng annual reportsfoom the
mandatery. "j&e league ie - a8 Lord Balfour saia - not
the author of the policy hut its instrument". She mandatory
power is the sovereignover the mandatedterritories.11
*his interpretationof the covenantis stronglyopposed
iy thosewriterswho see in the *arm ’Wa t e * and in its im-
-^plicationsembodied in the generalprinciplesof law a con-
elusive expressionand evidenceof the declaredintentionof
the parties, the league is the lawful sovereignover the
territoriessubjectedto mandate,and it has the doubtless
right to revoke it in all cases in itoichit deems the pro-
visions of the mandate contractto be infringedby the man-
flatcry'*.2'.
She third group tends,naturally,to reconoilethe con-
flictingview by assumingthat sovereigntyover the mandated
territoriesis actuallydividesbetween the league and the
mandatoryor, shat amounts to the same, that sovereignty
belongs -to the mandatory"actingwith the consentof the
Councilof the league "3> .
4\
S3, If we take into considerationthe provisionsof the fhe actual
covenantand of the individualmandate®,it is difficult the^iida-
to see how - putting aside questionsof legal theory - to The° ^? ?
the sovereigntyover mandated territorycan ever be mandates,*12
attributedto the mandatory,even if we commit the error o fYhe^ ouneU
of Identifyingsovereigntywith the exerciseof the right KLy/ ^ t o " 1"
of sovereignty, the sovereigntyof a state over its eisions’of6” j
^ territoryusually finds its expressionin the fact that naUonal eourta'
the inhabitantsassume the nationalityof the sovereign}
that he has the right of disposalover the territory*that I
he is free in utilisingthe revenueof the territoryin
manner he thinks proper?that liehas the unlimitedright
of levying troops and of conscription;that his tariffs
and custom policy is free and that restrictions,if any,
are conditionedby reciprocity;t$at the right of inter-
ference by other states in the internaladministration,is,
as a rule, excluded. One or two of there requirementsmay,
^it is true, be absent without destroying what is called the
sovereignty of a state. But it cannot be doubted that in
the absence of all of them the sovereignty of the administering
power cannot be seriously maintained,
i’hisis just the case with the alleged sovereignty of the
mandatory? She inhabitants of the mandated territory, even
those of the "C” mandates, do not assume his nationality! he
has PPisright to assign the mandate to another power, let alone
to part with it in the way of cession* he must not use the
the revenue of the mandated territory for purposes outside
Its borders; he has no ri^ it - in the rTil?’mandates -
to organise military forces except on a voluntary basis,
and - in the "B" and ”C'rmandates - the military trying
of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal
police and the local defence of territory, is prohibited;
the establishment of military or naval bases or fori^ rcations
is prohibited in the "B" and "Cn mandates; the most favoured
% 1
nation clss.se- without reciprocityand in most comprehensive
terms,no distinctionbeing made between the nationalsof the
mandatoryand those of other countries - formspart of the
*Attand nB” mandates; the Mandatoryis not only under the
obligationto supply the mandatescommissionwith annual
reports and to submithimself to an examinationby the
commission,but any member of the League has the right to
demanda decisionby the permanent Court of International
Justice in any questionrelatingto the application of the
i*terms of the mandatewhich can set be settledty negotiations *
Ifhisis the law of internationalmandates as defined
by the terms of the Individualmandates,by the decisions
of the Counciland the Assemblyof the League of $ations,and,
1) see the Judgment and dissenting opinions ftnthe Mavroaattis
Case between Ur©at Britain and Greece before the permanent Court
of International Justice, September, 1924*
T9.
in some cases,by decisionsof nationalcourts• $his is re-
cognisedlaw ana not theoreticalreasoningas to the ad-
missibilityof the applicationof the rules of privatelaw
mandate or trust®It is very far indeed from the recognition
of tbs sovereigntyof the mandatory*- £ $ it would be an ex-
aggeration to maintain that it recognises- *fcta±in a manner
not open to aoubt - the sovereigntyof the mandant,of the
I League of Nations. She framersof the existingmandate law -
notably the Council and the mandatescommission- repeatedly
express the opinion that it is for the scienceof international
law to give an answer fos»this question.
34. She science of law, In giving its answer,has to take ^ «horitJ
into consideration: (a) the originalsonree of the law of
internationalmandate: tie article MIX of the Covenant: as g£en
ftb)the sutsequentdecisionsof the ^unoil* of the man** covenant*
dates commissionand of the competenttribunals. But it
  has not to supply a politicalexplanationof the real
characterof the mandates*
It is submitted,on the groundof the proceeding
considerations,that the formulationsof the law of
mandate subsequentto the Peace Treatiesdo not allow
t'nesovereigntyover the-mandatedterritoriesto be
attributedto the mandatory. It remainsnow to draw
the necessary conclusionsfrom the Covenant Itself.
She answer turnshare upon the interpretationof the terms
if
, ' .. (  
!»o i
"mandateand "mandatory"used in ArticleXXII. If the anal-
ogy to privatelaw mandate be admitted,then there is no doubt
that alongsidewith the "mandatory*1there exists ^/corresponding
"mandant",who is logicallyand legally the "principal",and
from whom the authorityof the mandatoryis derived,no matler
how great may he the restrictionsof the authorityof the
mandant. In this case the ultimatesovereigntyof the I»eagn®
of nations over the mandatedterritoriesis a natural inference.
If the analogyhe Rejected,then other solutionsmust he sought.
Can this analogyhe rejected? It is submittedthat it !Ph
can not. It has been said in connectionwith leases and it
is one of the main propositions put forwardin this mono-
graph that "wheneverin a treatya generallyacceptedcon-
cept of privatelaw is being used, the interpretationand
constructionof the treatymust follow the rules generally
recognised as impliedin this particularconcept.1'^ «
The same rule appliesnecessarilyto the law of mandates.
Shere may he differencesin individualsystemsof private
law as to particularrules regulatingthe relationsbetween
the mandant and the mandatory,between the principaland the
agent; they may differ with regard to the remuneration,to
the determinationof the cases in which a mandatecomes to
dical re-
lation
between
mandatory
and mandant
3?hegeneral
rule of in-
terpretation
to an *ita#with re gar a to the diligenceto -feem m *, m
mandatory, and so on, but they allagreeas to the ultimate
authority restingwith fee a&ndant,as to the fundamental
relation of delegationbetween the agent and the principal.
Commercial law may adapt some of the rules of this institute
to special requirementsof businessand commercialinter-
course; constitutionallaw may adapt it for its special
purposes; but in no ease is it conceivablethat this fund-
 ' amentalrelationof derivationof powers shouldhe obliter-
ated. If it is, then violenceis dons,to rules of juridical
logic saidto the acceptedmoaning of words, fhis is
true even if pur view on the inherentanalogybetween the
subjectsof internationaland privatelaw is not accepted.
When states #se in a treaty the eoncept "loan”,then it
is inadmissibleto say that the generalrules governingthis
contractin private law are inapplicableto the respective
treaty,and that the duty of repayingthe borrowedsum is
|subject to specialconditionsof internationallaw ant inter-
national relations. The relationof a mandatoryacting ©n
behalf of a mandant can never be reduced to a relationof the
Bandant being an Instrumentof the policy of the mandatory.
35. It is misleadingto state that ttifthe term mandatehad
an acceptedmeaning in internationallaw, doubtlessthere
would be •&strongpresumptionthat the treatynation© accept-
ed that meaning,but it apparentlyhas not”1)
XT’bright, op. cifc.p r m r — — -- — --- --- ----
Private
law as a
source
of de-
velopment
and ad$E&*
ment.
/n.
for if "mandate"has no acceptedmeaning in international
law - how eoul^Lfc? - it certainlyhas a Gleaningin IMe
branch of law from which it is derived. Mandate is a
legal terminustechnicus* 31©assume fch&tconceptsof
private law taken over laypositiveenactment* hy treaty-
into internationallaw, have no meaning,or - to put it
imore clearly- lose their usual meaning,would mean de-
priving internationallaw of a sourceof developmentwith-
out ^shiehit must for ever remain in the rough stage of
a primitivelaw. $e shall see in the course of the dis-
cussion of the cases of internationalarfcitsation,that
a greaterpart of disputeswould have to he left unde-
cided if only such terms and conceptswhich have a well
establishedmeaning in internationallaw were to he allowed
to serve as a hasis of decision*Positive internationalaw
is at libertyto change individualrules of a privatelaw
*notion in the course of its receptionand to adapt it to
its specificneeds and circumstances,hut as long as it has
not done so, the generalprinciplesof this sourceof law
fromwhich the conceptionhas heen derivedmust prevail*
Shis propositionapplies,of course,only to those cases
in which a term of private law is actuallyused in the treaty,
not where the analogy to privatelaw is the result of con-
structionhy writers.
rf
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36. f&e sovereigntyof the League of lations over the ffeeLeagu©
©f li&tions
mandated territoriesand, indeed,tbs admissibilityof as the
Soverein.
analog# the private law mandatesare often contested She diffi-
culties.
because;(a) the allegedmandant neither chose the
mandatory,(b) nor did he fix the terms of the man-
date» But this fact in no way precludesthe sovereignty
Of the League or its position as mandant.1) She league
hecame mandant and sovereignover mandatesat the moment
the Council approvedthe draft mandateslaid before it?
hy and through this fact the mandateagreementbetween
the two partieshas bean concluded. $he fact that its
influenceon the choiceof the mandatorieshas been small3
ot none at all, has no decidingInfluenceupon the general
constructionof the reciprocalrelations. In a contract
of sale and purchasethe price Is usually fixed by the
parties to the contract,but it is emit© conceivablethat
this tas& shouldbe entrustedto a third person,to a
bonus vir.
Those Efeodeny the ultimate sovereigntyof the
mandantwould find it impossibleto give an aamm*
to the questionon the positionof the mandated territories
after the terminationof the mandate,owing either to the re-
15.Although it may be doubtedwhether the interpretation
given by the Councilto the expression’"membersof tte League
as relatingonly to the PrincipleAllied Powers Is Justified
by the letter of the Covenant*
.•
vocationon the part of the League or to the withdrawalof the
mandatory. But they agree that in this case the right of ap-
pointinga mandatorydevolvesupon the league. V* fhis is,
however,possibleonly in the ease of the ultimatesovereignty
resting exclusivelywith the League. - Difficultiesare ob-
viouslycreated by the fact that the writersdo not think it
proper to distinguishbetweenthe right of sovereigntyand the
exerciseof sovereignty, ffoefirst rests exclusivleywith the
League, the second is shared - in very unequal portions- be-
tween the League and mandatory.
37* Whoa, however,it is urged that the analogyto private
law institutesof mandatemust be applied so far as Its par-
ticularrules have not been changedby the provisionof the
respectivetreaties,it is by no means suggestedthat the
rules of only one systemof privatelaw, even those of
Homan law, must exclusivelybe applied. It has alreadybeen
mentionedin connectionwith leases that there is no Justi-
ficationin tying down internationallaw to one systemof
private law of a given time and place. Many institutesof
Homan law have been adopted by modem systems,but it would
' . . . . . . ’   ’ *
not be right to say that, while adoptingthe reform of an
institute,they did not effect such changesin their con-
tents as was necessary.
Limitsof
analogy.
It is re-
stricted
to funda-
mental
and gen-
erally
accepted
principles.
1) Wri^it op, cit, p. 702,
*
m s is seen, for instance, in the case of the re- She rsnumer-
numeration of the mandatory: in Homan law mandaturnwas, mandatory^**
as a rule* gra$*£t*ous# although - and this is often dis-
regarded *•it was not vitiated hy renumeration, the proslse
of which mm being enforced feyextraordinaria cognitio of
the praetor* In the German Civil Code the mandate is de-
fined as an absolutely gratuitous contract#1*, whereas the
JapaneseCode* so largely influenced feythe Germans, contains
the provision that rtamandatory is entitled to compensation
only feyvirtue of a special agreementf’,s^, a provision
identical with the respective clause of the French code3)«
In the English law of agency - which althou^t not identi-
cal with the Soman mandatum tafeesto a large degree its
place in the system - renumeration of the agent is a rule*
aidjdieagent is not liable for the mere non-performance of
that which he has undertaken to do gratuitously ^ She
trustee, resembling in some respects the mandatory, is,as
a rule, not entitled to compensation for personal trouble or
loss of time, hut he may he renumerated under an express or
implied direction in the instrument creating the trust, or an ex-
ipressorder ot the Court, or by an express stipulation on the
subject which he has made with the cestui aui trust before he
accepted the trust *  
X)'* parVSB'sfm'1 ' ”   """". . .... .~
2) « Art*648
Z) Art .1986
4} Bowstead, "on agency*, p .117
15)E&lsbury, XXTIII.p,163«
io(*.
It is obvious that in this — as in similar cases — no analogy to
a private law rule is possible - simply because there is no
private law rule of sufficient generality on the subject*
On the other hand, such rules may - and must - be applied
which are, practically without exception, adopted in all systems
o f private jurisprudence. It is no natural law and no phil-
osophy of law but Just this uniformity of acceptance which
*is the empirical prog£ of their legal necessity. This
applies for instance to the question of termination of iu
mandate* It is common to all systems of private law,that -
as a rule -both sides have the right to terminate the man-
dat© at any time. XK This rights is the expression of
the permanent authority of the mandant on one side and of the
personal relation of confidence on the other•
The term-
ination
of the
mandate.
The generality of this yule is by no means impair-
ed by reasonable adjustments to exceptional circumstances:
that for instance, the mandatory is not entitled to termi-
nate the mandate at a time exceptionally unfavourable to
the randant, &)• that - especially in the English law of
agency ® the authority of the principal is irrevocable where
the agent has acquired a legally recognised interest in the
continuation of the contractual relation. 3)
Modifica-
tions of
the gene-
ral rule.
1) German code par. 671 French code art, 20QS, Japan cod© art, 651.
2} French 0. 2007.
3} Bowstsad op. cit.
/#>.
Shese exceptional oases are not without importance in re-
lation to International law mandates. In article 22 of the
Covenant and in the mandates approved by the Council, the man-
date is handed over to the mandatory powers for a definite
purpose and - impliedly - for a definite period. This is
especially clear in the "A" mandates, where the advice and assis-
tance rendered to the mandated peoples is limited "until suoh
time as they are able to stand alone”. It would seem therefore,
that, until the time of the* performance of the task entrusted
to the mandatory, the right of the League to revoke the mandate
is limited to eases of breach of the provisions of the mandate
on the part of the mandatory. Similarly - owing to the same
reason e the right of the mandatory to withdraw would be re-
stricted to those cases in which the continuation of the task
is fraught with great danger for his independence or safety.
In both cases it would be for the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice to state whether the alleged facts are objecti-
wl y existent or not.
Ihis eonstrueUon of the international law mandates reach-
es, in close analogy to the corresponding conception of private
law, in many respects the same result as the theories which
oppose this way of interpretation.
T : ;  ,     ;:
/^r •
It aiffars from them by the fact that in recognition of
the fundamental legal relation between mandate and manda-
tory. between agent aad principal - it places the ultimate
sovereignty in the league of Eatione. It avoids thus the
necessity of ignoring the declared Intention of the parties
and of reducing the termini technici used hy them to a mere
form of speech. It is based essentiallyon the con«e,uence
Of the general proposition put forward in those pages, but
it is, on the other side, corroborated by the actual de-
velopment as expressed in the terms of the individual
mandates, in the decisions of the Council and the Assembly
of the teagne, in the decisions of the .tmdatas commission
and in those of national courts.
S»woother instrtetive instances of interpretation of
a conception of private law used in a treaty are c o i n e d
in the Alabama arbitration treaty ("due diligence") sad in
the treats providing for the British Suiana boundary
arbitration (prescription)'. • *hey will be discussed in
the Chapters dealing with « » respective arbitrations.
? J *^ ke the English
ana American commn law, mar ,
properly be resorted to &s a
Jbher.nfthe *?tr*»sic value of
fcherules of Internationa law...
CHAPTER IV. Internationa Lsw,p<^4*, n./,.
Private Law Analogies outside Treaties .
^he investigation into private law analogies outside the in-
fluenceof
treaties has a double purpose: it roustbe shown, firstly,private
law on the
in what manner and to what degree a particular notion of theory aad
practiceof
private law has been used; it must be examined, on the acquisi-
tion of
other side,how far the use of private law did,in a territo-
rial '
particular case, prove to be an ordering element in the sovereign-
ty.
development of the respective part of international law.
The part of international lsw upon which private law
has engrafted itself with the greatest force and durability
is that relating to acquisition of territorial sovereignty
over land, sea a«3iterritorial waters. This influence
dates from the formative period or international law, and it
did not cease until to-day,although it is now obscured by
tre reaction against the so-called patrimonial conception
of state.
"Without some acquaintance both with the language and
doctrine of the Roman law upon the subject of possession
and dominion, it Is Impossible correctly to understand and
/ - -  -sa-< .. • - ,.' ' Jm-
Justly to appreciate the writings of commentators upon
/
International law'*(on the subject of acquisition of
terdtorlal sovereignty) - says phlllimore1>, giving thus
expression to an almost unanimous opinion or writers*).
V,ShSVS l° enqUlru Bheth«r ‘his influence is of a rerely
historical importance or .tether l M esBence ls preEerved
in the international law of to-day.
There are two essential principles, both taken rrom The re-
•0*,, lav,,but inherent in every system of private juris- 2? ? ™ '
prudence, which form an integral part of the i nternal !
iaw to-day. There is. firstly, the principle that the
r 0 r » S Of acquisition of territory are regulated and
defined by International law. There is a l i m i t e d
number of modes of accuisition of territory, although it
may be a matter of dispute whether accretion o,TsubRation
or prescription form a special mode of their own. or ought
to be included as sub-divisions in other groups2). Fut
international law will not recognise any acquisition of
territory accomplished outside the accepted forma. Hot
every acquisition is lawful acquisition. The dictum
""esitsstand glelcht Kechtzustand" (possessionla law) has
no validity in toterational 1..S). iSere^ unaocomp£mle<J
1) Oppenheim Vcfci.p.3V4s WeBtlate vol a. p.88| ^
*) **ithregard to accretion:
gruende, p.418; with regard to ^oelkerrechtliche firwerbs-
p.392; Twiss vil.I.p.8B7 (tl?if®J«g»tlon« Pradier- Fod^. VdUH.
juridically into title by c l l t l t n t ^ n^ t resolves itself
p.3ee. (subjugation confers no titL *?uel?*lle*'H°nfils,19i£i.
below). “ ers no title at all; prescription.see
3) ln «o»i-«ion of
* • * p.107, OareL p s8 ",aint'8lned^ op.oit/
by a legally recognised form of acquisition does not confer a
legal title, &ven the title by conquest is regulated
and well defined by international law*).
The second principle, dominating the theory and 'Aheconnection
of animus and
practice to-day not less than a hundred or two hundred Corpus.
years ago* is that based on the Homan law rules of
possession, on the connection of animus with corpus,
of the bodily act with the mental attitude, from
Grotius*5^,Vattel*H and Cynkershoek^, through j
innumerable disputes accon^anying the discoveries of
new parts of the world to the articles 34 and 35 of
the Congo Conference of Berlin which gives a modern
- / N -i*
formulation to the requirement of ’’corpus’1-there is
the «ame principle underlying the theory and the
practice of original acquisition of territory. It was
of the greatest importance as an ordering element in the
development of international law and international
relations in the period following the discovery of the
Hew fiorId.
1) I say is - although it should, perhaps, be said: was. It
appears that Article ID of the Covenant of the League - not
so much by its actual contents as by the interpretation
given to it by the sub-sequent resolutions of the
different organs of the League - abolishes the title by
conquest altogether.
2) L .II.c.XI.s.2; L.IJ .c.VIII s.3; see also passages in ’’mare
liberum”1quoted belowa
3} I. s.g08.
4) de dominio maris, Cjg.I.
n , v v
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39. States and writers were being confronted in those The histori-
cal function
turbulent days of partition by two opposing principles? of the
"animus and"
the principle of papal grants, of title given by pure corpus”
principle.
discovery, of extensive rights given by the so-called
contiguity; and by the private (Komsn) principle
of the connection of will and fact. ihat principle
could oppose the rights granted in 1493 by the Pope
^ Alexander V to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain over
"all land further westthan a line drawn from north to
south, a hundred leagues west of the Azores of which
no Christian power had taken possession before
Christmasday 1192"t and the rights of Portugal over
the lands east of that line? or the exaggerated claims
of fictitious discovery? or the conflicting rights of
contiguity stretching so far as Imagination or scant
geographical knowledge reaches? 2he Jregon auestion,
the Louisiana dispute, and the Hritish-Venesuelan
Guiana arbitration afford ample evidence that even so
late as the nineteenth century the question did not
leave the field of controversy1^. How, says Vattel1
•i-• “ -y'•
•- • 1‘ ' ./ i
"... when explorers have discovered uninhabited land
through ?ihichthe explorers of other nations had passed,
leaving soiresign of their having taJkenpossession, theyI ^ ' .... jc}   '
have no more troubled themselves over such empty forms
1) For references to these disputes, as well as for a lucid
exposition of the question s.Hyde, Vol.l. pp.164-6.
//3.
than over the regulations of Popes, ^ho divided a large
part of the world between the croons of.Castill® end
Portugal.”1^ This sharp statement, undoubtedly written
under stress of c.lrcusnst.ances accompanying the set tlenient
of these Questions among nations, clearly shows how great
 ??8Sthe need of a comprehensive rule to master the facts
ol the international life of the day and to command the
respect o*.navigators and statesir&nin a greater degree
than the regulations of the Popes and the principles of
fictitious discovery. This rule has "beensupplied by the
private law of Ross* by the private law of possession and
of property, Its was not often that English Admiralty
juages had recourse vo r.oman law, but Lord £toaell had* it
seems, no hesitation in applying it to questions of
territorial property. &e sais In his Judgment in the
Fafiia All concur ... in holding it to be a necessary
principle of jurisprudence that, to complete the right of
property, the right to the thing and the possession of the
thing itself should be united ... this is the general rule
of property and applies, X conceive, no less to the right
of territory than to other rights And - seventy years
later - a fairly positive writer like S"»issregards it as
suiiicient to repuaiate the clainnof a state to territory
on the ground of sserediscovery, by the simple statement
1) B .1„s.208. ,
2) 5.C. Hob .Adffi.Hep. pp.114-16.
<"?. , , , .V
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that it is neither “recognised in the Roman law nor has
it s place in the system of Grotius or of Puffendorf?^ ^
It was only natural that Roman lew could not deal with
a l l the contingencies arising out of the discovery of
the M»w World* hut this is of minor importance in
comparison Kith the weight of the service it has
3)
rendered. It is firmly embedded in the international
la* of lo-dsy and the great majority of writers do not
hesitate to use the terms of corpus and animus in
1 -1
order to explain the present law of occupation as a title
for acquisition of territorial sovereignty* It is9
therefore* inaccurate to assume that the adoption of
this private law principle is solely a result of the
then prevailing patrimonial conception. It has been
largely called into life by urgent necessities of
j , * \ *
international intercourse, and it was ov*ingto these
necessities that a close analogy of rules has been
established *
1} p.197; The Oregon %iestion p.156.
2 ) The Cuke of Wellington demanded repeatedly,in the coarse of
his negotiations with Russia# to he supplied with the opinion
of the 0civilians” on the legal Questions connected with the
claims of Bussia* This, it seems* has been done, because he
writes in a note to Count Nesselrode, in October 1882*
referring to the claims put forward in the Kussian Ukase of
1821s "'.Thusin opposition to the claim founded on discovery...
*?ehave the undisputable claim of occupancy and use for a
series of years uhich all the best writers on the law of
nations admit is the best founded claim to a territory of
this descriptiontt(Appendix to the
Alaskan arbitration pp.113-17).
s) I ^ U i V 5^ S ^ S M 5 ; 8 T
Caae of the IS.S. in the
d by some writers*for in-
268; como.Wenkeira I.p.385,
40. Store is soothe? reason ehich causedthis
fundamentalpart of the private lao rule8 of
-lieanalogy
'beUetm
sot®r&Ignty
possessionto bocone firmlyrooted m Inter- pr°p8rty-
national13». The reason Is slsaplythis, that there
exists, after all, a definite analogy betseen terri-
torial sovereigntyand propertyjn private Isa. I
says analogy,not identity. There an Identity
of the two notions in the time of the patrimonial
theory. To-day, the publicists,suite rightly,
reject this identificationas ant.icuatedand as
unworthyof our tie® end of our eferaocrsticInstitution*).
..Butit is often forgotteninthis reactionagainst
patrimonialideasthat both institutesere nevertheless
analogous. Hot so ouch by the fact of the object of
*iOthbeing transferal?e, se by the absoluteand exclu-
sive right of the entitledsubject of laa over territory
(in --hocase of a state} aui over the object of private
property*). They belong. In juridicallogic, to the earn
class of rights; they differ only in the object of the
right,.The so b ® piece of land n a y be under the territorial
sovereigntyof one state end under the private propertyof'
1' P5-01-®!I’irittointern.piibl.3rd ed. par.863.
2) . G^r inetfisi
1
H(o.
' 1)
another3 treaties exist to this effect . But it is
futile to deny that "bothrights, although they differ in
their contents, are similar in their'legal relations -?
sshichalone constitutes the basis of analogy2^. is it
not suggestive that there is scarcely a writer ?*ho,
notwithstanding the undoubted rejection of the
'‘patrimonial**way of thinking, doest not use the
expressions'*'internationalproperty*’and “rights of •
property and jurisdiction”?
Ihis intrinsic analogy explains why international
:'': '''-?yJ
law relating to acquisition of territorial sovereignty
has retained not only the classification but also many
rules of the privste-and especially Homan - law of
~'f\%  ''
property and possession. Ihe division into original
and derivative acquisition has been retained, and all
the three Boman law modes of original acquisition:
occupatio, accessio, prescriptio have been taken Occupation.
tr. ^ , Accretion,
over. - -J-hecase of occupation has been already dealt
with. How, it is generally recognised that in the
case of accretion the rules of Homan law have
regained unchanged until to-day5i although they have
__ \
1) ilellborn*System des Voelkerrechtes, p.30.
£) Only in one case would we be obliged to abandon the
analogy: if we agreed to regard territory not as an
object of the rights of the state, but as an element
of the state. This construction adopted by Fricker
(von Statsgebiet, 1867) has been generally rejected.
3) Fenwick p.229; ‘iaylorp.273; in detail,PhilliirioreI.p.342.
to.
"beenextended from fluvial accessions to those arising
on the sea-shore1! Wot later than 1911, the Roman law
terminology and.Koman lassrales on this subject have
been used, in the Chamizal ax*itrationbetween the United
States and Mexico, not less freely than in the formative
period of international law ^ ‘ihatmany of these rules
are simply the embodiment of coiamonsense does not alter
the fact that they have been taken from private law ^
i {
41. The influence of the private law doctrine of xhe influem
intention coupled with actual possession as an essen- la^ujon^th*
tial condition for acquisition of territorial so- ofV?hePcon-
vereignty was not, however, limited to acquisition the freedom
of sovereignty over land* It is generally overlooked
— —— — ___
1) comp.Lord ktosvell’sRoman law reasoning in the Anna.
2) see the award in Am. J . I. L., 1911, p.786.
3) Hall p. 1^5; Sriepel: ,p.22D; Eluntschli. p.179.
4) Ihe scope of this monograph does not permit an investi-
gation into the iniluence of private law on the develop-
ment of the Institute of cession. It is clear that
cases of acquisition of territory by gift, exchange, cr
testamentary provision are not likely to occur*now to
any noteworthy extent, but this cannot he said about
sales, which occurred frequently in the second half of
the nineteenth century (Oppeaheim I.p.3 7 9 ) 3 and as late
as 1916 there took place the important cession bv
Denmark to the U.S. of !,allterritory, dominion, end
sovereignty, possessed, asserted or claimed by Denmark
in the west Indies ...’'in consideration of twenty—five
million aollars . (s. the convention of ftewtorn:, of
August 1916, printed in Am. J. I. l. supplement 1917, p.
hda) . Wot only dominion but also sovereignty is made
object of the sale; art.II provides - in a ruite private
law terminology - that Denmark guarantees that the cession
maae by the preceding articles is free and unencumbered by
any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants or
possessions . . ,n
—10~
how decisive an influence this doctrine played upon the
creation and the development of the conception of the
freedom of the sea. *t is not too much to say that it
has been the chief legal argument - in contradistinction
to arguments drawn from natural law. The 11Mare liberum" Grotius.
bristles *1th quotations from the JDigestsnd the
Institutes sho?iingthe necessity of actual occupation in
„ 13
order to obtain s clear title of sovereignty. Says
Grotius - combining the legal with the natural argumentJ-
"If sny part of these things (sea or the shore) is hy
nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the
property of the one who occupies it only so far as such
occupation does not affect its common ase"2^ and even
moreclearlyt °the nature of the sea, however, differs
from that of the shore, because the sea, except for a
very restricted space, can neither easily be built upon,
nor enclosed ... nevertheless, if any small portion of
3)the sea can be thus occupied, the occupation is recognised”.
The argument that occupation snd possession is necessary
for acquisition of sovereignty has been taken up by
4)Bynkershoek , who, however, held that the sea c a n ^ynkersftoefa
be actually occupied by the maintenance of an
efficient fleet. &e supplies (in chapter 8) ample
1) iiareliberum, translation of Magoffin, pp .12,13,15,29.
2} pp .30. ibid. 2
3) p. 51. ibid.
4} De dominio msris dissertatio, Magoffin*© translation
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Revidence by which dominion over the sea is proved concerning
the nations which have gained possession of the seanj but he
denies that any European nation of this time liasactually
1)
acquired such a possessionA'. **© have said above that no
sea is held to-day under the dominion of any prince* and we
have proved it according to the rules of ownership^
However, he unreservedly agrees with Grotius so far as
the vast ocean is concerned; "The fact is certainly patent
that this is not occupied and clearly cannot be occultedj
for all the ships of the would not in any way be
sufficient for holding it in possession wherefore no
one can justify a legal individual right over it
Vattel also accepts «rotius1 arguirent^„
Xt is indicative of the great influence exercised Ortolan
by the private law doctrine over the theory of the
freedom of the ses8 that as late as 18^6, a tire when
the principle of the freedom of the sea has become
generally recognised, urtolan used in his w<§ll-kaown
treatise on the law of the sea5^ the same argument on
which the founder of international law availed himself
over two hundred years ago. &e quotes Savigny’s
6)
treatise on possession , and he says: Le fait sans
1) Ohs .IV» V, VI.
2 ) p.60 ibid. ' "” '; ,v- = / '
3) p.77 ibi*.
4) B.1 s . 208. •
5) Bugles Internationales et diplornatiede la mer.35d.ed.1866.
6) p.126-7 ibid.
tip.
—12-
V intention ne suffirait pas pour constituer cette
possession, encore raoinsl*intention sans le fait.
1)
II faut l'un et l^autre reunis . Decuplecentu-
ples toutes les flottes du monde re^unies,mettront—
elles la mer a la discretion d*unpeuple...? La mer
n*est pas susceptible de toniberdsns la propriete
des hommes, parce que la mer ne peut prs §tre possedee" .
doctrine a modern form when he states: “it being
recognised that states are unable to maintain effective
control over large spaces of sea, so as to "beable to
reserve their use for themselves, it is a principle of
international law that the sea is in general Insuscept-
ible of appropriation as property.*' ^
• But while this private law doctrine — coupled with And on
, , the con-
the natural law argument - succeeded in finally silencing ception
terri-
the claims to sovereignty over seas, it led, on the other/torial
waters.
hand, to the establishment and the acceptance of the legaL
rights of states over their territorial waters. It was
^ynkershoek who laid the foundations of the modern con-
ception of territorial waters. But he was only taking
up Grotius* arguments of the necessary connection between
the possibility of occupation end the right of approprislon
1) ibid. p.i£6-¥* Kegles Internationalesetdiplomatieda In mer.
2) p .127 ibid.
3) v ana5a ed• p .269.
s.iiall,p.155, p.l.
iheaton adopts the argument3^ - like many other writers
before and after hisP^. Hall Is only giving to the Hall
til.
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of any part of the sea.“if any small portion of the sea
can be thus occupied, the occupation Is recognised" says
Grotius. He adheres to this view In many passages of the
"Laws of iiarand Peace'"0 . Eynkershoek folio,a closely
Grotius' legal argument, although - as observed - he does
not agree with him In the application of the rule "Shat we
have set forth thus far concerning thecnnership of the sea,..
Is the right solely from the origin of ownership and from
the rules for acoulring or losing a possession which are
admitted by the law of nations. And these rules, for the
most part, we find written in the civil law of the Romans ...S)
“ence the rule of the extent of the maritime belt" as far as
Cannon will carry; for that is as far as we seen t4 have both
command and possession;" 3) »For there can be no ^
he possesses a thing continuously who so holds it that another
cannot hold it against his will... f0P there can be no reason
for saying that the sea which is under some one's man comriand
and control is any less his than a ditch in his territory."
It is a long way from Orotius and Bynkershoek to a modern
writer like 'feesUale,but it is interesting to know hostthe
latter supports the resolution of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law in favour of the existence of a territorial sea
— - W I - K H - H U - — . III.,-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _n |. -
1) Mare liberum p. 3.
2 ) De dominio marls p .53.
3) d . 44. Ibid.
4) p.43.ibid.
11i,
SU b jeCt to sovereijgntyby till©argument ^thst occupation
sshichIs the ground of sovereignty is possible in the
case of the territorial sea”.
i \
43. * It was about two hundred years later that the same &nd on
the so-
private law argument played again an important part in vereign—
ly of tht
the theoretical battle concerning the acquisition of air,
territorial sovereignty over the air. "I.*air*par sa
nature imsme,ne se prete a aucune appropriation! il
*
,ne seoi'sit etre occupe d’une fagon reelle et continue;
il ne peut done etre an objet de propriety a thing
which cannot be occupied cannot become an object of
property or sovereignty. 2his principle of the freedom
of the air* (subject to the right of self-preservation) —
adopted by the Institute of International La??in 1911 -
has been rejected by the practice of states and by - ,<
conventional international law ^ The principle of aer
.'•;ii
clausus obtains to-4<y with undisputed force. But it
would be too much to say that the aerial law of to-day
is incapable of further development in the direction of
the ever-growing freedom of the air.
These instances show the direction of the Influence
1) Report of ikr.Fauehillebefore the Institute of International
I»aw*^ nnuaire 1902, p .'62; see also report of Hys, ibid.p.104.
2 ) The Air Navigation Convention of 1919 ((Ttnd.670).
-
i) This connection is frequently concealed behind the changes
that have taken place in political and legal theory as a
result of the rejection of the patrimonial theory. It would
be of Interest to tra<Tethe influence of the conception of
;- §T$h£ESt£MiVt &f§6^ f0F°the ^
exercised by private las*on the theory and practice of acquisi-
• . 1 • , . / x;
tion of'territorial sovereignty. It is suggested that in all
these cases an ordering principle of great practical merit was
represented feythe use or analogy• It is not suggested that ti©
reppective principles are valid to-day as miles of private law*
They have become an organic part o f international la® and are
„ . •’ ' ' /
valid as such. But their creative influence in the past Is
not of mere historical values it hears witness to the fact
of the intimate connection of both branches of 1tar, a connection
quite independent of the fate of the patrimonial or other
conception* - it remains now to deal shortly with two
doctrines connected with the acquisition o f territorial
sovereignty; prescription and international servitudes*
44. - Prescription is, in international la^, not only a PrescrfetJa
mode of acquisition of territorial sovereignty. It
may - and has been * invoked in other cases where the
lapse of years was deemed sufficient to create the presump- ,
tion of a legal title or to bar a claim, ^t is especially
in the field of international-arbitration that the institute
' • • • - ' - \'v
of prescription is gaining - with one exception to be
property - says ^oltsen&orf* vol.XX.p.228 - and its
application to the territory of the state it would not have
been possible for the old{}theoriststo discover the principle
of political sovereignty. s.also *%rriam* History of the
theory of sovereignty since Eousseau. p.21-34* and Grotiuss
L*I*^.lII.Ch.l8. ,
discussed later l * unqualified recognition8*. jts
importance is increasing «ith the growing intercourse
between state®. *lthas been recognised by «lao£t
all writers on international U v . Sveu those publicists
who sr* usually quoted as rejecting prescription, as
a01tsenS0rf3) * U11,» ^ 44J. °»r3*«6) . Bgwe that although
It does not create the title, it alio** the presumption
oI such a title - a very theoretical difference.
Heal opposition against tillsprivate law rule could
only conasfrom this side which stresses the fundamental
difference 'betweeninternational and private law. In a
community in which - unlike that governed by private law —
force constitutes right, in which actual possession -
regardless of Urns - confers a title, in such a commuulty
is the institute of prescription unnecessary* if no :
possession is illegal, if every possession is lawful, then,
clearly, there is no need for a jural principlemeant to
legalise an originally illegal position. This is, for
instance, the vie® of l>Uzt who ^peaks of "the direct law-
1) ^he Pious Jw A Case, s.ch.7.
11 v S l ® x l ® % ! i | | ? Ulti0nal <krbltral lsw « * p r e e e d u r e . p . 2 e s - m .
4) psr .92.
5) p.m.
  '   \  -/
^ prescription liWretoIre en droit international,
~ xt doee n«* seem that accent
article ol 2*••ilbsy \ih& Story of the Manilla ransom. 1762
::s. “ *“ s r " “ r — « - » % » . « « " » , £ £ w
^ PP80ti0e °f *nt*wl»tlon»l„ ttaj>ll (fw. ^
creating influence which mere force9 especially
conquest9 has on international law•* * This Is-fcfce
opinion is almost generally rejected, but it never-
theless an instructive instance: It shows from what
theoretical sources the typical opposition to private
• -• . < . ...
Is?*arises.
Closely connected with scculsition of territorial |tate_
sovereignty Is tte>question of state servitudes. It Is. tudes.
naturally, impossible to deal here ulth anyother appect
of tbs problem except that tearing upon the subject
under discussion. It may. hoaever, be stated In this
connection that no other conception has brought private
la® analogy into more disrepute than international -
servitudes . The reason for it is, perhaps, the attest
on the part of the majority of the publicists to esibrace
T>y it all, or almost all, restrictions of sovereignty
not merely those relating to the territory of the state
3S such, or to the territorial sovereignty In general,25
'« ^ « ) That the Hague Conferences do not
S o t T r i ? i a r d l y ^ g u m S t for the co«e„tio»
that,prescription is no longer recognised by states . As
to compound interest (the bill presented by the author
amounts to 2,187,000,000 *.) see p. n.
1} p .166; s .also derusalsmcp.cit.
a) For an extensive literature on the subject s.Bwtfll
Fauchllle par ; for *" ^ins tance. international
national servitudes - includi per.185) classifies as
r*T<fn t . e r n a t ionalservltude the grant by the U.S. to Or.Brit.
in 1671 of freedom of transit in the farm of an exemption ^
from payment of custom dues for certain classes oi t,oo .
in adaiiion to authors enumerated by Oppenheim (1.365) the
tiliQconfusion whiihresulted from this lack of moderation
inth© application of analogy tended to deprive it of any
value, even in those esses in which the analogy to private
la© servitudes seems quite Justified.
There would lieno harm in the classification of this The cor
or other restrictions as a servitude if no practical con- c?uences
of the
secuences were attached to such a classification, "but— doctrine
oMously - there are such conaecuences. The classification
as servitude naturally implies that the right is a real
one, that it is not affected "bythe change of sovereignty.
International law is called, in these cases, to choose
"betweentwo alternatives* (a) Should every restriction of
territorial sovereignty for an unlimited period of time
he regarded as a servitude, that is as a permanent obli-
gation running ?jiththe land, aE a real right, or ih)
should such restrictions only "beregarded as servitudes
which sh&rcebeen expressly described as such by the con-
trading parties, or the real character of which has been
expressly stipulated in the respects treaty. There is,
in the case of the first alternative, a distinct possibility
that a construction is being put on a declaration of the
parties which is by no means in accordance with that1 intentions.
follo*ing oppose the institute} Kys,11.p.32o7 the Louter I.336J
Niemeyer p.lJ4 . £trupp.n.77j (partly) Hydel 272-7; Fouike I .p.33,1}
S .also the opinion oi the intern Commission of jurists (Pro—
fessors Larnaude, ktruycken, Huber) appointed by the Council
of the League in.the ouestion of the Aaland Islands (Off^ourn.
Spec .Suppl. 3, Uct.1900) and the judgment of the Permanent
Court of International Justice In the Wimbledon case.
12%,
In order to avoid this, international law would have to
demand that in all cases where the parties Intended to
create an international servitude the respective stipu-
lations should leave no doubt as to their intention.
This has been adopted in a striking manner by the tribunal
in the **orthAtlantic fisheries arbitration of 1910 .
It is commonly accepted that the Hague Court ‘I’heFish
rejected the institute of servitudes in international award
examined
law. •‘•his,however, is by no means the case. The
Court rejected it as a matter of construction by
lawyers, but it was prepared to accept it if so stipu-
lated by the parties. ffAtcould therefore... be affirmed
by the tribunal only on the express evidence of an inter-
II1j
national contract. I'his brings us to the following
consideration: it is quite possible - and has in fact
.i*
been done by the Hague tribunal - to adopt the conception
of servitudes without adopting the so-called doctrine of
international servitudes. By rejecting the doctrine, we
reject the legal presumption in favour of an inter-
national servitude having been created in a particular
case; by adopting the conception itself, we
1 ) The award of the Aribunal; Dcott, reports p.l60j that
such treaties are possible and actually occur may be
seen for instance from the xreaty of October 1901 between
the U.1^.and ur.Brit.which provided: "...no change of
territorial sovereignty, or of international relations
of the country or countries traversed by the before-
mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of
neutralisation or the obligation of the High Contracting
Parties under the present treaty11.
state that, should the parties avail themselves e-xpressis
verbis oi1 this conception, international law will recognise
it ana n ill give effect to the tr*ill of the parties by the
application of rulus generally recognised as applicable to
* \' 1
this concept. The private law analogy is here fully restored.
There is an additional reaa>n why it seems difficult to
adopt international servitude as a matter of construction or
presumption. Ihe construction of a treaty as a servitude
means not only that the right connected with the servitude
is s real one. In accordance with the maxim res transit cum
\ .V
onere. It means, In the case of positive servitudes, the
existence of jurisdictional rights exercised by the
grantee in his own name. Ahe North Atlantic suard re- ^he fur-
ther ana-
Gognises it expressly. So does the Cologne Court of logy to
a real
Appeal In an outspoken decision regarding the state right,
servitude enjoyed by Holland* n... This means ... not
what might be termed a mining concession of the Dutch
Government granted b£ Prussia according to civil law,
but the exclusion of certain sovereign rights in the
ceded parts ... a sort of internallonal servitude has
arisen by which Holland as a state is entitled, now as
previously, in the matter of this mine to exercise its
1
own legislative authority and police and supervision,
that is. It has real sovereign rights with respect to
the object situated within the territory of the
foreign state iUllraann*voelfrerrecht»pp.32D)”i^ ~
Grave doubts may therefore be expressed as to whether
a constraction resulting in these far-reaching cause-
cuences is permissible - although it is being denied
by some publicists that the consequences of interna-
tional sei’vltudesare as far-reaching as has been
claimed in the above-mentioned instance .
*
At is not intended to pronounce here an opinion
whether it is necessary for international law to <
retain this conception. It seems that the confusion
caused by its exaggerated application to almost all
restrictions or sovereignty has become so great9 that
some publicists prefer to dispense with it altogether
and to put forward alternative constructions intended
primarily to grasp those cases in which an international
obligation co&feinuesto be attached to the territory not-
withstanding any change of sovereignty. The fact*
however, that the conception has been introduced, that
it has been taken over from one generation of publicists
to another, and that it is still being retained by a
large number of writers3\ is indicative of the great
attractive force of private law even in titosecases in
which its application admittedly offers considerable
difficulties.
**    nw'W'WWiBi.wiimnnww iii "»«« «—  »«»»»«»   —»— —« v
1) For the award 8 .*m.J.I.L., 1914 p.SG7.
2) Qppenheim I.p.360j but see Clauss»Scottfs translation p.165?
CaIvo*£ictionnaire pp.215j ±%ffter p.lGQj Heliborn p .30-4.
3) see f.o.Hats clek.Voelkerrecht 19 E3 n if,a . „
p*1&4i Feiwick pp,2 6 1 -2 8 3 ,
i
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46. There i»t perhaps* no instance more typical of State
the relation between private and international law succession-
than that of state succession. The notion of state
succession has been created and developed in close
connection with the Roman and private law conception
' of inheritance and succession. From Grotiue to the
most recent writers there is no hesitation In applying,
in principle, the private law analogy to the solution
of the question as to how far, in the case of change
of sovereignty, the rights and obligations of the
former sovereign are taken over by his successor.
This is the prevalent opinion13. It is admitted also
by those who - attacking the use or private law and
international law - oppose the predominant opinion in /
the question of succession of states2^, that the ana-
logous principles of private law contain, quite apart
from thoir ethical value, an ordering fural principle
essential for the well-being of every civilised society.
It is really not Important whether succession takes Interna-
, ^ \ tional La®
place quoaa iurs only, and not ©iso quoad personam — orthe «in
of the
although much is being made of this distinction by' staxe the
international publicists3^. succession
1) Bor^a^c|ncise history of the doctrine s.Keith, p.ll,3;*iuber#
2} &chbenborn p.1 0 1.
Zi °f+SiStJ?Cti0n drawn Huber (p.IS,19) is of a the-
oretical rather than practical importance* 1%
i aa g . , fWn f tg - feke — — — - _
'' 1~ v *’V •;•••*; • • ; .. ~ .. V _ . ,
"' ' '  ' • * '.' • - .' -
The fundaments! fact is that there is?a substitution
and continuation of rights, that the logs! stability
and the acquired rights are not destroyed “bythe phy-
sical end of the subject of law. This principle is
one of the basis of every legal order, and it was only
natural that the general consensus of publicists incor-
porated it into their systems. It Is* as a rule*
followed by the o^ctice of states. The problemis in
international lav*undoubtedly the same as in private
law: whether the legal order, the international legal
order, is strong enough to regulate the facts arising
out or a change of sovereignty, or whether it takes
place in & legal vaccurn; whether the new sovereign
acquires rights because it pleases him to take them, or
because international law confers upon hitnthe title;
whether the nes?sovereign is-bound by the obligations of
the old, because he finds it convenient to be so, or
whether he is bound by international law5 ¥;hether,to
put it shortly, the so-called succession in international
law is regulated by the discretionary will of sovereign
states or by law. The first view will regard the
private law analogy as inadmissible; the second adopts
it unhesitatingly.
In the theory objecting to the application of The l£^ill,s
private law the process accompanying the change of theories.
sovereignty is a question of fact lying completely
outside the sphere'of law. is the theory of Oidei
and of Keith, developed afterward?,in its logical con-
ssqouencesby Cevsglieri and Schoenborn1^. ’’Another
power attacks a state, defeats its force, occupies its
eeat of Government, appropriates its revenue, annexes it,
counts its citizens as Its nationals, m d legislates for '
it. vshat takes place is substitution of authority;
there is a break ^ith the past. The state seises whatever
think of value it can obtain, but it certainly did not con-
^eithereisSthe° posi?ion 1C&iPfe?ifi£raln®tfieecase
, Lne case of cession.
*s=Hhbi£is no legal obligation to take over either contract-
ual debts, or debts secured on local revenues, or even such
real rights as local servitudes of passage - although the
last-mentioned my be talcsnover as a matter of expedience31
Gioel^ supplies the theoretical construction for this assertion;
The state ceding the territory abandons its rights over It, and
the acquiring state establishes over this territory, now free
from any other domination, its own authority in a mannerM which S
*- “v:'?;;
it pleases, and only with such restrictions as it thinks properji-
lt is not possible to epply to internetionsl law the private law;'
rule no3K>plus iuris In alterium transferre potest ouam Ipse
habet. It is only a consistent upholding of the assertionthat
there j.s s complete break of legal continuity when Schonborn
declares that the rule res transit cum suo onero has no
TTZeith. thw theory oFstate” succeT8I^7l9G7Tc^iiTieFiTia <fot*i»
* stato a stato e il suo valore giaridico,
•.-chOunoorn,^taaten3uksession,191d; the sam& views are ex—
cession*fGidel*in effets de 1*Annexion sur les con-
2)Seith9p.6.
5) p.4.ibid.
*11 -- *+3J._ HA
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application in the case of state succession^. CaVagUerl
dra*s only the inevitable logical concision ft-omthis
theory «hen he declares thst the problem is not,one of
International l „ but of municipal regulation fchichshould,
however, be guided by the principle that the recognition of
the obligations of the former state is "I,«*spr&Ssionedi un
eentimento di ecuiU e di giustisia cosi elementare che e
logico Che essa aia reconoaciuta, nell’una o nell'altra forma,
da tutte le lagialaaione modern*.”*> 2.hesovlews a„Q
by an almost unanimous opinion or writer*, but they are
illustrative of the consequences to »hich leads, in SOne. ..
cases, the total enanipstion of international l a w r?0m
analogy to private law.
47. Ihe oasis function of laviis protection of The inter- $
acquired rights. Ihey do not suffer - as * riUe . aa ^der' as ,'1
a result of the death of the individual. Interna- coStinSity“
tlonal private law contains rules safeguarding rights °f ri®ilts* I
acquired under foraign municipal law; the execution ' ^ I
0£ foreign judgments is, subject to slight modifies-   ' A
'•r/r,y
lions, a recognised rule, While pm sowing the
peculiarities and the individuality of the different
system® of rnunicipal±anf the international community
gives thus expression to the unity of law and to its
continuity. Only in the case of states being
l) p.47.p,cit.
g) p.im op* oit.
I)
-j
flif.
agencies oi force and of their sovereignty being a Mwilln
unfettered by a legal rule* can this recognition of
sccuired rights be disregarded by events of international
P/Titics. It is not only the sense of right that is
prlma facie violated in this case, it is the sense of a
legal order overstepping the -bordersof state that is
being violated. The death of the individual and the
changes in state sovereignty are - in relation to legal
rights and obligations ~ legal crises which may be either
regulated by law or decided by events lying outside it.
Private lav/regulates these crises by the rule of succession?
international lav*,by accpeting the broad principle of
privete la??,adds to its character as a legal contnunity.
It Is not on a plane lying outside the law that the succession1
of sovereign states takes place.
This 16 mode clearer hy the following   Succession
consideration: there Is no writer, so far as I Imo*. revolution,
and no theory, which does not accept It as & truism
that the change of the Internal constitution of a state.
In the way of revolution* does not affect the duties of
the state as an International person. And y«t, there
Is no legal continuity between the old and the new
constitution, between the old and the new state. It
originates in a revolutionary act, from which - &yA
from which alone - is derived the legal validity of the
no* order. From the point of view of the ne* state there
>is.
is *10 leg641obligation whatsoswr for regarding itself
"hound by the acts of its predecessor who, legally, does
not exist for him. Bat his duty is recognised by inter-
national law ~ independently of the will of the new state.
It is the international legal order ??hichIs the bridge
between two facts otherwise totally disconnected. It is
\ . i /, ’ , ' ;
internstionsl law which fills tht;void and provides for a
succession of rights and duties1! The same applies to
the rights and ou.t5.esox states in cases of changes of
sovereignty* * l^gal order - international law - is the
link securing legal stability and recognition of acquired
rights.
It is not en exception to this broad principle of The pri~
\ X £y;lrc
private law that political treaties do not pass ~ principle
because they are iura personaU se iraa,which by the ri^& one
very nature of things, and also by’private law,cannot
pass to its successorj and the private law rules
governing the passing of obligations for torts2^ and
1) comp.Kelson p«£$8> the contrary opinion would be*
in relation tostate succession, that the changes
which take place are outside the sphere of law.
This standpoint is again given very clear expression
in a recent article by Cavaglieri (Note in ,materiadi
successions di Stato al Stato* Rivista dirit.intern.
19^4, p.oSJ Tra I'estinzione del vecchio Ststo e
1 apprensione del suoi element! constitutivi da parte
di uno fttatonuovo o gia preesistente via un hiatus,che
il diritto e incop&ce di colm&re”. '
<,) Sir Cecil iiurst*British Year £>ookof International lew
1924. p. There is no need to start, In this case, from an ,
alleged inapplicability of private law, !fherule actio
ct^peoioxi^ s ardsra-aajsttj
"v-'M
fitr-
the*benefit o f inventory1* my suitably be used without
- <lfc»troyi»gin the least this 'broad principle.
a-fcereis no doubt that the practice of states *ifepractice
rollers, on the .hola, the principle of succession °f etate**
not only in rights, but &Uo in obligation* 5 but ,'H
there are res&rkable eruptions ©hoeing the contrary,
ire&tiea* .forthe most part, affirm the principle,
but saaa deny it*w. It is a vicious circle that is
involved in tm query whether treaties affirming the
principle conform to the rule* or ,&tetethe exception;
or whether treaties sfcioh'do not adteit(succession,doi' . -M
it only as an exception to a gprnvallf r^oognisctflprin-
ciple. Clearly, if unanimity i* the.test of a customary
rule, then no ouetonsry rule of internation©! law hss yet ;
been evolved on th® Question or state succession. But
the rect that it is "beingaccepted by the growing practice
of states' and by the vast majority of writers; rmd that
 » | , » j t «*<»'ia«w»»nr")r..i)iwi.wa» ^ Mui,w , -~irim itJ--n-rft-r,*- , i , - n 1 n .
1/ «copt©d by Westlake vvol*X.p .?6,^hose»atatenant of rtu>th^ wr
of eaccemon is ln ft,U accord .lib th T » , n S S UXt l S
? ? 0S£X' 2. 2?. “ ?!“ p“fi0s• «•<*»«• & * s rgmC TI tol r
' f n t0 Ppll,*t0 Is®, It is the mill of thu
nrrt - ™ „pl! Ofeaflva of the respective riftts In the case
°: *o»»rel6nt.T, by the simple etstiasentthat «*
*I I 1 eaeeeeaor is not bound to accept the succession so
? ° ** no* t>oan»3to accept- |he succession* s<o that ' •
m j i ao 1*. cos*a in Hy his own W , s.aiso Coll J s p J ^ X
&) s*K#ith p.*.
1 r ^ ! J L Sff\ttef>,8XsoW R« “»XN>™ (p.11,1005 who,however,
t- L necessity Of taking into coasifisratlon the
intertiEts o, tht neigbboars end of the annexInj- state Itself.
/37 ,
even those vjhocell into doubt its existence as e rale
of law, accept it as a rule dictated by justice, ecuifcy
and the necessities of the intercourse of*nations'^ ,
proves, that in this as in many other cases* the prin-
ciples of private law, far from fettering the develop-
Eientof international law, are an important element in
its development to a higher stage of l&v*. J
48. ihis is shown, vsithstill great clearness, in ITietheory
of state
' the theory and the practice of state responsibility responsi-
bility.
for international delinquencies• Is an international
delinquency committed by the very fact of the legi-
timate interests of one state having been injured by
another? Or is it, broadly speatikingan essential
condition for the existence of such responsibility
that ailful or malicious intent, or culpable negligence
should be proven to theinjurdfcg state? Here agin we
see a repetition of the usual story: the adoption of
the private law principle in the formative period of
international law, its beneficial effect upon inter-
national relations, its acceptance by the coramonopinion
of writers and the practice of states; and - lastly - Its
.rejection by a number of positivist writers in the name
1) Hyde I.p.20b; it maybe noted that other institutes
of Eoman law are used in connection with state succession,
i.e. the in rem versio theory by Bluntschli* .Pradier—foderd,
Appleton; Cavaglieri (p.135) hes recourse to the principle
uche nessuno debba indebitsHssntearrlcharsi (condictio sine
causa); the opponents of the institute do not hesitate to
mention the ^usucapio pro hedere lucrative" (Schoenborn p *l£S5,
SX '
09-
of the special character of international lew u against
a misleading private law analogy.
It was Groilus who Introduced this conception of
Roman law into the theory or internationai law. "Thai
anyone withoat &ny fault or his own, is bound by the
sets of his agents, is not a part of the law of nationSp
a civil community, like any other community, ie not bound
by the act of an individual member thereof, without soros
act of its own, or some omission."2^ This '‘faultof his
oto" lies in the "patientia" and “receptue"; in the
“sharing in the crimes’*by "allowing'1 or "receiving" ; it
is the Roman lav doctrine of liability as dependent on
culpaj it is ~ subject to some scanty exceptions -the
foundation of the doctrine of liability in the most nunicipal
systems0 . There are few examples of the theory and practice
following with such a degree of unanimity in the foot-
steps of the founder of international law as this
private law principle of culpability in relation to
responsibility of states4! The opposing theories do
not arise before the end of the lost century.
1) h,11 ,c. m i .s.20.
2) jj . j.X. c <mOiX   s • £2,
3) For instance the well-known rule in Hylands v.Fletcher:
ompare Pound,interpretation of Legal 1$1story, 1983.t)t>,106 i
also »oline^esponsabilite sans faute, n .D.1. L. C 1910,
4) *or references, s.Schoen, p,S-iO. and £truPP,oP.cit.
'39.
The great historical service rendered to inter- The his-
torical
national law by the introduction of this principle function
..... . . - of the
can be fudged appropriately only by taking intp sc- tradition-
al docfcriifg.
count the state of affairs to which the culpa theory
«8S originally opposed. It was especially the Gernan
doctrine of reprisals, of collective responsibility for
wrongs done to a state or its subjects by a foreign
state or its subjects. There ^as an element of perpe-
tual strife and injustice in this reversal of the Homan
principle of ‘'si cuid unlversitoti debetur singulis non
debstar ne-cquod debet universitas singuli debent,ri),an
element so rooted in the habits end usages of Grotlus*
time, that the great lawyer himself was not free from a
partial justification of some aspects of this practice.
"And this rule has been established by a certain
necessity, in that otherwise there would be great licence
for the coimilssionof injury, since the goods of the rulers
often cannot so easily be got at, as those of private
persons who are more numerous 1 j~hcVc/rilcn.QS8
But it is nevertheless obvious that he dealt a death blow
to the doctrine of collective responsibility by the
adoption of the principle of malicious intention or of
culpable negligence. It is, henceforth, only in cases of
patlentla and receptus that the collective responsibility
becomes, U o M j .' nrre*,a direct responsibility of the state
itself
1J i n Kffififgp
2) h -III*0.HI . S.2*
It Is not possible her© to expatiate upon the
sseritsof the accepted doctrine. It is sufficient to
say that it checked the theory and practice of collect-
ive responsibility; that it "becamea part not only
of the science of International la®, hat also of the
legal convictions of states and of their practice; and
that it corresponds with the conception of states as
moral agencies accountable for their acts and omissions
in a proportion to their mens rea‘#a conception which
must form the foundation of any legaltheory of
responsibility
49. The attack upon the orthodox theory has been The poslti-
launched by Tripe1 and developed by Anzllotti} it ofSabsolute,
was naturally coupled with the usual argument of the ^
inapplicability of private ljn?to relations between
states. It is especially Aazilotti who thinks
that It is the theory of state responsibility which
has been influenced more thsn my other part of inter-
national laisby private and Homan la® - to its own
disadvantage .4> He starts from the dualistic con-
ception of the tao branches of law. While in private
1) “tempts have been made to prove that "therecent practice ' ‘
ol staues diDpenaes *itn the reouirisiamtof culpable ne-
foffn?e a? ‘I131 adopts the prinoiple of absolute lis-
h , St'i°f }m 4 *»*J. 1.1-.l»14-808-86e. - It seems,
have hepn r,‘3i'-,? * f6B Ca3es the dei"andedindemnities
^ b e e n paid under external pressure.
current opinion s.: 5tooreDic-eRt:
(Dipl Protection)’112* 2896, 30 37 .5034 ,492 5j Borchard
3) Ls t trh * I n i iZ i 1 4BaIsfcon,quotedbelow pp.217-259.
general© della responsibility degli stati.pp.154 ,15{
4) 1..don vi e forse altro argomento In tutto il diritto
1^ 1 -
law the juridical precept imposing upon the individual
a certain line of conductemanates from a will other
than that of the individual who is, as a rule, not in
the position to influence the scope of duties imposed
upon him, the legal precept of the international com-
munity is a result or the direct**ili of the state which ...
is not bound to a greater extent than it wished to be bound*:1*
As therefore - says the theory - the raillof the state is the
only source of its obligation, it is not necessary to make its
responsibility conditional upon a particular connection between
the injurious act arida given state of mind. The theory makes
an attempt to shoiw,very ingenuously, ho® no culpa in the usual
meaning canbe applied in this connection. For; (a) if the
organ of the state acts within the scope of his authority, culpa
does not take place at all; (*) if the state organ acts
outside his competence* no culpa can in law be attributed to
the state Anzilotti arrives thus ©t the conclusions ’’the
state is responsible not for the direct or indirect connection
international© in cui Influenza della teorie romancistiche
sia cosi profondsmente ra dicata come in cuesto (lbl/»
L* discusalone scientific® intorno slla r^pon°iMlita alcu"
sta-i corwrdnciocome una affertua^ionedel ni'iminin nm / »
contra le idee germaniche d. Ua £° “ n s ^ i l i t a " ^ a l e L
teoris e P“re intimainentouolle-
L*. ,.,. ,_ frf ercitat'adalle idee romanistische.rene-
l) f W A /jr ne tteldiritto naturale".(p.166).
**^ or these arguments see Schoen (die
Z tT UZn Z [ W / T * * 1,*TJtsch*f •
h»E teen recently ^ '| ^ •;» ««:« the
Oft1 •»»
W i ,
between its will and the action of the individual, not
for a possible culpable or malicious intention,but for
not having fulfilled the obligation imposed upon it by
international law, for having violated a duty to other
states, a duty consisting in the non-toleration of the
facts or in its punishment if it has occurred? not the
fault (colpo) but the fact which is contrary to interna-
tional law creates responsibility**.^
Ihis statement is the locus classicus of the posi-
tivist opposition to the established doctrine. The argu- •
ment that not culpa, a subjective state of mind, only the
very fact of the violation of an international obligation
is tie source of responsibility is being quoted with un-
qualified appoval by recent writers. But in what does this
violation of an international duty consist? It consists
either in not showing proper care, or in actual malice.
^o one ~ not eve£1Anrllotti and his followers - asserts
that a state is responsible for every injury done on its
territory to another state, ft is responsible for not
showing a proper degree of care. But "care" or "due careH
are conceptions logically connected with the idea of fault
192V P-42 J t0 the effec* that~absolutert^po.i.inility only so far as material reparation i*?confpwp-?
J S i 0^ : * M fsctior ramcia °Maii1£efa? eth«o™^? ? t l this view, a.the declarations of Oreece
dispute,Uh IteeiJ\ ri^ . ^ ^ ? - ‘^ ^ ^ o l > the
Je'alhilift1ffB1’entforaulatloa « the theory Is contained in
CfelU* MBCUe U«Mlr*. ttOO. p .***,.
and negligenese1*^
. - • «
The attitude of writers urging absolute respon-
sibility was, no doubt, prompted by the great diffi-
culties in dealing with the_responsibility*- of many
turbulent states, especially in America, for acts of
their ©gents snd private persons in the course of fre-
quent revolutions occurringin this psrt of the world in
the second half of the nineteenth century- The require-
ment of culpable negligence helped, no doubt, many of
them to avoid the responsibility for damage done to the
life ana property of foreign residents’0. But the accept-
ance of the principle of absolute responsibility does
overreach the mark. ** in private law it may constitute
an exception to the rule, but not the rule itself. The
t *
legitimate interests of foreign resident can be safeguarded
by extending the duty of due diligence not only to the
suppressing of wrongs perpetrated in the course of revolu-
tlons, but also to the prevention of such revolutions as far
as possible?^
1) abradelie et Politis,1924.op.ci*.t>p.973-5j-Viescher,
la responsabilite dee *tata, Biblioth .VIsser,19S3-Vd.II .p.89-
*u \ 1 interesting to note the attempt to support the
theory of absolute responsibility by reference to the new
Ctapradelle eW o litis® Pff®onality ot the state.u>spraaexio «i,tPolxtis, op.cit.; hb there is no sovereign.
culnaP'c*tt ^ t dJhe* ?ntity# there is no subject to whom
5f ? « attributed. but it is forgotten that ^hese ”new
rSplaCe ^ 8ti0«1 ***** by real person*, by
ihfm 16 sub^ects of international law. To
them culpa and aolue may no doubt be attributed. '
2) Ana5ilotti,op.cit.p.159; Goebel, op.cit.
3) comp.Oppenheim I.(p. ) am II, (p. ) edition.
There might also have been apprehension In the mind of
t
the expounders of this theory that the unorganised character
of Internationa1 law does not permit distinctions between lia-
bility based on fault and absolute liability. But such a point
of view, it is submitted, should never be made a starting point
for suggestions of reforms in InternationaI law. International
publicists, when they put forward suggestions siiththe view of
altering the practice of states, should visualise the Interna-
tional community as proceeding gradually to a stage of organisa-
tion with a normally functioning judicial authority. In our
case: we ought not to accept absolute liability because there
Is no superior to ;)udgewhether negligence (or dolus) has taken
place; we must think in terms of a permanent court of inter-
national justice deciding in each particular case whether a
breach of an international duty has been committed. ‘1‘hecommon
theory of the publicists and* on the whole,the practice of
states are in this particular case a strongbasis to build upon.
*hey are both, it is submitted, of great intrinsic value. They
visualise Internationa1 law in terms of corysmandsaddressed to
men - not to metaphysical entitled. They regard them as organs
of a legal order, as moral beings accountable for their acts
according to general standards adopted between individuals under
municipal lew .
^ith the question of responsibility of states are the cues-
, ^ tlon of
closely connected those of damages and interest. ©fcteyinterest.
both supply Instructive evidence of the ultimate adopt-
ion by international law and of the respective.gonerally
recognised ruien of private low. - ikebegin *ith the pro-
blem of interest* more«peel*ily of moratory interest in
international law.
Does, for instance* the general rule of almost ©very
system of private law (the position of the English common
law will toeconsidered later) that in the case of default
of th© debtor to fulfil & pecuniarycfcligationthe creditor
is entitled to moratory interest without further proof of
actual damage -apply automatically in international lav*,
uiiiessprovided otherwise ivycustom or treaty? Does the
I
tact that all systems of private law have recognised in
this or othei1form 4 e validity of this rule entitle it to
recognition by interruptionallaw* It will - and has been
argued in this connection that nothing is aioredangerous and
unjubtifiable tnan application by analogy of the rules of one
system,in the field of another; that although there are similar
situations calling lor analogous rules, these rules cannot
derive their obligatory force from any other source than from
the collective will o(Tthe states* wNossuns application©
analogies e possiblie da11* un all' altro campo, perch©
^application© analogica presuppone che i subietti del rapporto
sono sottoposti alia norma da applicare analogical rite»e gli
1) n»Anzilotti, h&vista di diritto Intern®3ionKle,1913,fasc.I.p.68.
fl/Cr.
it
atati non sono sottoposti alle norm del diritto civile”•
It la said that a rule of private law* even if identical
in all Municipal systems, remains nevertheless a rale of
private law* unable by itself to govern the relations be-
tween states? that* therefore, moratory interest not being
a logical consequence of responsibility, has no application
in international law
fe shall see in the analysis of the important arbitra-
tion in which this question constitutedthe main issue - the
Russian Indemnity %se before the Hague Court, Uover$>er1912,-
that arguments had been put forward attempting to show that
the situation is, in facfeno analogous} that states cannot
be compared with individuals* and that payment of moratory
interest may under certain circumstances prove to be incon-
sistent with their self-preservation, feeshall see that the
Court adopted, to its full extent, the respective rule of
private la1®. ^t adopted the view that the non-fulfilment of
an obligation bj one contracting state constitutes a delin-
ouency exititling the other to compensation* that in the case
of a pecuniary debt this compensation assumes, in accordance
with the generally recognised principle of private law, the
form of moratory interest.
t*headoption of the contrary argument leads, in the long
run, to consequences incompatible with the normal development
of international relations. To maintain that a legal relation
1) p.62. ibid.
mi.
between two states,prims facie identicalwith a corresponding
relationbetween Individuals,cannotbe governedby a generally
recognisedrale applicableto the matter in cuestion, because
it has not been expresslyrecognisedbF internationallaw - u
uo make such a relationimpossibleor to render it ineffective.
The postulateof positivismis complieds?ithby the fact t.hat
the statesenter-into legal relationas s result of their own
aill# but it cannot mean that this legal relationshouldbe
renderedabortivebecause there are no special international
lB* rui9* t'° it. Internationaland private law differ
usuallyfrom each other b7 the subjectmatterwhich they order.
Xt the subject matter is the same or analogous,then the rules
to be appliedmust be the same or analogous,unless stipulated
to the contraryby treaty or custom. It is true that a
generallyrecognisedrule or private law is not per se a rule
of internationallavrjbut it becomes so implied by states
enteringinto such legal relations*which con be maintainedor
renderedeffectiveonly by the applicationof this generally
recognisedrule.
The practiceof allowing interestin internalional
arbitrationis generallyrecognised3-*%and specialreasonsare
adducedby arbitratorsin those cases in which interestis being
disallowed,for instanceif theclaimantshave been guilty of
delay in the prosecution of their claim2>. There is only one
won -— m-m-n m u ,itinm u m- h m m 1 ir m ran ....
1ston,op.cit.pp.82-7; Moore Arb.p.658 (GenevaTribunal)p.
. op-oii. ^.Upradll^k i“tep98t
2 ) Moore Arb.p.2186,4,327. »op.cit.11.pp.101-111 .
case In rahk;h interest has been disallowed becau.se “there is
no settled rale as to the payment of interest on claims on
countries or governments”^^. There is no reason for not
recognising interest as accepted by international law because
there is no agreement or settled rule as to the rate of
2)interest or to the date from which it begins to run. ihls
fact cannot exclude the awarding of interest any more
than prescription canbe excluded, because no rule has
yet been evolved as to the amount of ti.rierecuired for
<2)
its completion .
50. A general problem of a similar kind is involved The Mea-
sure of
In the Question as to how far thisgeneral principle damages,
of private law that, in awarding damnges, a restitutio
in integrum should as a rule be aimed at, applies in
cases when damages are to be awarded under International
law. This principle means that "the law will endeavour,
so far as money can do It, to place the injured person in
the same situation as If the contract had been pe-rformed,
/
or in the position he occupied before the occurrence of
the tort which adversely affects hira’*4^. It means spe-
cially that not only - to use the Roman law expression -
1} i<lonti$oCase (Moore Arb.l44&) •
2) So f.l.&trupp (^elilct)p.215; but s .Ralston pp.83-7.
3) It 1» mere pedantry to say that owing to this fact even
the recognition of moratory Interest on the part or the
two interested states - in the Russian Indemnity Case —
is of no decisive value* Strupp, loe.cit.
4) Halsbury,X .p.302.
the cfamnaeiemergems* but siso the lucrum cessans is taken
into consideration. 3-hisis, as a matter of fact, the
practice of international tribunals in almost sll cases in
1 )
which damages have been awarded '. The principle has been
affirmed even in those cases uhere the claim itself has been
rejected. "The umpire desires to lay doienas one of the
requisites for consecuential damages, that there must be s
manifest wrong the effect of vshiohprevents the direct and
habitual lawful pursuit of gain* or the fairly certain profit
of the injured person, or the profit of an enterprise judi-
ciously planned, according to custom and business.’^*3
It sill be seen in the course of the discussion of
relevant cases (s .esp.Chapt.8) that the Question of remote-
ness is often a question of degreet and that some arbitrators,
while not denying the right to damages for prospective losses,
are apt to take an unusually strict view on their "uncertain
and speculative character’4,nyiththe result that the right
to prospective damages is sometimes denied in fact. But it
may safely be stated that out of the uniform practice of
governments and international tribunals, the rule gradually
evolves - in conformity with the respective principle of
private law - that prospective profits are compensated if
1) Ralston, op .cit>‘hapt.IX.j La Font©ine,pp.164,261,36fe,S37,511j
very clearly stated in Moo>e Arb.41J29.
2) Rice Case, x^ieberumpire (MQOre 3£48); Kudolff Case.Vehe.z.Arb.
of 1303,p.182,1985 Ee Caro Case ibid.p.810 (lucrum cessansin
the course of blockade); &.^alsonp.108,95 Schoen i£6~^ 7.
/bC>
resulting directly from an international tort^.
Now, the undue prominence given to theisgtabamasward and
to soa® minor arbitral decisions crested the impression
that international law doe© not recognise the validity
q* this general rule of*private la®* This impression
was strengthened by the opinions of some writers
(notably Calvo) attempting to build up an international
law tneory of damages uhich should take account of the
special and privileged position of states. But it is
not only the practice of international tribunals that*
rejects this doctrine2^ at the London Conference of 1909,
v?h©narticle o<;of the declaration was under discussion,
it isastaken for granted on the part of some delegates
tnst in international 1©$?damages for lost profits are
2 )
not awarded . '3uthow unjustified this view was will
be seen from the fact that both Great Britain and the
United States which in the Alabama case and in the Behring
1) s.Lspradelle et Politis,op.cit .pp.£83-287,978-960; says the
arbitrator ^pser in the case? Cape Korn Pigeon* 1 .Hamilton
Le«ia-f,,r.,tiM 4hite, Sate and *nna arising out of **Whaling an3
Sealing claims against Russia {UX ,-Eussia,'i1.&.For.He!.1902,
App*X,.p«4£-7et s.)I The general principle of private la®
according to which the awarded damages must contain © com-
pensation not only for the actual loss* but also for the
profits of which one has been deprived, is equally applicable
to international disputes . And in order to apply it, it is
not necessary that the amount of the orospective gain should
be certain and exact, but it Is sufficient to sntm that in
the ordinary course of affairs one wo‘ildhave made a orofit
frustrated by the fact out of which the claim arises*.
There is,of course,nothing to prevent contracting states frc
excluding the operation ox the general rules s.f.i. The Cor
venti.onbetween the united £ingdtom*Franee,I^aly and Japan re
lative to the assessment end reparation of damage suffered 1
Turkey by the nationals of the contracting parties (Treaty
Series Kq.S (1924)art .&.e.E.
2> Strupp p.21£; Hold v.Femeck, die Reform deskeekriegsrechti
x duroh die.LondonerKonferenz p.213,n.l.
3f) For the aisctission of.the Alabamaawards.chapt.yi.
>S<-
Sea arbitration represented* respectively, the view that
actual loss only, in the restricted meaning of daninum
emergens should be compensated, and proposed at this con-
ference that full compensation should be paid in the case
of illegal and unjustified seizure.1} The question of the
measure oi damages is thus another instance of an attempt ~
an unsuccessful one - to discard a general principle of
prlvaoe lay*in deference to the ''specialcircumstances of
International law".2^
V
E2. The enumeration of private law analogies dealt with Other ii
in this chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive one, o^analc
The scope of this monograph allows the discussion of ^ide*""
such cases only as had acquired actual importance in the
practice of states and in the science of international
law. But their list is certainly not closed. Cases of
analogy which, to all appearance, have only a theoretical
value in the systems of writers and are therefore vigorously
opposed, prove often to be of considerable importance in
the construction of facts of international life. So, for
instance, when ^ffter gave place in his system to the
notion of quasi contracts, he either found no following,
or was opposed by many writers. But when - in the Venezuelan
1) l or the vieiisexpressed in the official raetnor.on this question,
s.The Declaration of London,Official Docura.ed.by J.B.Scott.-
Kussia alone advocated compensation for direct losses only;
Gr .-rit.and the U .S.proposed “full compensation’5)comio*also
Bentwiehj^ecLarationof London9p.100j for the meaning of full
compensation in the practice of prize courts8s.Moore Arb.2721«
In full accordance with the view represented above are: «*.C.Wis<]
ice *L•»1923P *245,where the pract-
arbitrati6n of 1903 - the blockading powers demanded
that preferential treatment should be granted to them
with regard to the revenues of the Venezuelan customs,
they did not hesitate to have recourse to the Hainan
law or procuration {negot.iarum gestio ) - a typical
case of ctuasi— contracts^ . Moreover, their opponents
did not deny in principle the Admissibility of the
analogy, but placing themselves on the ground of the Roman
law institute, attempted to prove that the blo©lssdingpower
did not comply with its essential requirement^. - In the
course of the same arbitration the Question of the appli-
cation of private law rules of bankruptcy in relation to
a state attracted considerable attention from both
parties* and although there was no agreement on this
point and no decision of the tribunal, it cannofcbesaid
that the question has since been neglected by international
A.Haurlou* Leo dommsges Indirects asdkjes arbitrages
internetionaux, ft.0.D.l^p. 1924,pp.203, comp•arbitration
cases discussed in C'hapt.VWof this monograph*
1) Des europ^oelkerrecbt»18&&*p.183| the usual attitude of
international writers is again expressed in a recent work
of a distinguished Italian writers: Hon e escluso che
sorga.no.responsabi1ita anche da un rapporto cues1-contrattuale
(non easendo inconibile una gestione di negosi o la rlnotlzlone
d1unindebito nemmeno fra Stato e £tato» n^a'si tratte di cos©
oggid© tanto rara che non m&rita particolare discorso. (%mma#
Appuatl di diritto internas.1924); s*Tr^p©i p ,222 .
2 ) Proceedings of the Venezuelan Preferential case p.1094-6,1110,
1190* 1194,5.
! . 1)
awyers . xhe fact that in the same arbitration the
private law rules of hypothecation, and the common law
and itoman law doctrines of consideration and causa veFe -
amongst others ~ used in application to the questions
arising out of the dispute, prove*; that there is nothing
in the “special character” of international relations
s’hich is opposed to such analogies, and that they cannot
he dlccaraed by ths dogmatic statement that the respective
rules must be expressly recognised by custom and treaty.
Shese and similar cases will be analysed in the chapters
dealing with international arbitration.
l) comp.Sir John Fischer ttiliiaa*t Internalionsl hew and
§ £ ^ S 2S ? ! h ! S ^ i % \ S S i r tl« - « « *   *
CHAPTER ¥,
I
Privates Law rules of evidence and procedure.
otates are, in their nutusX relations* subject to rules v
either expressly recognised by them, or flowing from the very
nature ol'thoae relations and ;rom the fact that they constitute
a legally ordered co.wunlty The attempt has been made In the
preceding chapters to establish that in the absence of rules ex-
pressly provided by custom and treaty t it is , on the whole, Estoppel
private law as generally accepted by civilised communities T?hich ion
supplies the element of development for international law and
the rules for decision in individual cases, it does so, not
because it has been expressly recognised by sovereign states*
f
but because it contains, in the'majority of cases, the juridical
elements of xhe respective interstate relations, The saiwe
applies with no less force in principle, although witirsome mod-
orrrw*^-
ifiCations in detail, to^concepts of private law as rules of
evidence and,procedure* It is not possible to deal here with all
v
cases of this‘kind; only the most typical instances will be
adduced-in ord-r to illustrate the general principle. Of them
there is m m more instructive or better illustrated by cases
t&Jcenfrosathe practice of states, than that of estoppel, X
propose, therefore* to deal at some length with this doctrine*
?It is instructive because it aho#s how even a technical rule
of evidence in private 1m la being incorporated into intern-
'national law,^because it throws light , not only on estoppel ,
strictly spefaking, but also on the Antiey-m*.irl-ei».1 rules of ad-
mission and waiver (aveu, renonoiation; Anerkenndlng, VYrr
ihc doctrine or estoppel is prima facie a private law
The doc-
trine of
estoppel a
doctrine forming a part of the law of evidence. It is, at tlie universal
rule,
first sight, a strictly technical rule unfit to be applied in the
“rough jurisprudence of nationg0. Where one by his word or
conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of
% certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belietf
so as to alter his previous position, the former is concluded
from averring against the latter a different state of things as
existing at the same time" - this is the classical formulation of
confined to English law, and that it cannot therefore be regarded
as a general principle of private jurisprudence• But this is only
so in form* In substance, the principles underlying estoppel are
recognised by all systems of private law, Wot only so far as
^estoppel by record (estoppel by judgment) i - concerned, but also -
under different names, - with regard to esto pel by conduct and by
k9)
TJ Lord foiyftan,G.J* in Pickard v,’Sears, 1837,6# A,V,E, p. 474,;
'comp* also McNair, Legality of the occupation of the Ruhr, Brit.
Yearbook of I.L,, 1924 p. 34;
2) comp, art* 122, 307-9 of the German Code art* 1541,1350,1551
1552,11856 of the French Gouc and Kiealer, quoted below, pp.
114, 121,122,144,147,14S, 106} s. also S^custer, Principles of
German Law p* 561-8*
1)
the doctrine . It might b&~that it Is a doctrine exclusively
deed.
1I
It is of interest to see how strongly English judges believe in the
anlversality of the rule# Says Lord Campbell in Cairneross. v,
I )   '
Lorimer: ®3a* doctrine is found, X believe, in the laws of all
civilised nations# that if a man*•• (follows the exposition of
2 )
the doctrine) ; or Clo&sby B* in Halifax Union v* ivheelwright;
It is perhaps only an application one of those general •princi-
pies which do not belong; to municipal law of any particular coun-
try, but which we cannot help giving effect to in the ad&i&istaxa-
tion of justice vis. that a roan cannot take advantage of his own
wrong, a man cannot complain of the consequence of his own de-
fault against a person, v.ho was misled X>$that default without any
fault of his ownH - It is not easy to adduce reasons why it
should be disregarded in the relations between states - unless the
"special" and Rrough* character of international law Is pleaded*
no
As a matter of fact in/less than seven great arbitration cases -
apart from those of minor iyiportance - has the doctrines of es-
toppel been put forward by the parties or made the basis of the
award*
In the excellent judgement of the senate of Hamburg In the
s
Croft ease between Great Britain and Portugal the plea of estoppel
was dealt with In extenso by the Tribunal and the principle It-
self adopted.
It was Lord Ha.men who in the Behring Sea arbitration, while
opposing the institute of prescription, admitted the possibility
r r Sherman op•cit.vol*2*417*T it cannot be investigated in this place how
far estoppel originated from an equivalent Roman doctrine (Inst*$,£1) s.
Rlesler, Studien in roemiachenn, englischen und dcutchen Heelite,Yenlre
contra factum suurn, 1912* |
2} ilacueen's Scotch Appeals (House of Lords, vol. 3,p.827.)
oi busin^; the claim of the United !5tsit3s on egtc<ppo3.p on.the part
oi ureat Britain j Article 6 of the arbitration compromise con-
tained the question; "how far were these (Russia's) claim of
1)jurisdiction recognised and conceded by Great Britain ?" and a
great deal oi the argument in one p&rt of the award was devoted
to answering this question* Cfhe detailed analysis of the argu-
ment and oi the legal position in this and other cases is con-
tained in the following chapter. ) In the British Guiana arbl-
tration, it aas claimed by Venezuela that the so-called Palmerston
line of 1850 constituted estoppel on the part of Great Britain
which prevented her from claiming now any territory beyond this
line; it appears clearly from the proceedings that neither Great
Britain nor the members of the tribunal denied the admissibility of
estoppel as between states* In the Pious Fund case, quAte apart
from the question connected with the principle of res iudicata,
It was maintained by the United States that Mexico ©as estopped
by Its conduct from questioning the jurisdiction of the mixed
4oireftissionof 1871, and this assertion was accepted by the tri~
3)
bunal. In the Venezuelan Preferential Claim, both sides
- ' 4)
availed themselves of the argument of estoppel , and the tri-
bunal took the fact that the Goverratent of Venezuela itself re-
cognised in principle the justice oi claims presented to It by the
10*lThTV. x (1875j p* 19§7 WT Soore arb* 801; Ibid p* 916*
Proceedrn^s p. 854, 2024-42. 4)Proceedings, Ralston*8 Report
p.lll, 3453* arg*
blockading powers as one of the grounds of Its decision* In
_ ' 1)
the Alaskan boundary dispute the question again became relevant.
In the Corvla Case oi the Venezuelan arbitrations of 1903, it was
held that estoppel operates against a claimant state, a national
of which has forfeited his citizenship by accepting foreign dip.-
2) l<)ir
lom&tic employ,ent abroad* The award in the Russianjaiovern-
ment Is by its conduct precluded from demanding moratory inter*
est from Turkey because ‘in the relations between"the Imperial
Russian Government and the Sublime Porte, Russia.... renounced
i
its right to interest, since its Embassy repeatedly accepted
' f
without discussion or irescrvation and mentioned again and again
in its diplomatic correspondence the amount of the balance of
indemnity as identical with the amount of the balance of the
5)
principal In the Agreement between the united Kingdom and
the States, of Augu t 1910, constituting the Am.rican and hritlsh
Claims arbitral tribunal, It was provided In the terms of sub-
mission that "the a bitral tribunal shall take into account as
one of the equities of a claim to such an extent that it shall
consider just In allowing or disallowing a claim any admission
of X3s±& liability by the Government against whom a claim is put
forward* 4) 'Ihi3la, it seems, j .<o e than a permission to
treat a mission as evidence. In r&ot, in a number of cases de~
T] see~beToiTchi h * 2j"ciu 6*
3) oh, 7. 4} bcott’s Heports* p* 322 (the award)
Cl/yy^fUwfyIf
I 't VTVf»LlJslLibvt Ki.
elded by the Tribunal the award is based - parti* of exclusively
- on what practically amounts to estoppel ( for Instance Undls-
1)
fame, Steamship "Eastry",Xoukor.Lumber , jt,others (Hardman,
Bavid X. Adams, 'iheFavourite, Sewchnang) the a-guaent of eotoppel
*®8 10!*»ardby one or by both parties without having been
thfecrod by the tribunal.
These examples show how a private law rule of evidence, whlc%
apart fro; the last mentioned ease, has never b^en expressly re-
$>
xcognised by positive international law, may now be regarded as a
working rile of international arbitral las?#*"Xt flovts «*as <^o
many others - fror.\ the simple,fact that states live in a legally-
ordered community, and.no such community, b^ it or individuals or
nations, car,favour the venire contra factum suum, ootoypejfrThe
plea that states have never accepted it or that they, being pol-
itical entities of a higher order* cannot be subject to rules
governing the relatione oi iudividuals, t.ouldlead in this and.
other cases to irupossibleresults  ju*fact, it is very seldom that
states have, in practice, recourse to such arguments
This may be seen in the case of s iudicata, included in
English law in.the doctrine of estoppel. The principle of *e©~
iudicata is , no doubt, a fundamental principle of private(law*
Is an express recognition by sovereign states necessar in order
to male©it binding between nations? A strictly .positivisttheory
would answer this question in the affirmativo. But the practice
1) *1010 (c.d. 6501) 2} St~©ch. Sj also award of C*J*
jin an arbitration between tir.Brit, and Costa Kiea, M. J.I.L.
1920* /
T&ffc
of states mxm&b and ftl&ir it* In the Pious Fund arb-
itration, jrhejpethe.Question of r-es iuaicata formed the central
problem confronting tbs tribunal, the p r i n c l . p i e of res
iudlcata was not denied even by Mexico* It will be seen iron the
analyses of -thie case, that the actual differences betweei?.Uie
parties turned upon the question of whether the iorce o£ res
iudicaia extends to the award only, or'whether it embraces .also
other elements of the judgiAent, especially the reasons of tJ&ade-
cision* The Court foilqaed in the answerin& also oX this par-
ticular question, ssnatmay he fairly called a general principle of
private jurisprudence. ‘ Tlw award does not contain - this was not
/
necessary - a pronouncement in favour of the principle of re©
iudfcata. It affiriosonly” that all the parts of the judgment .X
or t$e decree concerning the points debated in the litigation •
enli^bten,iimimutually supplement eacb other, and that they all
serve to render precise the aning ana the bearing of the
du>ji^uX{^ I(.decieoryp&rt of the judgment) and to determine the
  l' ' 1  \ ‘
points upojawhich there is res iudicata and ahich therefore cennot
/beput iv:Question 11 1}
A1,.''1 / \   : ; ' - . V £
It is dn-lynatural that the analogy to private law has been
closel^;fbif^wed.'in the application and in the development of the
institute of arbitration* 'Ihisanalogy has been somewhat absaured
feythe-fact JthH international arbitration takes, in 'sos*ereapeeti
the place ofjtlak ordinaryjudicial proceedings1in 'municipallavr*
International arbitration had avndbum frequent recourse to
private las?rales of procedure and.evidence*.' Counterclaim,
- ..v, .* ’ 'I .' ''J V •.
set-off, intervention, the principles of sumsraaryprocedure
and other rales have been Incorporated into international
arbitral law. It Is also recognised,ixiaccordant® with the
respective private law, that the.burden of proof rests. In the
case of international tort, upon the claimant state, upon the
.party alleging the commission of a tort, fhere is scarcely an
arbitration case in which this »aoo did not prove of some irs-
X'i
port&nce*
It is especially with regard to two educationsthat the
application of analogous private la*fhas influenced greatly
The compel-
the development of international arbitration, there is, ence of an
internation
firstly, the competence of the arbitral tribunal to pass al tribun-
al to pass
judgiiientupon the scope of its own jurisdiction* It is a broad upon it&
jurlsdict-
rule of private arbitral 1m that the arbitrators possess the ion.
potterto determine their own jurisdiction and to give an £ber
^nataatiitlnterpretation to.the instrument creating their imn~
' ' 1 ... 1 y -
date* it is a rule grounded on principles of logic and exped-
iency upon which it is not necessary to dwell in this connect-
ion* But it was only after a prolonged discussion, lasting over
1'• ."    ''‘’(S _. •   / •
a century* that the competence of an international tribunal
to determine its own jurisdiction bscaraea recognised principle*
fibequestion arose during the deliberations of the mixed co?«»r
l7 Mobri’'ar^p*"si<i>i£0*34,<>03'? Sehoen,op*cit#p.123j Borchard
op.cit*232,3 also p.
H:
ffa-2_
mission fwa M a.a$erartisle?? of the f $reatjrbetween the
trmiteftstates and ©real B rita in of Iw« 1794 * iAmm tt»
B r it ish $he p ® r a f the C ttttt to
determ ine its Ju risd ic tion# and m s tharoogh ly dealt;
w ith %jr the O M tU l ln if t t Ottm i ^ i t ooonpietf strain
th@ fcrifesmalaIs the Alafcassand Isathe Pim& ffcniftQ M K
^ I t woal£ he an M l® tmk to de elite whether I t is a&e
f t a eoosseioa*? app lica tion o f® p riva te law ru le tap to /
the In tr in s ic merits o f ttsci <jaesUon, to the **eaao& o f
the th ing” „ th a t there la now a aRanitmma mtm®nma on
the part o f tbs preset ioe and w riter® In answering , th is
3)question . Both views are prohah ly r ig h t , in the
sense tha t i t is p r im ar ily p r iva te law whioh provides in
most easea a e lea r form u la tion o f the * reason o f the th ing* *
#“ '
58* The same eaa be «*$& w ith regard to the qoestion o f Appeal %a
rev is ion .
appeal and rev is ion in in te rna tiona l a rb itra t ion . I t flows
frm the eoneeption ana the purpose o f a rb itra t ion tha t the
find ing o f the a rb itra to rs ahoali* he a f in a l one* fh la wm
“.... M-, . , _ .-. ,--- „ ----- — ---
1| Moore argf* p* 2?.7¥*
£) r^ooeeitngs of the Hon® pand m , B&lotona Beport p* 11M.15
3} fgg* gammaseh# Uie Roohtsfezaftinterestio&aler 'Qhie<Saap*tteefcat|il3 j . 6 W 0 } cue L©h3?evon der 9Ma*aen l*M lm am t% B 1914,
P* li*&; Elgglm-i BBgm Peaoe conference l$09d p* 176. and art
73 of n* convention for m& iflo m U l&mnt of international,
U}'
m rnmw ml® of nmm %m (fWlmm& m *m ? ftyOko Hw
aa<*   **  * !* •* Ql»miwt 15 and i t ta sow aeeep*-
1^3010* * pris t flip lo o f ao6ern p riva te ja r la~
prudcrnc*« Oa U * otb©r tea^„ iM 'lis rega rtii&g fh© a rb itra l
award a& f t i f t i , raotfem ayafctaa gs&vitfft a aafagaard aga ins t
a taas * d©ma i^s!sg a fo rm ! as iiio r iaa tloa fo r t te tfe t-
©ation q£ Iflhoa$ar$ fey$!*? ©tata aoarta ^ or feysr^sSSng
re l ie f la ca&ea o f ® M «« l nlooarria$© o f Jua tioo* ^ i t
m y be a» ti now. a fte r a long ta t t l* la feooka aM {«»} a t
ooaferftmrae* tha t «t» < lem oz**n t feas foXXow*<3# 00 fa r as
tt* finality of the ward is eonaeraed, the obvione pria-
eipleof private law. "The award duly pronoanesotana noti-
fied to the amenta of the parties settles the diapate
definitely and without appeal". (4) Bat the analogy has
not been enrriec!so fiaraa to provide a aafegttard"in
ease of en invalid aoapxmim, or in eaa® 0f exooaa of
authority, or of proved oorruptton of one of the arblfc-
••'.),•-• ,: .,.;' ..a. , •• r- •• -•;'7.
******* w ** mmntl& i orror." 5> fi» m *w & m 1w «
paaala at*the eoaoad Bag»t conference proved atoerliv©
1) £» XIX, C!u so,,
81 •*• *>*. 1. * * w 8 * » * urn, BaUhory
4) a S f f fffiSffig 1* ’ f » « • » » *»«*«*» W ; lo«l
rVJSf^^S* • P M H **> **KevlaioBof the par.
s g s j K M » s : | g
*> “ ® w a ^ L „ ^ . t r r r s r
/6*.
foeoauaeof opposItion IftoiSMr^atfttrliatoiat«f
a re«1 peraaaont 00art of arbitral Jifrttoiwhich eonlA
aerve as a ooart to dcsido In mm® of anility «f
tba aeartl» Bnt tfcsroIs no raaaon why hm e with the
Permanent Omrt of International jmHa® in exietenec.
t'
th© ana logy ahoa ld no t bo oompletatf. ^h ia *rossXa satmtan®
t ia l ly atreng then th© la s t l in t* o f in te rn a tion a l a rb itra -
t io n . 1}
59* Haro fcho eons taora tion o f in<?m a«a l oasas o f p r l- mn&m
*• in it&ndas
?ate law ana logy aaosas to an and. i t ia not oonte ndod "
tha t tha l is t o f poss ib le o r o f aa taa lly agp liaa atm lo~ p S lt**
gias la fifcaraby axhaaeted* tu * h is to ry o f in te rn a tion a l
law , o f peaoa ana war* la rio fc in in® tana© a o f ana logy
*' . 4'
no t isan tl oned In tfca la a t thro© adap tors. Eero T&olong
fo r ina tanoa ; t *» in flaano© o f p riva ta law apon the
•rcragoaent of the aontents of lntensaUon^iaw. l.o.
upon the ^rstoiaof International law, £) upon tl»
institute of aonaonlnlna, upon the Choosy and jirootloo
of ratification, 45 stpontte oonoopti.on of e»intessstioaai
11 M appealand revision sea Jiaeswsoh, diojbaiir©P* 3m$*4wm+ r
’**** ' * » w w * ‘w. M M U W t
33 asm. vo, i. 331,si
4) "rlepol p. SIS.
ffc.
1)
guarantee, open the eeneeptifrna as ee lf-h e lp , aaaeea it,
«wa a e li-p re mrr&iiim, "1apua th * no tion ot the equa lity
etatae, tad it woaia be interesting te traoe the
iiu'laeaee e£ iioiaaa law upon the early lateof eontrofcsna
ana upon the International lama£ the eea, * * er the at-
*ca^te tB «*K>13 iionsanlaw aaalegiee ta toe esaeeptiaa at
Uaakata 8>
60, It m a only intended to ttoroweo?aelight upon thoe©
Epical loeta»« *hicfa,it is tmliev«<*9ahow that tfea
usaally eaeouatered picture of international las?i«rpeae&
in its growth fej?an exaggerated n«e e£ private law i»
niflioading. It will toewen, in the eonrgo of
the aaal^eie o* caeoe e£ internation^art)itration,that
t M® inti-.at© eenneotiOTj,m often challenged mdor tha
inflateace oX the positivist tendencies 1© aisoftvtoaa
ana «n<Sigrated rale o£ practical application* It haa
already fecenmeatioaed that to w n M m ffceeettle»®nt
of international diapita to application o* ©weftmiae i|-
ae «ora a recognised part o£ the positive international
She eourcea
fltfdevelop<»
mnt of 4n-
tera&tioaal
law*
li Jf L??1**®1 Oaraatie, 1911, pp. 31 .
s> a“ * p?‘ m * m S 8w *tu e T, I I o . I l . B .fi.
!.®S* oi*° Mc Mn& oa op.eit* th rm ghm t*
4 1 l U “U 3 (*Uh aKipi0*«•***•••>.
f> orttflaa# vol. s. p* 3£9*
® ' ««> <*Mwaa**«« e t the Bagae aeeu lationa
r* aa ; usufruetory ajt t$ie iraBOvat»Xe
* etates Hollaaa» the law® *£ war oatland* p*58.
/1m (in the cur m iit moaning) is to renounce, in
a great majority of eases, emy settleanestat all;
to confine internatlonal tribunalb to such rules
is to render abortive a judicial pronounoesaenfc
altogether* the realities of international life
cannot, however, talesinto account onerifledtheories*
ireshall mz that, as a rule, the parties to m
international dispute, and, what la more important,
a considerable number of arbitral awards9 have no
hesitation in applying the u»dlogy of statos ana in-
dividuals and in making use of private law rules,
notions*and arguments*
!2hereis, naturally, a consensus of opinion
that in no systea of law are gaps as nameroue as
in international law ^
but tfc*views differ widely as to the eompetAnoe of judges
ana arbitrators to fill them*1* :UouBaaafcpoint®, as a
source of decision in Buch <smmt to analogy - analogy with-*
in international law ana in accordance with a ciplrltof
internationallaw* £E® refer® also to logical deductions
on scientific b»si#* ^ In order to make jffMlble such an
analogy, he continues, it is?necessary * to appoint judges
coming from countries with different system??of r a u nl c i
p a 1 law* In the same way* J.gJiootfc,while speaking on
the administration of international law saidequity by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, urges the neeeasity of
judges coding from countries with various systems* as well
as the necessity of the *internationaXl*ati®nf'of municipal
law for the purposefiof this couM*3) « It is the sume
idea that finds expression in article 38 of the sstal* of
the fermanent Court of International Justice• It provides
that the Gourt akal! apply:..<3* the general principle©
of law recogniseJ.by civilises nation®'1* 3?he©e*general
1), compt £Lvaraz» Codification fludroit intern*w *114*
E)* lehr©, p.180
3) . the statu® of the international 3ourt of Juetife^p*94*
principlesof law’ do set eishraeeeither Internationalconventions
or internationalcaslora• both are enusaercitedbefore. A source
of law of lying outside the two exclusiveeearaes of what Is
called the positive internationallaw9 Is fcherehyreeegnleeao
It is submitted that in practice- it itstlraefeeleave oat
theory at thia stage- the phrase ‘’generalprinciplesof 1am*
cannot useananythingelse than ‘generallyrecognisedprinolp-
les of private law*** It la now intendedto show that this
1© the actual interpretationput upon these words by the practice
of states se far as internationalarbitrationIs concerned•
1) se® on this subject Prof• Lianasj Ftsentesdel dereche later*
national eegtm el eelatmto del frlhimaie perasanewtede Justi-
eia# levaede droit intern* (Geneve), 1924» n*3*p*295, ^iere
this provision is explained hf ref*reuse to nataral law, and
;alvioll»loe» eit*
frg&Umtrtem 04'private 2 m m arbltr&tl m
011APTBRVI.
Private law as a source of International law in international
arbitration,
61. While the continental, and especially the German, The British-
American
theory was busy in the three last decades of the past century arbitration
in attempting to banish from international law everything that
^threatened to deprive it of its "independence11,British and
American practice was laying strong foundations for the
building of modern arbitration which, it is submitted, was
called upon to prove the futility of the respective posi-
tivist theories. I shall not mention the long series of
arbitral mixed commissions which, starting from the com-
missions constituted under the Jay treaty, continued almost
without interruption tot11 the close of the century. But the
great arbitrations - partly preceding the establishment of
the Court at Hague, partly talcingplace in its lifetime -
the Alabaroa,Behring Sea, British Guiana (it was in reality
a Brltish-American arbitration), the Alaskan boundary and
 ;s
Horth Atlantic Fisheries arbitrations, were in fact, the
most instructive and the moat important instances of peace-
ful settlement of international disputes. The interests at
stake were, in all of them, big, and, in some cases national
passions were roused to a high pitch. Their legal importance
np *
is equally considerably* fh& arguments o f Counsel were
carefully prepared and may, therefore, bo regarded a® «*.
pressing the considered legal conviction of the Governmentsj
We shall see how, one after another, the arbitrations destroy-
ed th© fiction of an international law as totally independent
of concepts of private law and private law rules*
|6S* a*heAlabama arbitration stands on the threshold of mod* The Alabama
. , . . .. , arbitration
ern international arbitration, not only owing to the importance
of legal problems which it had to answer and to the applica-
tion, on an unprecedented scale, of a well ordered arbitral
proceedure, but also owing to its political importance as
the first instance of settling a dispute vthichraised highly
the national feeling on both aides, and which, if unsettled
would have proved a real hindrance to peaceful relations be-
tween the two nations. The Alabaraaarbitration settled a
dispute that really mattered* The instances of arbitration
until this date are either restricted to cases of minor
importance, or fulfil the task of settlement of questions de-
cided In principle by a peace treaty*
It would seerothat the object of the arbitxmtion, as The four
Question®
concerned chiefly with the rights and duties of neutrals,
does not leave much scope for the examination of the prob-
lem of private law analogies. It will be aeon, however, how
the recourse to private law, both by the parties and the
nr
members of the tribunal, was instrumental In deciding the
Chief issue® of the arbitration. Hi© legal battle In Ckmeva
centred upon four questions? (a) what constitutes “due
diligence1*(or the absence of due diligence) required from
a neutral in the discharge of obligation as defined in
the article 6 of t!i©arbitration Treaty of Washington?!
(b) in the event of Great Britain having been found
neglugent in the fulfillment of her duties of neutrality,
what is the measure of tarngee to be awarded to til©
United States? (c) in the event of damages being awarded,
should Interest be admitted?! (d) upon whom lies the
burden of proof that negligence has taken place? Has
Great Britain to prove that her authorities acted with
due diligence, or in due diligence on her par to be pre~
sumed and the burden of proof to the contrary to be
thrust upon the United States?
It would have been in vain to rely, for the purpose of
answering these questions, upon settled rules of interna-
tional law - for the simple reason that there were no
settled rules of international law on the subject. The
analogy between states and individuals reveals itself in
the lack of hesitation with which the parties in this,
and in many other arbitrations, have recourse to generally
recognised rules of private law#
02,
65# fhe contention of the Unitea States that wth© extent of Due
... diligence
the diligence required to escape responsibility is
gauged by tho character and magnitude of the spatterwhich
it m y affect, by the relative condition of the parties,
by the ability of the parties incurring the liability
^ tie.
to exorcise the c&ligenee requiredvexigencies of the
case, ana by the extent of the injury which may folios?
(1)
negligence" was based chiefly on Homan, common and
continental law, on the pandects and judgments of munici-
pal courts* “TheCourt had now to answer the ques-
tion; are the crlterions of due diligence as applied
between individuals applicable to states and their
mutual relations, or have these words a different and
special meaning so far as states are concorned. this
last contention was obviously afcthe bottom of the British
argument W It seems, however, that the contention of the
United States has been taken as a basis of the award: the
I
due diligence ought to be exercised by neutral Govern-
ments In exact proportion to the risks to which either of
the belligerents my be exposed fro® a failure to fulfil
TXT ---- ---- — _ _ _ _ _ ------ _ _ _ _ _ — .—
the Case of the U.S. Government*s Mating Office, 1871, p. 152.
*2loc. /it* p. 153 - 7.
it would not be reasonable to exact, as of right, from the
Government, a measure of care exceeding that which Governments are
accustomed to exert In Matters affecting their own security on that
of their own citizens11ffh© Argument at Geneva, Hew York, 1873, p.
156, also Moore, $**b»pp. 573, 612.
'73 .
the obligations of neutrality on their part.” This is a typical
private law solution* It ia a wall settled principle of the
Emin systems of private law that9 although the degree of dili-
gence required by law varies from case to ease, it Ms never*
theless an objective criterionj that the amount of caution
required of a citisen in his conduct ia proportionate to the
amount of apparent danger; that the diligence of “an
A*|verageprudent man**constitutes an objective test Independent
of the Idiosyncrasies of the individual citizen. It is clear
that the unrestricted adoption of the "diligentia qam in
sues rebus’*would render Impossible an orderly administration
of justice. The Tribunal did not however go to the extreme
of proclaiming the absolute responsibility of a state,
irrespective of fault. The award does not speak of the risks
to which a belligerent has become exposed, but to which it
m&j be exposed. ^ It is evident, from thecpinion of Count
Sclopis, how great a part the Roan law distinctions of
Xmlpa lata and levis played in the formation of the
award.(3)
67. It is, however, with regard to the measure of damages Damages.
m — — - — — — — — — —
Pollock, OlheLaw of {isorts,1923, p. 440.
|l(£)
This does not amount to the adoption of culpa levriasime, as some
writers were disposed to assume (Lapradelle and Folitis, op. cit.
  Vol. I. p. 970) S. art* 25 of thef®. Hague Convention of
1907
(3)
Moore. 4069.
*
i
nv.
to be awarded In the case of an international tort that this
arbitration is referred to by a<am©writer® as settling
an important rule and a® reacting at the same time a
general principle of the private law rule£ of dasaogessthat
indirect losses cannot be compensated and.that damages
for prospective profits cannot be awarded by an interna-
tional arbitral award. The first rule has been formulated
by the Tribunal in a preliminary decision which declared
that indirect losses “do not constitute upon the principles
of international law applicable to such cases good
foundation for award of compensation or computation of
(1 )
damages between nations*1j the second, obviously running
countex*to the general principle of private law which
take® the restitutio in integrum as a basis for compensa-
te)
tion, has been embodied in the final award*
There is no doubt that this part of the award contains
a distinct element of compromise. There was nothing in
previous cases of arbitration that would as a precedent
justify the Tribunal in a total rejection of all claims
forprospect!vo damages# The practice in this regard was
varying, and, evan in the ease® of rejection of axachclaims,
the respective awards were at pains to show that the
h t
Moor®, p* C>46*
(2)
p* 668*
/7f>.
speculative or, owing to particular circumstances, highly
ascertaincharacter of the prospective gains, does not allow
, decision to their favour.(1) To rej0ofcjln R „we8plng
tatement, any compensation for prospective gains is
ertainly a rejection of an issceptedprivate law rule,
but also, at the same time, of a demand of justice and
sonvenience. The subsequent arbitral decisions do not
(2)
(followthis lead, and the most recent arbitral awards
iuite clearly - although subject to certain conditions -
recognise the right to damages for prospective profits,
?he awards of the British American Claims Arbitral Tribunal
inderthe convention of 1910 offer Instructive instances
n this regard.
The rejection of the demand for Indirect damage® may
-« justified by the character of the American claims. They
mbraced the loss in the transfer of the American Ceraser-
'
ial Karine to the British flag, the enhanced ayments
f insurance, the prolongation of the war and the
n — — - — — — — . — - — _ _
Tl1-p*
3) The findings of the commissioners concerning the individual
ases arising out of the distribution of the gross am awarded by
le tribunal do not belong to the domain of international law; they
are governed by an act of the congress (June 1874) which provided
lat in no case shall any claim be admitted or allowed for, or in
aspect to, unearned freights, gross freights, prospective profits,
,iiinaor advantages" (Moore 4278)),
'16>.
addition &£ the large s m to the cost of the war and the
suppose ion of rebellion*1^ to reaction of claliusof
this character cannot seriously affect the general rule.
It is* So doubt, a recognised principle of private law
that causa proxiasanon reiaolaspectatur. But the Kdirect-
ness"5of the dasages reaains always a question of degree,
and the too general stateiaenton the part of thp Tribunal
contains an element of compromise and was re-
peatedly criticised in other arbitral awards, - She
arguments of Great Britain in this question, coupled with
the plea of contributory negligence on the part of the
United States, were based on decisions of iUaericanand
English courts,2^ but so also were those of the United
States, who supported their claims by reference to the
opinion of jurists "both of the coiMsonlaw,
as in Great Britain and the United States, and of the
civil law* as in the countries of the Roiaanlaw in Europe
« 3)
and in Asaerica.
1), Moore, p.647; and the-British Counter Case p,131-l$4,
137-140 (GenevaEdition) .
2)® Counter Case p^lSSj says C C o sk b u r n in his dissen ing
opinion (For. Re1 -Geneva Arb.Yol.4.p.S570: Where damage to
property arises not directly from a wilful injviry*”bu -
directly only from want of due care, an indemnity against
actual loss is all that by the law of England and fcerica,
or by any principle of general jurisprudence, can possibly
be awarded."'
S). tr*S«&rg« p.213.
'7 7.
65. The question of Interest on the m m awarded for losses
was of considerable importance as the interest claimed by the
United States amounted to about 75 $ of the principal.1* As
the treaty of Washington contained no mention of interest to
be awarded in addition to the cross s % the United States
manded that interest should he allowed as an element of
damage within the gross sum and quoted historical instances
2)
in which interest has been awarded* She accuracy of
those instances, as having any bearing on the case under
consideration, and the demand itself, were strongly con-
tested by Great Britain.3* Both sides based their argu-
ments on private law. Great Britain4* contended that*
according to settled rules of civil jurisprudence, interest
can be allowed only "where there is a principal debt, of
liquidated and ascertained amounts, detained end withheld
by the debtor from the creditor after the tijsewhen it was
1)* s^suiiinaryof American ClaiiuS,TJ*S,Arg.p*573.
SJe U*S,Arg» p.280.
3)* Gounter Case of Great Brit9 p.141 (Oen»ed9)
4). Arg. of Sir RoundelX Pals&r on the claim of the U.S.
interest by way of damages, Brit* Arg*p.551 -667.
fhe
quest-
iion
of
inter*
est.
/ 79.
was absolutely due, and ought to hair©been paid, the fault of
the delay in payiisentresting tith the debtorj or where the
debtor hm wrongfully taken possession of And exercised dona*
Inion ever the property of the creditor?1* Pandects, French,
English and African authorities were cited, Here the case of
Great Britain rested on a secure ground* But she had to con-
ned® that private law ’"admitsinterest ton given as damages*,2*,
and, pleading absence of gross negligence on her part and con-
tributorynegligence on the part of the United States which,
in addition, it was alleged, wea?©responsible for the delay
in the settlement of those claims, Great Britain thought
Ithe allowance of interest inadmissible. But it is signifi-
cant that, while availing herself to tin?fbiii0f the rules
of private jurisprudence,Great Britain recurred again and
again to the plea that it is a claim "between nation and
nations'’ and quoted Sir Christopher Hobinson to the effect
fc » ^
that sovereign powers.do not usually pay interest*3** ft*-
1}* loc. C it# p• ....a
2). loc. cit* p.553.
)* loc. cit. p•&£>£)•
ni.
®be American arguxoentjustthe British contentions on the
ground of private It did not deny that principles?
2)
of private law govern this question , but entered a ais-
.   ‘j.
cussion upon their application* - the tribunal decided net
to disciase the manner in which it arrived at the gross sum
of 15,600,000 dollars awarded to the United States, but Sir
Alexander CSockbum revealed in his dissenting opinion that
^ "L\it took 6$ toterest as the basis of assessment. '•
66* It appears, from son® parts of the award ^ that the tri-
bunal adhered to the well established principle of private law
that, as a rule, it is upon the claimant to supply the proof.
But it was asserted by the United States that as r‘bythe law
of nations the state is responsible for all offences against
international law arising within its jurisdiction, by which
a foreign state suffers injury, unless the former can clear
^its®Ifof respc^ibillty/demonstrating its freedom from fault
in p:remises,after proof of hostile acts on neutral territory
1)* Heply on the part of the U*S» to the Arg. of HJB.H. Counsel
on the allowance of interest in computation of indemnity p.568-575
loe* cit6
2)* loc. cit. p i 669•
3)* The allowance of interest in this case itykharplycriticised
by Lapradelle end Polifcis,op.elt. Vol*XX.p.$81, as an inadmissible
analogy to private law,
4}• especially fchsserelating to the ^Bailie, the Jefferson Davis,
The Music'‘and so on**
1^0-
the onus probandi of due diligence rests upon the neutrals.
2)
Shis conteation was vigorously opposed by Great Britain*
Other rales and analog!®© of private law mre mentioned in tl»
course of the Nitration by both parties (for instance,
tbs pouer of khe tribunal to pass on the question of its
jurisdiction®^ the rale oiusde* , interpretation®),
rules of e^idencef^ but they do not seem to have influenced
4toe issue of the arbitration*
67* Among the five questions submitted to the tribunal in
Paris9 in 1892$ in the BelaringSea arbitration^ two ware of
decisive importance in the <3©teradnationof the issued*
how far were Russia's claim to exclusive jurisdiction in the
Behring Sea and to exclusive rights in the fisheries theAn
reooignisedand conceded by Great Britain? Have SteF
both?
Tim Behring
Sea arbi-
tration*
1)« U.S.Arg* p«154»
2)* loc.cit9 p*423 - 5»
"))* loc» cito
p.&ll®p»440»
loc*eit* p*43B»441»
c o i p: S l o n Cfof PArt: S of the Arh.Sreaty of Washington
of February 1892,
f
5).
6).
7).
/£7.
the United State*© m d if so* that right of pro-
e
tee t lon or property in t&e fursoals the islands
of me United States to,Miring Saa ^hen sudi seala are found
I*•'••'  '•  xl
o u ts it to m&mmf; thme~mn® l& Mtt tb&y mm. both
%mn%£m* in whieh to pritata law was obviously
esasBiisXs pa^seriptioiawith regard to th® first* tla®genar^ai
fttleeof property sn& possession with regard to tfssm cm ti
'MqmhH& HU m& pmWMm of damages anfiof the Imrdm of proof
apmm*®d again* and the theoretical discussions on t o pari
of the Coaasel ***8i of msm rnsmra of to frS&aastl on the m i-
of international law and the w w m * of ita *«#l 0 paM*
&o&t&Sa «a&Mfe3* toriwSMMbM to tM problem oosweted with
this sMajferaph*
6 8 * xt i© teibtfaX «fb»tti«rthe inclusion of the W ^ t i o n
as to the recognition of the M i l ©laiisa by Great Britan
coastfiMflfe*a case of tho adoption of the- doctrine of estoppel*
h .-: • "v'-;  -
* neither the ters nor the doctrine o*® Mentioned in fetefrritt®
and apoisenwgmwafea of both parties, or in the pronounce«*nt*
1)* Question §»
Tte plea
of pve» -
scription,
/<6l.
of the arbitrators * with the exception of a casual remark oh
the part of Lard Haanen, sSho, &foile denying the existence of
proscript ion in international law, suggested the possibility
of arguing the case on ffedground of estoppel« But it
appears ele&rly, both from the opinions of the American ar-
bitrators and from the oral argument, that it was on the
feasts of prescription that the Unifeed States originally
'^founded their argmsent* It was contented hy the United
States that after m acquiescence* fm a period or more
tfam sixty fear#, in the Russian assertions of an ex-
clusive right ofer the sealing industries on the Eri-
Ml of Islands* it is not competent for Sreat Britain to
denj?aow the existence of this rigkt ^ « It seems that
this contention has been put forward not so mudi as m
argasaent in favour of estoppel on renaaiaiatioa, as an
element of prescription* Senator Morgan, one of the arbi-
trators, after quoting map^ authorities on prescription
"asks in the course of his opinions "Will this 2rihi2nal
shrink from the recognition of this doctrine now thafcan
opportunity, distinctly given, calls for a firm declaration?1*
It was the same arbitrator who, in the course of the oral
1) « Proceedings before the tribunal in the Behring Sea Arb .p.361,
7S5-9; arg» of the U.^.p »4C; opinion of Senator Morgan p *30 -54
(Vol X* of the American edition of the case*)
Z)* loc» cit* p*46»
it*.0
argument, in a langthy aisea88ion with Sir 3ichar4 sie’asfcar,
ftocihly urged this view.x) She relevance of the problem
vae conceded by bote partiasj tee diplomatic correspondence
preceding th® arbitration Ireaty shows teat question a of
article 6 was raaaily assented to by bote of team.3' She
Bnited States failed howstot to prove acquiescence on tee
part of Great Britain, ana tea proceedings establishes as
S) ?4l
a fact tee very opposite of tie American contention. . It
is aaoittea by tee agent of tha United States in M s final
report teat "early in the preparation of tee case of tee
Unitad States tee conclusion was reached teat it would be
diffieult to sustain this allegation and teat "the de-
cision of the i’ribunslon the first fou r points of article
¥1 was notunexpected." 4) . »>as9 questions of fact are
not essentially but tee circumstance* that both states
Included the principle in tea terms of submission to tea
fSibunal is of importance.
69. Anticipating dofait jttaprescription, Counsal for p“o;,3-..sy
United States put teair s&ols strengths in proving the possession'
United states’ right of property in seals. Both tee
Unitea States and Sraat Britain, which rejected th#S
assertions, adafctteaiyadhered to private law as a source
for decision. 8> . It is not neccssary to pronounce
x tOic&i *g**» »«*
E)Annexea to tfceBrifeiJh^Gas#* 0f jusUe© Harlasr-
s f e ^ s s & r s . 1™ - a , * . M - g s ; k m ?
*U£5sell’sarg- pp*7-S.
iiu,
Mrs to opinion on the issritsof IIm controversy*
Unt%m& Statue claiisoato hav® established the facts;
that the Sir seals wore "bogotton, ‘bom and reared on
£iLw>XL-
the M M l o f Islsads,^ owned by the UniitedStates; that
tho^ taadothese Islands Chois’hos» ®a spent there a
largo part o f each $earj that i&tle on migration they
possessed the animus s-overtendisad never resorted to
my other land, ana that the o^stonee of tho race do-
I 'pended upon the oar© anclindustry of the IftilfdStates.
But th®$ were unable to answer the objection of Groat
Britain - an objection baBed upon private law of the
Unitod states, of Great Britain ana of ofcbsrsystems
of private jurisprudence « tha \ the seals being
strictly animals forso naturae the property on them
Hopends on actual physical possessions tlxat "if saisu©
revertendi gives property in animals ferae naturae9 fchaa
tho law of ever^ civilised eoun>ry would have given
|? property in pheasants, in rabbits* in hares *.•*; get
it is notorious. . that there is merely the exclusive
right to ts&e game afetm it is upon the land of the
1) proceedings p.7»8»
SI is onl$ natural that, from the ver$ beginning, the United
States teasedtheir argameute not onl$ upon positive private
law, fontupon philosophy of law, upon the law of nature, and
upon Justice ana morality underX^i&g the law of nations.1)
But the SJrifconalrefused to follow this path in a question
where private law of all countries supplies a pretty clear
answer. Her® lies the importance of tlx©deaision wUh&t the
^ Unite! State® liasno right of protection or property In the
%
far seals frequenting the ialand of the United States in
Bearing sea when such seals are found outside the ordinary
three-miles limitw«2)
70 * fhis arbitration famishes an instructive example
Samages
of how Tsothparties did not hesitate - in tliequestion of and fh®
 burden
d3^ sg93 for lost profits to assist an attitude direst** of proof®
opposed to #hafcassumed in th© Ala’baffifl/artsitration*
great Britain, 'basing‘h&rselfon decisions of her courts*
j demanded now damans for pros$e#ti« profits assdpointed
1) , Irg* of the ff.S. pp 4.-25, 613-S43, ©specially the chapter:
what law is to govern the decision?; proceedings p»3S5,36? 9 1S83 "1902g
very clear and instructive is Justice Harlan’s discussion,of Komaa
law as a source of decision: pp*143* .
2)* The award; vol*1*©p*cit*p*73 *
oat that ”the refasal of the Geneva arbitrators to award
damages to the flattedStates for the loss of prospective
eamtnga 5*mast liean&orstood with reference to tha actual
conditions of the case before than"*). ?:he United States
invoked private law a&tfcorities'and,with snorejustification*
the mv&rd of the Oeaava TrihanftX^* The decision of the-*'
frt^asai did not embrace this qoeation«
k;- V-;r.... v.vv- .. ' . v.. ’. . . , ...«f ; ^ :.   ; - ;'   ,vr' .,-• ‘"r;.  , :  '*' 
fhe attempt was spAe feythe United states to throw
apon Great Britain the harden of.proving that Baasla had
loat her alleged Jurisdiction is the Behring $»»*. , hat
Sreat Britain objected, pointing oat that”®&aa a nation
la contending for a jurisdiction la a£ that ^hioh
Is admitted hj international Consent* the onaa mast Teat
With that nation o f proving the existence of saeh jarla-
dietion”&)* It seems that this view expressing the
principle of the onsiaprotect! resting upon the party
alleging an exception to a general rale has "been adopted,
* in practice9 hy the Unitea states in the coarse of the
arbitration.8^
71* *?hethird great arbitration of the nineteenth The British
&uiana &r-
eentGry, the British 9a1ana hoantey arbitration, naa, hitr&tioa*
no lea® than the two ahove mentioned, largely $a«
'TXIKrg '^"0iM,^r«¥rltV"p»fS
£) Arg* of the U•3«pp.217-2fi?«
3)U.-3.Casep.57.
4} Brit,Coontar Case pp.59 - 
5)Proceedings pp.194.
,n.
defendant for Its solution iroemthe proper application of sosne
private law notionsi* There is continuity, so far ag parties
to tli®dispate are noaeem®<i* between this ansithe former two
88391, as it was the United States, who, basing their later-
mention ob the Monroe aootrine, were instrumental in brin^is^
afeoatthe art?itratios* They provided the Counsel for
Venezuela ami the two national arbitrators» Article III
# of the arbitration treaty of Washingtons of Fefcrn&ry1897,
between Great Britain anfiYen©suela provided that: nfhe
\. -' '..-• •;,   1  r <•
‘^rifeanalshall in?estigate ana ascertain the extent of the  
territories feelGaging to or that might lawfully feeolaita©dby
the United letherlanda or by the Kingdom of .Spaina respective-
y':K   ?/\ -•: ;*U;<• .' . -'‘'• '•'‘.' ' '‘' '*.7: "“ '
ly, at the tisveof the acquisition by &reat Britain of the
colony of British Saiana - and shall determine the Boan&ary
lin© feetween the eo&tagyof British Galana and the United
States of Tenesaela", fhe United States of Tenesaela  
based their claim to tfeawhole land between the Orinoco'
4
the B&aeomibo on S'ptin’s ^isaovary of America vfeloh
_.... . ' - . ,  1 • '- i 
gave her &he right to t®s3iis@ to possession tha discovered
countries; on her actual possession thereof from early .
In the sixteenth century,aa3 her actual control ©Ter the
.Orinoco an$ Ha®e$alfcorisers ana the adJaaenttarrferj during
the seventeenth« eighteenth and the first part of the
nineteenth century an the fact that the Dutch rights
acquired against the established title of Spain and the
treaty of Ha©aster mat be limited only to such land as r&a
t‘if'4•
aetaaHy redaeed hy the® 1st® possession; ©a the fact tliatth®
disputed region heing a geographies! and political wait* 'f&m%MtM
had during tillsperiod asonlred constructive possession of th#
M e region; and tot the prosent oee&p&ilen 'byareaftBritain
of pertlose of this region* 'beingin %s& violation of the fgmt$
of Kaenster and of the agreement of 1850 fcttvtpnGreat Britain
and Tenessaelacannot feeregarded as a valid teals of & title3*!.
, Great Britain denied that either 3pain or Yeaesmela,
after her declaration of independence* had at any time real
possession or dominion over the disputed territory; that
long prior to, sad at the date o f the treaty of Kaanster,
the Putoh had founded settlements in the various parts of
the territory of British Suiana; that they extended gradually
their possessions h©tween 1648 aod 1796s,when CJreatBritain
succeeded to all the rights of the Batch* ana that after 1814
great Britain e&tesdeci her gettle?s®»t3 to the territories
originally olaiisedhy the Snteh* - fltoedispute ^as* no doubt,
to a large extent a dispute afer tins facta of actual possession,
occupation and exercise of Jurisdiction, hu% it *Hft noceaaa*>ly
coupled with questions of lew, the three most prominent M ng
those in flfeicferules of private las?^er© freely invoked and
applied fcythe parties*
1) Case of T m mt l a P P ^ ^ ;336; <*«»»«*• S t l * £* 2 2 ;
•pondencerelating to the Ration of bonttesy Ut
and Tenezaelat Venossela Hr. {1896} (-0*-/9T*)
72. Them .Ml, firstly, the question of prescription «hlob
was of deolS^iBportancs with regard to arittsh a*m®aento
m6e after 1796. Hale (a), of Article 17 of the tern. Of
sabmlsslon of the treaty of 1897 provided "adyerae holding
or prescription daring a period of SO years shall Bate a
good title. The-arbitrators nay deem oxeMsive political
eontrol of a distriot. as well as actual settlement ther©-
of, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to oafee
titio by prescription." this provision of the treaty Is
rightly quoted as an Instance of reoosnltion of the notion
of prescription in international law. Bat not the whole
problem has been settled by the provision. It baa been
contended by Venezuela that poeaesaion daring a period
of fifty years is not enourti. fhat tine- so mas the
argaaent of Venesuelan Counsel - is bat one of w * el ect s
essential to create title by prescription; that preaorip-
tion between nations - as between individuals - must be
bona-fide, public, notorious, adverse, vxelualrj. i?eaos-
ful. continuous, anconteatsd and oaintalned under a claim
of rleM. 11. It is true - so i M the argument of Vena-
saelaa Counsel - that the treaty fixed 50 years as the
period of prescription, bat it leaves its other eleaenta
X) Vemz e A$8>,£>«3S4»
fhe requ ire -
ments o f
parserlotion
la iaternatlt
al law.
f
onirapaired. These oontentiong «t« pat forward hy Coonael
*UH raoohrtgtmr. *5 •«* * arS',d • °®B08I!t of pElW“ *
law laving heen expraealy inoorporstod into a treaty, it i«
i g n d « t upon the fm m & to foil® all the implication*
of'thia term. -Whenever in a legal docoraanta *oid eocara
whioh in the las tears a technical waning, that teohnioal
msntng U> «» meaning®* the parpow; *»*
teflng a well-Mwra legal waning, whether they ocaw in
Statutes, Seeds, sill or contrasts, are given their legal
seaning mleaa the context olearly indioatea the oontrsry...
Bo terms are better Known or have a raorepreoise and
osaot meaning than the terras"averse holding" and "?»-
aoription". Bffsst ransthe given to that meaning wfc«a
aaoertaineJ, anleas there is something in the contest
of the treaty whiah indioates the intention to nae the
Uj m i» a different sens®"85. «* t5>disanss.
on the basis of oomon and Roman.is*, the ahove-wntioned
reqoireraentsof prescription in application to the Brltiah
Mttlooaots. and they attempted to ehos that those speeifia
reqairementa have not haen fulfilled eitter hy the B«toh
or hv the British ooaopation. -j). It 13 paa0iM -c io
^ S B S S ^ S T S J ^ a a r ^
£:} &®mm ,X fraey, xoo.oit*
an op.ait. pp.m o - m 2 , w i.io . pp .soch .
the
/?/
to deal here at mm length,with these arguments. It is be-
lievefi that the tem nm lm oonto&i ion vmi sound in prinoix^ .
An impartial reading, however* of the treaty ia question
convey® the impression' that it was the intention of the
parties to constitute the elewnte of time as the only
essential requirement for adverse hoXdlag«
73« ?he queationa of occupation* possession and abandon-
taeat,were throughout the arbitration ia the centra of tie
argument. It was especially TeneBuela who* m a aaccessor
of Spain, pat forward extensive claims resting on the right
of dlseovery; discovery, it was contended# gave to Spain -
(and Venezuela) the right to eonstractive occupation* "fhe
Befcchcould not therefore rightfully me apy, as terra
miHi as, Is&safuihoor any part of the disputed territory,
and any title actaireia&y the Dutch mm t therefore 'be
routed either ntgoaconquest9 evasion or prescription.'11*
£ho British argument Invoked the soaificafiionsof the
absolute title conferred fcydiscovery anS fomalated with
great clearness in the Oregon and Iioaisiaeaatspates;
(a) that whan a nation takes possession of any extent of th*
sea coast, that poaseoftoaextends not fro® aea to sea feat
only to the.country covered hy the rivers emptying with-
in that coast and their branches; (15) "then any European
Oeespat?^
and (0
possess!©
i,lh ipuwwa w a . i,v*wn»»ili 'n iio r»n» »«r»fn>»mmn * .. .sw »»g .
1) ?eaes, Case p,230.
nation m km a discovery takes possession of any portion
of that mn&inant and another after&arde <3oesthe saiseat
son© distance fro® it where the bomd&ry between them ia
not determined fejthe principle above motioned,, the
Mat me® be(tomeseach of coarse•" %}. it m $ denied*
012 the ether hand t hy Sreat Britain that there tea 'been
moh an extant of conferelon the part of either Holland or
'j
Spain as to areata a pgoaaiaptioaof perfect title*
fhe influence odfprivate im mlesr of poaeeaiiien
spon the respective doctrines and the seoeeeit^ of their
application wlasaeverconflicting claims of this natmre
showed itself clearly la the coarse of the argument•
Thej were used hy both si$e§* Tenesuela alleging that
the requirement© of corpus and animus should atrictly
he applied to the claims of the Hetherlanda and Sreat
Britain, as conflicting with their good and original
title»S* and they ^er® used, with even greater force#
b j Grea,tBritain9 in combatting the Tenesoeian claims
founded on first Shsmver^o fhis and the Alaskan
Boandar^ Arbitration are * perhaps, the b®st instance a
illustrating the private law element in the modern in-
iTT"fwiwr“^ iB“"Bw^s r^ii?¥f@'‘^ " ...... " ~ —
2) * Broeeedii^gi vol.8*pp•2189-2819»aTg» of Sir BofcertK«id»voX*3
arg« of Sir* Mcfcard Webster pp,88-3*
3)* proceedings vol.9,pp.259$; 899$,£•
4)« proeeed• vo1*3.pp*819-849,
internationallaw of occupation.
7 4 , it is isnpossi'ble, in the alwtBtte of a reasoned amri*
to state few far the argument of estoppel raises fejTene-
saela affected the decision^ of ths arbitrators» hat the
elrc&iisstanaes?of the case, the force of the plea and the
attention fftldto It tsy the arbitrators make it one «f the
^uuast illnatrative instances of the application of the $oe*»
»
trine of estoppel la internationallaw.
In 1850, in the course of protracted negotiations ana
in ostar to facilitate «?ea a tenporarj ae$tleasmt# Lori
Paliseratonadopted and handed to Yene^ueia a sap* the so-
pallet!sofcoafearg's sketch mat which was regarded Teaa-
zaela aa the extreme claim of Great Britain* It was now
contended by Counsel for Tenesaela that this was &&-
mlsaion.on th© part of dreat Britain that her claim would
) not extent bayong th# area defined in the map, that itwae
acted upon hy TeneKuela tshenshe made th® subsequent agree-
ment m 1850» that she womld sera? haw entered this agree-
ment hfrtfor the representations m3® that the extrema
claim of Great Britain would not extend he-yonithe Use
of 1040# and that accordingly* £reat Britain is eatopjed
from putting forward claims going beyond that line. It ist
perhaps, advisable to ^aoSe some parts of ife©argamaat
The argu
sent of
estoppel
dealing with this question:
Ma.
1)
"Lord Bussell (arbitrator): la your point tto& that
Great Britain is estopped f?m saying aoytliiog out-
side the palmerston line?
Kr.soley: ''Aim©lately» W Xaor$«
Lord Bussell: estoppel?
Kr •Soltys Absolute aad eomplete estoppel.
Lord Bussell: 3o that* if feemade a J®4 ^as
wrong 9 say different right ©annot feemmrm&Y
Mr* 3oley: Yes*
2)
a s s w s s . >• ' ^ T ' & t F S J H S ? *
SbX/ SSSTA'SSS »V“T‘*JS?;»,itf^rpoae^* wonM there *e anything to enable tt**t
esto^el to Ise carried forward In.r^feren^ to ,
which was not before, in tHa a M a of the parties at the
tiss©of the agreement?
Mr.S: fh» interpretation mwlM depend on ffc&twas
 before the Biod of the partiea«
M> » —» — **»• — **»—* **“**"•«««—»'—**"*
Lori BBssail: Is that agreement really aors
than a oodaa vlvendi till the reapeative rights are
ascertained?
Hr. 3; It ®>as vaatly oorc.... K f i r e . f ® f a®3a®n2| |te.
tfc&tariee fro® the agreement * $he very fast ox j i w m
ment by Great Britain of the territory tbat^sae o*aiv.;ed
was ons of the most important elements fpr *enezuela to
eonaMer in entering into this agree cant n* to ooospy
1)* loo.oit«p»£024«
E). p.2026. flSfrgT
/*>*'
or encroach,,
L.J.Oollinss: fan are upon estoppel no?? mad so far
aa the rights of.Ve&esaela xserealtered by the
repra&e&t&tiom of teat Britain thatGreatBritain
oanaot recede .froa that representstion*
Mr* 3* Hot altered, tgyLore?•
InJ,Collins* &a far as she acted upon the®.
Hr. S: Yea.
 «i ’“
Lord SMmXl: It depends if 70 a can show that either
partlyacted to their prejudice.
Mr.35 They agreed &ot to oecapy tbis territory* I
sa.7 that they 00 needed something* they mad© seme *»
promise and 1 say that there was a consideration. *
fhe disc&ssion was continued in the coarse of the subsequent atage3
of the oral ®rgamut «2K $&psa \ms no suggestion feat the doctrine,
beissg a rale of private law 8 had no appXication between at&tea. 3) ~
Ho express doctrine of estoppel was inwfeed by Counsel for Vene-
zuela «itfe regard to the gpeatlon as to whether Great Britain
now at liberty to deny the extensive claims of Yenemela bHaed
on discovery* after baling*  in mny Imtmaws cited by Venesoela*
adopted the theory and argasftntaon wMein now the eonteated claim
of Venezuela it based 8
T T p T O T T .. '--- --- — ~ — — ------— ----- —
2) 20^9-45
3) *coisp*p*2339» ar$* Sir Bobert Reid; He denied that there was any
action on the part of Yeneaaela as a raealt of the Palmer®ten line
^hicfe constituted only a mo&m vlmn&i (?$JS$T§B&m$)
4}  Art* $$ General Harrison, vol «il«p*8998t he dealt tally with the
case of St.Lucia*
/ ?£.
75. flic?aft5liaatloiaof private law is, and shoald fee*of ?&© k lm 'km
Boundary u
a sahsidiary oiharaeter• Where there are avallafcl© other dispute*
fhe &a%»14illJ
nmtzawt, as international eastern or ^ rights arising oat - oharaoter of]
analogy« *i
of a treaty, it is to those soarces that states prefer to
ham reeoaraa in tfee eosra© of a diapata« fhim is s©©n
" ' 1: '   *•.yi- ' >.•> 1 ,’
.••' ' -',:  -r' ;v] v..; ,_..* V - _ o,-a V;-J-.,_... ^ V: r;• .'.•••
clearly is the case of the Alaakan Boundary Arbitration
of 1903, eoostliated under the convention signed at Washington
in January 1S0$* ffce $adi<&al taak of the tribunal was that
of interpretation* It had to decide what mis the meaning of
articles ill, IT* and.7 of the Treaty of IBS5 hetwees Great
Britain and Russia wMoh, among other things, aefined a liae
separating the Hassian from the British possession is 3oath
Bagtern Alaska, the right© of Bassia having heon afterwards 
acqaired hy the United States through the purchase fTom m m %a
of all its possessions upon the Borth West Coast of Ameriea,
to whieh 'mB given the nmae of ilaafea* fh© arbitrators M$
to decide, la the answer to the fifth eaestion, whettser,in
the intention of Himparties, the eastern hosSdary was to ran
round the feeada of the h&ja , ports, havens, atitwaters of the
ocean, or to cross the®* By ra&Bfj roand the inlets the line granted
to Haaala included a substantial atrip or lisftr© of territory apon
the mainland extendicu so far soath as to Portland *
1). Con®, Alaskan Boundary -Mbanal proceedings, ;,'en«doe,58th Congress
second session; th© opinions of arbitrators vol^XJBS-D1?; II•S» arg't.vol
5.p.90; u«5 •Counter Case wl, 4»| #fl; Baieh; $he Alasfeas Boandasry
PeijQ-iS.
m .
fh® United. States “basedtheir claim to the Xlsi&r© oa the
feraaei?of 1325, on Hid Intention of the parties to It, ana on She
ovifienseof fehisintention as rewai©a feofehin the negotiations
preceding the treaty and in the actions of the interesteciparties
after it© conclusion* She arbitration treaty provided
tribunal "should also take into consideration say action of fell©
several Gevsmjasnts or of their respective representatives, pro-
* ' ltainary to the conclusion of the ®aU treaties so far as the
same tended to ahow the original ana effective understanding of
the parties'5* it was as an element of interpretation of the
intention of tfceInterested parties that the United states put
forward their main arguments acquiescence, for over seventy
^ears, on the part of Great Britain in the exorcise of juris-
diction Russia aac!the United states over the waters ani
coats in dispute*
The United states, placing themselves on the strong
f ground of treaties in Question anelof the arbitration eoa*
promise, expressly disclaimed the intension of availing them-
selves of the plea of prescription of estoppel, although the$
hoth were contained in the essence of their argument« if I
shall he able - the Counsel of the Unitea states urged *& )**e
show - thafethere was a concurrent view between Russia ana
l) Oral arg. of Mr. Dickinson p«732» op« cit.
m-
Great Britain mich. gava m interpretation which was in effect
at the Urn the Baltea States bought, then the tFnitsastates
would succeed to the rights of Hussla mite that interpretation*
I ao not mean %y wa^ of estoppel, and I So not zraaato pred-
icate anything upon that or upon the doctrine of prescription,
or upon the aoctrine of acquiescence, so far as acquiescence
&ay sat up as » « w m claim,., and the onl£ point upon Which I
shall inslat upon acquiescence is that acquiescence maf be Ic-okea
to as indicating an understanding and an interpretation;* ^
fli®Canadian arbitrator an« tie British Connell tried to construe
tii®United States argument as a plea of prescription ^ which the^
promptly proceeded to ien^, in this case, as a ml© of international
las?> In the course of this stag® o f the arguments the President,
&or<iliverston©, associated himself with the Tien expressed fa$ Lori
Hannan in the course of the Behring r*eaarbitration, that while
prescription properly so called was not recognises in international
lasw,estoppel ana acquiescence might he of considerable Importance * ®)
But Counsel for the United States, feeingin possession q§
what they thought a clear treaty right, were $uifceunwilling to
exchange it for a contested analogy• AM althou^i tha^ quotea
in their argument the loci classic! of the International doctrine
1) She same arg. is repeated on pp« 7928 n z 9 830; s.also case of
11*8« P 3 102 9
2) Proceedings p. 32£,
3? p . 323.
of prescription the^ were ear©ful not to invoke the iac«
2)
trine itself* fmd it appear^ from the opinion of Lora
Alvarstone that the^ chose the righfccourse* 3* it is sub-
mitted that the course taken was a right on©; p r iva te law
or rules of International law analogous to private law should
he applied onl3? where there is no remedy in the positive
rules of inSectional lav*
76* She English Counsel did not, hesitate to appl$ the
common law rule of merger in order to weaken the evidence
sfr by the United states* s,itis a ml® of common
law that**« when a bargain is laadethe previous negotia~
tions are superseded altogether* Thsty are not admissible
and $ou cannot refer to them* for the simple reason that
' 4)the contract supersedes them”» " 2hey urged that although
the rjae is not generally recognised in other systems o f
law, it should feefoHewed when both parties are governed,
g\
in their municipal law, by the common law of England*
There are ®m$ statements in the opinions of the arbitral
tors to the effect that they &M not regard themselves as
The autho-
rity ©f
Boman and
common law*
Merger»
;V'.J y.
m
:.-;T'
1} Indiana v* KentueS^; H&ss&m&qnod^ Bay Commission under the
  .;*»,$yea*yof Ghent*   .......
g) ,Arg« of Hannis Savior,’proceedingspp® §54-¥; s» also the ©pinions
of the American arbitrators p® 49, 63,64 op« cit°
3) t " 4-2* loc»cit* "
4} Cral arg* of 3ir Ohristophor Robinson p» 4558 6#»
5) a» also Brit* Counter Gas® p» 6-7*
10 O'
bound bj tfniieozsmonlaw rule* X) But it Is infcerestiag
to know that this contention lea to an opposite9 and no Bulss of
lees extra®®, assertion on fch©part of the United States @vi&@me®*
put forward b^ Haunts faylo^'that the coMaon law rules
of evidence hair©no validity in international disputes
because «th* substructure of the whole international
Astern is tii©Homan law as developed and embodied in
the codes of continental nations"* and that," this being
a tribunal governed bj the rules of proee&ure and the
rules of evidence which prevail in Homan law tribunals#
©ver$ fact is atoissibl® which is pertinent to the issue*
ana its pertinence is a question to liedecided b^ the
3«#s t h e a s « X v # @ m shall meet With this assertion
in other eases of international arbitrations
In this case the question of burden of proof forms& Burden of
|>y0Gf a
a disputed issue* the United states contended that it is
upon Sreat Britain to prove that the unai&vigable Portland
Channel was rae&ntas a boundary* and not the thalweg, be-
cause the burden of proof Mes upon him who asserts that a
special a&A conventional rule has been b$ the
parties in the place of a general law. ^
1) s* Opinion of lord Alverstone p« 40 op* cit; of the American
arbitrators p* 49 *
2) Cral Arg» p» SOI*
3) loc» ©it*
4) f&gaors oral arg. p« 533•
3} As to rules of interpretation (which formed,a contested issue
in the dispute) s« espec. p. 459* of the oral arg; the U.S*
arg» PP* 6*11 and the opinion of the n o
v * * ' **« • 1oe* cit»p*49«
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CHftPTSTR711*
Private law as © source of international law In inter-
national ar Mtration*
(Continuation)
77. fflm Pious Fund of California Casa of 1902, the first case
feefttfr*the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the Hague Con-
tention of 1899, gained prominence feythe fact that it did ©x-
pMl®w \ j recognise the validity# in international law, of tfta
prorate ia» principle of res lu&icata (or of estoppel by judg-
ment in English tar}« The text-books siagplyCharacterise it
•as the arbitration Which affixed the applicability of the prin-
ciple of re® iu&icata in international law. These statements
are not accurate* Seliher party to this arbitration disputed
the applicability of the principle. It wa© b^ing conceded by
Mexico tliroughoutthe sfctoledispute that the principle of res
indicate does apply to the awards of International arbitrations.
Wha t rm indicate pro varitnto haMtur is a principle, admitted
in all legislation and.belonging to the Homan law* certainly no
one will deny* lor is it denied that a tribunal or a judge
established by international arbitration .gives to its decision®
pronounced within the limits of jurisdiction the force of res
itt&tcata/1 *B\U was the official declaration of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Mexico addressed in 1900 to the American
batons Intel?,law, 191S, p. 399} s, Blao Hyde,vol.II
!>  115-7*
The Pious
Fund of
California
Case*
The prin-
ciple of
re®
indicate
recognised
by both
parties*
?0l
jSfiniater* ' ^ and this a t t i t u d e w & e 1 ) c i i )ginvariably bus .Intaine &
,'^ T H©3cioo in t*h© course o.fthe proceeding® before the Wbtoaal ^ 5
although Qorniml for the TJfeitedStates Seemed it necessary to
expatiate upon tills point ®s,d to defend the rule of res Indicate
&& a fundamental principle of every jural soci ety* ^ It is sig-
nificant hoar a n il «®Ter before Qxpresslyaweegnieea as binding
Jj©tween states reeeiree recognition ©yen on the part of the state
Tsfheieinterests would a m» M the rejetton of the principle*
?8* It IU| h©«seV0JPfcontended % Mexico that res indicate Is
limited in Ita application to the condemnatory parte of the
judgment md does not embrace the considerations sm4 presaisea
upon t&lch the judgment ie founded.$ that the "dlspositif" of
tli©judgment la the only thing coming under the scope of re®
Indicate, snd that therefor© the award of the umpire* Sir Edward
fhemt m of 1875, to the effect that tfexiooshould pay to the
JJhltedstate® 904#000 dollars as representing 2X annuities due
on the Pious Fund, has no binding effect for the future,*4'}It
wagscontended# on the other stag, by the United States that  
"Whatever mm of necessity implied or nowed as a necessary
w Cited in the Supplementary Brief on the part of the U.S.
p* 43*
Omp* p, $6Q* of the Record of the ffemmdiag*# Van
Lan$er! mysen Brother®, $he Hague# 19QS, erg/ of Mr. Bemaert,
H*8* Brief, pp. 80.
Mexican answer to the Memorial of the 0.S. (esshifcitV of
the replication of the V*B» p* 23)
The scope
of res
iudicata*
I
1
i
1
I’}
\
I
consequent© from the finding of the Judgment is to bo considered
m an Integral part of It, a M not to bo divorced from i t . ^
Both sides quoted amply private law rules* cams and authorities
as the only source for the decision of the 'xribuiiml.
Hever before was sn important international Tribunal con-
fronted with this problem* There was, however, no doubt that*
in the absence of an express rule of International law, the
H) <2)
'generallyrecognised rules of private law m y and.should he used.
But is there a general rule of private law governing this ques-
tion*? fhe fact that fcothsides quoted private law in upholding
their contention would indicate that there was no uniform aouroe
upon which the judges could rely* But it seems that the
authorities cited by Mexico referred to motives of an explica-
tory character, and not to those forming logically an essential
part of the-judgment proper. ffctistom been clearly put in the
argument of Mr* Descaatpst nIX faut Man recommit re qn& sous
.^ette denominations les motifa, on pout clansla reallte com*
prendre deux chosea tree distinoteas de simplea elements d*orclre
expiicatif et lea hasea substantielles de la decision. Cello®-
ci constituent &vec lea reaultats toie&iateraentpratique® lea
Cl) Oral erg* of 1ST.Penfieid op* clt. p. $$l*s also arg* of
Mr* Halston* p. 187.
(2) For the large number of eases and private law authorities
®* Mexican answer to the memorial of the 9*3* op. clt* p# 23-29*
hy the U*S** Brief and Statement p. 45~S5# Supple* Brief*
8S»4*
i^iesumta conetitutife ©sseatiela et foment la terrain d*applica-
tion 3$ la chose jugae”. ^ fhis mmw to be sound, Of course*
it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between the two kinds
iofmotives* It 1b i in such eases* fop the fribunal to decide,
ias a question of fact, regulated, by the broad principle adopted
by all systems that what Is logically *m essential part of the
fsfagmnt falls undo? the scope of res tudicata, whether the
if
motives in question belong to one category or to the other. In
'this light should be read the part of the award which affirms
111that all the parts*of the judgment or the decree concerning the
litigation enlighten and mutually supplement each other* and they
tallserve to render preeise the meaning and the bearing of the
i&isposltif{$@cisory part of the judgment) ®M to determine the
ipointsupon which there is res lu&iceta and which thereafter
icannothe put in question*'3 sad that this principle of private
law" should for a still stronger reason be applied to inter*
iiltionelarbitration**#
"79* But should the Tribunal come to the conclusion that the
question of future annuities falls within the scope of res
lludicata,in this case - ran the further contention of Mexico -
the umpire had no right to pass over his jurisdictions he ren-
dered a decision lying outside the scope of the mandate conferred
The right
of the tri-
bunal to
pass upon
its juris-
diction.
(1) Oral erg* $>,23s?j for Mr* Bemaert' s &rg* e* p* 231*
10$  
upon M m by the compromise. ^ So arose the second "private
law questions Ims an arbitral court the inherent power to
pas® upon its jurisdiction? ft9!hemm logy existing between
international and private arbitration is suoh that we are Jus-
tified in believing that if private arbitrators possess?the
poror to detem&se their own jurisdiction mad to interpret the
instrument creating them, for stronger reasons must the same
w
powers Im regarded as resting in International arbitral courts’1
 K ’ t2 i
• my® the argument of the United States.' / Although they
could roly in this matter on weighty precedents of international
arbitration in their favour and on an alinoat unanimous opinion
of International lawyers, ^ they quoted amply private law oases
and authorities*^ fhe Trigonal adhered, as was to he expected,
to the contention of the United State®# although the respective
part of the award does not express the rule in & sufficiently
general for®; *the convention of July 4th, 1863, concluded het-
(§,aenthe two states in litigation, had accorded to the mixed
commission named hy the two states, as well m to the -aspireto
he eventually designated, the right to pass upon their orni
JurMiction*’* Xt is not clear Whether this is a conclusion
(1) Oral arg. of Mr* Bemaert p* 2f>0.
(2) Brief of the t?»S*p. 27. 11) p.25-31*
(&) Brief loc. oit*j oral erg* of $r# Halaton p. 11-16.
(4) Oral arg* pp* 110, 111, 119*
2^ -
reached on the ground of interpretation of the mwp&m tm of
1888 or^ perhaps, on the part of the argument of the united
States that was based on estoppel*
60* For it was contended by the United States, in the written
end the oral apgnraent,and in the briefs9 that Mexico was m~
topped by its conduct from denying the right of the talkedcom*
f fial0° of 1 8 6 8 10 deolae OTep the 'JUSBtioa of the
Fund. It wee urged that throughout the whole dispute, both
before imd after the decision of the umpire, tgeadfe&o!lirapllodly
and by e uniformconduct conceded to the former commission the
power to decide the case*9’ Thle conduct consisted in the
ratification, in 18?g and 1874, of the conventions providing
for the extension of t tm within which the Joint commission
should settle the claims brought before it, ©n& in other acts
of the agents of Heacie©. ^ "Her (Mexico*s) course of donduot
»i#tt have created against her what is known in English and
®aeriean jurisprudence as an estoppel in pais* By such an
estoppel she would be prevented from asserting that the court
had no jurisdiction. We invoke all these principles in sup~
port Of our present eSAls*”^ The United states pointed out
that Mexico* embarking# in 18S8 a M in the eubaequent
(1) Oral arg* pp. 110, Ul* 119.
(2) fiuppl*Brief p# 47, 49. Tm term and the technique of
estoppel were used b j the U.S. throughout the case*
The argu -
©ant of
estoppel
2o 7.j
commit lom 9 t*pm %b» iiiig&tion* both %im opportunity
/
of tttCMMiv*an$ t&@ change of defeat. &h«scannot no*?*after
having Xoat, eu^&ticm th& Jurisdiction of t&m tribunal. HU.'t
it not be auppoaod that la ftdbttlttlafftnia point w# rely upon
& technicality, far It saouM &mm ttaatIf tlftwvfth® any intention
an the part of o w part not siiow a giwa to go to arbi-
tration*.# it it-his 4uty to announce such fact in the beginning*
sine#,if such announcement h® md% %k® opposing party m f at
one© agr^e to the withdrawal o t the subject-matter &m ?fi©ke
the claim thisfoundation of a separate convention. ^
It m®m .else that swteppeX -urn pleaded t»yUrn United
State® in another direction# although the-tiectrlnewas not
feamXXy imo &ed in this case. According to the terms of
submission, the tribunal in iiaguehad to answer a® questions
oniys (a) is the o&m within the governing principle of
res indicate? (b) if not* itsthe clai& JwtW It was now
contended ftythe United State® that*by these term of
submission* fttexlcois precluded.from raising such questions ©es
that the eiaisaantsought to tom rssort&d to Xowai tribune I® t
that %he m&r$ of &ir Jt4»«*dthronton ©as ««* that
the <&*£» aa such la barred by the ttsxleaastatute of
Hesitation®2'. tMs part of the argument* bo m* rf whicfo
seem® to bo a rather strained one, did not reeetve moh
1} fetateaentand Brief p ..M i E^e also p.43*
2) Oral erg. of &r.Fenfieia« p.342.
/
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recognition on the part of the Tribunal.
ex. ThU m j h® Inferred* am®m nthssrs,from the S'ho allage.3
j , , / jil / miction of
^u/KtZwipXm of the clalma b^ lag Hawed by the statui® of prescription*
limitations, dealt with by the Tribunal ®n<3sn~
giseyed in to; oottpolnrenad mnmrmly criticised de-
cisions wthat the ral&e of prescription* belonging
exclusive 1;/to the ddraeinor civil lm * cannot b©
applied to the pm m n t dispute b@tse$n the two
.1)   ' •1»»
state® la litigation **1 &o«e tale $eclalosi m & llf
signify the rejection of the w«&li-«BiabXl*hed doctrine
of prescription? Tbit la most laprdbable if the
a
following facta are taken Into conal^ aratloti* {&} Tim . .
••, ,, . •, i• . • ’..• . ;-X.-t • • ’  '"1-: ,*yi\•jjS^
eu*«tlon of prescription In law «5id not
fora an Issues in thle arbitration at all. It hml only
to do elded whothar article 1103 of tte ifexlcan cod©
to tb*» effect that %%t*; fk«mtic, or mml t f p&n&lana,
fevenuos, rents and any otter loans whatsoever, not
coliccta& aten due, wssain barred in five roars’’ my
%& in’rokad in the c@s© of th© reapaotiva claim beaming
an objaot of an intarnaiional diapatc* * the decision
of the iribosaaX* properly r&a<S* ssupplto tfe» Correct
&nmor to this cuestion; ** (i>)tritoniha United itatas
acre car&fal, in tha &mm& o f the arbitration* not to
oppose prescription &a $ach. fta^pdws © clear line of
1 ) fecofct*reports pp.51t>.
2) B&0 report of *r. %laton to the S@cretar^ of Mat#, p. lO Pth
bmt rmmmy aaa asilnantly international in ch&raotar,
national ral^ a of prescript, ion ciuld not ** Imotead to da-
fast Bach clalsis m pvvMMSbwl bafor© an international
b5d3rn).
-104 .
distinction between © ©t@ti*£o£ limitation©* »&ich is
recognised in international ls» only so far as it sis^
be agreed to exist .fora p&rtieul&r case by • treaty*
l)&tl & prescript lotiproper - vhleh they did not reject .
la the light of thsse com 18ersttone should be read tbs
decision of the Tribunal t&e <t h a & ml rules of
prescription, Ve'lon$lng { » h i © h / b e l o n g )
exclusively to tt*sdossein of oivil lev* cannot be
applied to the present dispute between the tuo states in
'  Utl|j#tl9tf-rt
82. Venezuelan Prel&rentlal Claim case of 1003 is, SfcoVene-
saelsn **re»
perhaps, the most convincing ergoiSMit for the contention fercntial
* ... .•v - ,-.•   •.'"' ' ' //«  Cil®JuSI•
that states do not ©hare the opinions of those writer©
aho Object to the application of ©ny other rule except
this expressly reeoenlsed by positive internetion®1 lew.
The’legal conviction of states ana.the actual relations
between them cell for enelofiee end for application of
•rule© based on such an®logles* $o theory can change the
fact that* shen one state, in the course of a Judicial
or cm&% 3u*,iicislprocess or recovery of debts €ia&to M m
or to his nationals, compels the debtor state to grsoi a
security for the ©mount due, «nc3iafterward®# on the
ground of this security* e^saanslapreferential treatroent
ae ©galast those statea which have failed to Obtain such a
HlllMllllI ............... .
1} iWlstoa* oral erg.inlj it 1® of interest'to note tor the
chief cgiet of tii©ItadtK States in thlssjsse,»hen acting
ee the uqpirft in one of the Venezuelan arbitrations of 1909*
devoted in ®n outspoken abartttouchspace to the &rgu®ant that
tlieprinciple of prescription MS 1>yno means denied by the
United States
saearity* no tJtoaory change %m fact of on obvious
analogy ta»%Keaathiftrelation rasasimilar relation*
bs*tw$#l*Individual** 3tM» ^referential ease
is a good instance of tbl* fact, not toaat o«ing to ih©
auBbetr or *t*te* taking part to the dispute. fen state©
{test Britain. Cenaany* Italy* on on© ©id©? Belgium*
Franc©, Mexico, th* Stetiu&rl&nda*Spain* S«a<§©nswl Iowa?#
on the otter) «*r» rcpr^g©nt®<l s M pleaded ttm
tribunal - a rsiprasan&ative array of nations •
5. ^f W alXiis4poaera naturally *w*k* as a© $o* Ronra la-®
as a
to ©atafelisfatheir contentions on tb* rul^a of civil and aourc®
.. Of iB""
.Mom®, la** ttafto gMftlttn"par excellences . This tfcmj&SfieJ
paaaa^e from tha countercace submitted by Spate
adc-eoatoly ctiaracteri&a® the proceedings in ihia cae®.
Tim m m principle has tm&n aeo*pi«6» with ©ven greater
en$ha*ie* by t&# opposing party* Mtb& principle by
ahiah thia ®*tt#r ahouM bfcgfl*mi*6 In international
lav is laM doan in **» legal system ^xhililt^dby the
,siuafS©ad wle3Sw antitbe opinions of Komn Jurisconsults •
rmm ims given a *»odyof law© to all nations, called the
latl,.or nature... By the gemral consent of nations the
yialgf of bomn law ,*wt adopted* especially in th©
matter of contraota**^» ....$a.>faa3A*»fethat mt fraal?.
of Spain*p• I0&4*3£iaVenasaaelan frustration
' bv fom %rn m m * ^rXhm rn lt k m vpvom&d%xm^ of the tribunal*
9«c*&ttu«doa**&6th CoRgpMMu 8ra seaalcaa*
2) The case of Italy* op.cit .p.880.
t
roteMNH* irwokMd in theteotira®of the arbitration.
th® parties hBd raaoaraeto $mmrn ayatosaa of private
la© In m ^ r as, in tkm lr op in ion , t lm j mhod lud a
general rule of t o ,
04 • patera <l»awading prefortsntialtraatftgrist %pothac*tte >4
H i m »
their aXaifton aavor®i f f im r& l l j aeavpMHI
rule-s of private Is®. Ttaay eafl&t--nS6&rfirstly,that
ttMDeealgnHs&nt In their favour of the thirty per
cent of ttw*om tom raimnm& of L& %aira ani Puerto
Cfe’beltoconfuted a pl64$» or a r«s&isecurity
g m 5'r»d by Uu» &<bm end private la® of pl&clm anA
hypothiscation, ahich eomt£ta-taa a title, to Deference
for tb& aro&ifcorto alUMitfe»object Is ^fpotbecatafi,*
A kina of international lien - It was aftKrt«d - has
feeea created 'bytbft©aelgnment of thos© . fh*
blockading powers m cm & l$9 preferential
trftfttmtataa & of tba a%p®n.ms incurred
by tterathrough the m Aa»gotloinMi .g&storesa**
2 )
of the eon-%e11ig»re»t po«rs and to thalr profit *
8$. Xt «ae m p m l& l lf m this aeoonA ground that tfcalr liegotlo-
rum
opponent® w«re quit# rtady to mot thorn* T&ay pointed g©Eii®<
oat that, accordiog to iossan.Xtm® tfm Gonetituant o1©manta
of proau.rat.ion* aJtlafcaonfarracltliarigtstto ao^penaatioa
for tta*fwp«B*»» imswrad cm feehalf of another, are that
15 torK ©?f4al*.X °B m of It©1.7 e s o ^ * ^ itSl««S^ ® f^arencaa
^te^n|5n o .Slfi.ttTA•ll£)8iC«atei» Ca m of Italf*D*l-*42 Jlfrit*
2'i.
another‘s?Vmslafissshould really and truly hav& been
the ohJect of the*mwkgpu&nt by the clainant to such
eoupeoiatlon and that the act® or thw latter should
hav © Meii realised with intention to mm$& and as a
«ans or bilging Use other party* who snu»tbe ignoreat
of such procuration and not teve expressly forbidden ltw1^*
and they Mfcintaiaed'thatno o » of those ooaaditidnaaas
corelied with in the action or the*'blockadingpower®. It
wee oven assorted that this;action# far from having
% brought profit to'th& non«4>tfllig&rentstates, hae Injured
. . . . . . . t : 4• :   ' • -   . . .   ; t. . . . . ' v .;• . , * • v " "
their Siuiereeteby disainishing the financial asset® of
ooBssohdebtor - France* «hile conceding the analogy
of megot!or.iurngetriio,proposed# m one of the rulea
governing the Im or proeuretioa, to limit the o l&im of
the blockading poaere to a.certain privilege# proportion-
. , r.v,v.,•,j r •'•.'"• v- ".•'' • ""•'*’...>,’•:/ -’a',,.?'••f '(V "'''
ally to expenses; incurred, without changing thenproper
nature of the claitsa -
86. Bat it was also on an analogy - & rather strained Ttonteruptey
.vr.,i of state® •
am — that the ol& im for eqa&l treaimsunt’#«s t’oundeci.
The non-4>e1li@©rent posst>rss^lntein&d that, the position
of Venemela ijeinganalogous to that of cs&asiobonoruia
or bankruptcy# lor the Qernan Konkurs) the respective
principles of private l«w arc to he applied according
to which the creditor* of the debtor enjoy# a® a rule
-miTrrr-amnyrnirron—- tr- tn tr- 'Ttmn-^-rTrr—n r r rT - 't—rri 1,1aMwHiW*-rf tt **'"* H* 0*XI»<i#W>' " i ““
1} Case of Sp&in* p .1196.
2} Cooater Oase of the Netherlands Sweden aad Sor»ay*pp .1110.
3) Case of France#p.,883.
*/>.
$$$&& rights m his estate*^ * %% wbb not too diffjUttlt
to shar, the todoqaaey of this ©rgum n t* It m® pointed
oat tim% Umm 1® no m ifa m to of b&oisruptoy* that
Uttcw is la iatei’nttlonal X«sw«ioppooedare in bankrupt of,
that the $@iwi' of the ®feoleproperty of -& state ®ou.M
'beinconsistent with it® continued as*®n lnd&*
pon4«snt Qomam ity^ *« that, in thia «***» is avt
actfflpfttt#*to ditferlbtf*tor mm%& \m twm i all tor
creditors, ^ that ©te©is not Imolwat and that, although
#h© ha®.®^Mois paid her Uafeliltlea ®xmp% m&®& pmu$,w ®9
sho oan do &q it h®r ywe properly ftdM&iattinta**
the blOKfeadlng pmmm t o fiftead,in turn, civil to ruiee
shoeing that that oreaitor is entitled to pr®S®mnm
»ho fir»t t&kefeaction In order to protoot hi*'rights -
4 }
vlglXaatlhus non dcNradUHi&lbiit««§»v©nit imx , os'*«ho
f irs t ob%®lm& pmm& Q lm o f the ©rod i t<w*« §ooda *•
prior in totapore*potior In iure^ 1•
67 • . Bat it so©s» that th& wm i tt*i£fryarpssa&ni pat
forward !syIImthlatfNMMa^ powers trnethat of ©ftop** ssatoppel*
pol (prolusion in Eo»n to sy*t*a*}» ©n ©r#»nt
miiy» m llhmgh nm* vxpm m iy* adopted in th# a*ard
of th* ^rlb-unal* In m hnw r? l&<&* mp®r&%® protocols
w#retsigned on on* ®3Wi and flwwrt
TTSS® of Frano& p.#80* ,®) Casa o f S Goamtar Case p«l*»36*0 +
3) p.10431 ©rg.of Sir Mb«rt Finlay pOfttft"** ^oontar €©so of
Or «$r i t #»*$?©*
-4)p*98$ 42} ®8Mk»  ^VftNAfi *&*$-€•*
Cess®of Italy pp,^6£~&*
2/1/.
Britain. (tersaay w atael,.lR Bbloh tfa},
justice of tha claim of the Beosiaaed po®#rs waSi
s<s.nitta<sby vems! U9l8 8SKj prmUl c m m m ff>p t M
allocation of ci.oeusta» «,veau.:8 of t*0 ports of
\ < * * * » !* for the purpose of *#ti*fytog tbs «*! »» af
the ’liookaain® pawn-. 1'. fhe#e **«. lBc «-
ported te the «!»»r«nls of * , « * 1825 providing for
£‘-‘a m t f*tl0° *»*«»• tba f m u m i at tto % ga8. n sse
no* « 6««I by te**t tt»t th. bl oc ks ... rai wa
and (be Venoawien vusseie r„®t0Pv(S ln « o M A w » U a a of fete
adnltclon contained la tho protocols »ms inc-wporstsd la
the oonproBls» %Hm British eoimswl res awed tore te a
similar m m tiiot oroso io tuo oourso of tins pious Fund
am in t lo n. Shtiy contt-ndta further that, »s th# other
poser® accutesoed in the action of tan Mockac?inr posers".
It is impossible far then no* to turn round end to oay tu*t
tbv blootsulna pmtsm are to b® <teprlire4 of the advantage
stack they ti&vumi-aad by toking tbs action in shioh the
other posers aocuifci.<*.d" it i® ta t m light of this
arguEBnt that the. reapaoUve parte of tto mmrei m ou.lt?t*>
reed: "... "hero#® the Oorernwent of Vmmsml a In the
protocol® of felmmty 13th, 19® (srtlele IJ itself reoog-
nltm in principle tfaa justlos of the olatas p»#entea to it
p.,1ii;93»4,#i^ 47# " *in ifeply of Mr.
hy %TmOod^spawot o f u n t i l it*© #nd o f
UK®* to 0.0 tiNnyp*dl& 0ti6 d nf&sissst 1Mtan
tiori of the l u la e jt t a A iB g to isi©lei of sp»«i**
&$«s*gwxttom-for Urn p£ ttal* ©I®! ©#*** •>#»*•
ula&rsw tla©twuc&Viilps»«rs *•* AIMSnot pi*#|#©t ag&itisi4b©
pareten&loiittof tto* bi<MflHWfci*igpommw io 9 )
@6* £*topp®l thtwi prov^A tfe« Bast mtrnr4a -
6 ®t & mm cat
la tt*$# &s%iir»tton ®o rich la pi*lv*te law ®nsiogtw w i 9 ® r ;»
for otter Sxu$«ite*ft #£ tmidgr bw^ tdw thie»« wiwfcioafiA
m i l l SiO»werts put AbhpwoNI*hA AlMMptid In tiu» mw,%®
p£ t&fe ftrMtretloai f&® raM re© intsr #Uas &cia
©ills m e noeet m o pvwtftst (could t o protocols of
mmwrn *•«» WflMftU tma o$«»I **# *» Of to s tu m i ;
pmmmffi t&» application of «b« vwJty n»uoaUty is
<W# Mr*s *^ tto* of o & « «ms& cornsi4w*ilan4,%
% m OWM or proof ( M H JHW* *apaa w«'&0 clsdm
a pi^ fos*#stiai io to m% riMM o f g tb t*
pa*®*#?-®? or on ttw :*ltMW» *to mbtfiltsfotbtir yifjhfc
to UftifiittW* ^ *  ->•-
ea. u *» rtftm s w M fcto t o immtrnt «•&» of
to m m in m , aorib At tost la *« • * *Ukw»l«» C m t * l t f
ta frloa is «» *U ? 4i&JUisite4 W «w © te im te of b tt»# ti*fc
o<3$teroM.$scontain 4 jSsiIt* ^ A iul fnn&in® ®£
a : .SB,Is
§ I Afgs-O®1 ^ ' j sW W f *«#»«*•*»
4 ) Counter Cat* of m # itetharlittte,*  * p*l%W* __$} f M j 'sg* yao j3am^ j||oii^ oi? tte wu£-ff»l*i' p*&§«ap«4lt«( Jieait#!
f) iirg*o£ % «C^M»H|tP*97&* ,
7 } fMt Hm» «»dr 4 jUt llm 15^ -sul.t or a gch^ poMs# feas be^ n »d®ltto«
S l i tm m
by the t r l
ffe
tt&- , hommr, temt the juridical part
of the findings of Use or&itrstor» i© amftfeetecl
tht? *ieh of tlM» tribuneX to arrive &t <tsolution
factory ror l>dth partis» fm mmpr «wft»cfi&le»mbtmr in
ttve urns Mtdtt by the* tribunal ot tim «rtiol«> l¥ of tbs?
arbitration %m®% y of J* m»ry 1 9 0 8 * mTtm T&ibm®l ®fo®Zl
moomemi S for th» of .the Hlgt* eontswat lag
p«rU. es rules snd gaptfcade oJtprwmtim#- w $ m M v h sli
eiaifliia*; arise in tfc» future m$tr&&f*g tJ»
eamwlafe or tin® afeovft#&fferr«4 to m y h® % e .adopt-
ion of »
d*te;r*&nftAin aoechecks® »ito t&® pvtoaipte* X&iS $ mn strict «»* 
%\ logf hj tbt .
Ittttae.aviftrd . For it m& m tfe&fcin tfcwprincipal tribunal.
o£ ttictarbitration* tbat of IntwwtSonal «#p-
vna( g*«» of tt* M i a m i w m t w m m d by
a strictly juridical reasoning #wJ &7 *
pay&Apft too m&ticaloufc* storing to its#©oa^u*me«& of
© priwt©
tto Stottea &%&%m a o q M M tot - to w « the
Uti&uzg® of tbs?Tribunal - **tfc©liberty of Fishery
graatat to the ftoitqd statue jsonatifcutoa an iniarxi&tlonal
mnritttdA l» tba&r favowp war tbs* territory of Or^ at
rvitain* ttoeretey insroiling a derogation A m t&a ®woroi$ n
of Great Britain.# t o ©erv tot atate* and that therefore
I) Mmuafclalty ttao ss&iasm y b® m M »ito regard to the
of oo&taiaad in t o Bering. Saa award.
1/7-
&mm> Britela la by s'oasas 0' tfea$s**ntv
or it® &8 tepenfMmt right to ragalato the tim®.w$*n
fa aa« oatahat l&gai ax*&
8f>«»Xogl^ B.this «Qnta&tlan «»a leased* It I#,saffleleat
to stale haira that Um trl&ama I tally #&0pt*& ites
kmrt mn &rgwmm.it e s^ rritu&o i& Infcormtloaal
laa ppaidieatfta&n tixpmm gr»at of a aovaralgB and
Isvoiva* an analog? to ttoa relation of * p*Mi6 ittift
a M a pra*61u&i ««. $&a ima-rd «##. w te bo ouita
rlgbi. in atat lag that %&£«? f tm tr im * w m So&m latad by
U m* tplfewial In fall acoord sifch t&o aoBt«xxtl$rk of tfco
fttataa - tt*•• Ims foaoti littics, if an$ support
frai *&o$*sm ptihliolstic«H 55t»goetrla# of ttarvito4« m
aaotpML by tft* ®aa$ tfe© United s&«ta» la a thorough
application of private laa aaalti$gr« ftwtxadoarialnly but
Uifclo support fro® U » pUbllolats * **But ib© victory of
tfes &mv%mn tfeftarvtleal mntm t lews aaiaaag tt« p?*aoti«&l
aaftwt. % proved too m b . Jasi hotas&a® of th» mm l mid
absolute ri^ tta <mfi»rr*d by aa U\t.m*m%l®ml mrrt tnflft-
*it eoo M feo« ! ! M W this n*rlhvml ml j m% b»
* r$ Amm of m international «o**tr&et^ ^* Vbv frltmnal
did not rajanfe U m» cmeoption of saa$# po^ hapa*
&ven. not 1M ftootrim of bat it <$am&n&0# a
6trl«t p^ oof for its ttislaiaiupa• £wte & proof oomM not
i) mm#& ana nu&atioa X i§}*
&) loo*, cit.
b© supplied by tbs 'UuitM •
It «a»e is Ux& Imt of the •rMtftfttloa that
Counsel tor felt© 4 $&*&*# ®m tb*t th®f are proving
too m*©&* *n4 t&**y b©g®a* v«vy Kteeljr* to w e t m tl»
*ay of retreet • fte-y #<*re bftlp**} l» tteie eaSe»vo«r
by the & mvl vm «irbitretor* Jfudjp &V&y* Me its
the «dttrwn of the olo©lag a^ gns^ iit of senator £&ms
right doe© aot depend tjqponits olft»«trieatloa
ufjtecdmlcwl genritodsrif’'
Berntor loot* ‘ Cejptfc&aiynot •
Jadga CfrelJ* :tfoado not m&ppm® bora M t
t-h&x. in mindp or that mp nS the m&P*
ti&tor® **- b»& la ml M *oy m in i ion to
ibis definition by writer® up to
UU* ti »f
S e w t w Root: i »vi$po&e tfe©it^ gotlatere i$&$eretee($ the
m f in which right© of that e&eraeter
•f-. :;' ..,,,. "••' ' '• ' ..  ', c.
*• * eappowi
titot t&$f cou®i'S&r«?4 timt- tb»y e#i*e*
w1)
aetlng ws&mv © teelukleel mie of • orvitudte*  
tievee m%m$i to m y t&e m m thing m ®
pr&vIa m .***•• ri#t# #*»e not e$&n to tfepewt
upoa abelegyl t,tey i m by «B&&ogr«*» *• are not
tor® end *• sever taww beeis eXelfttas that m mm <na&ltl« 6 to
have oar treaty rlgkt l*re tmt QteVm h m m m it ie a
1) As*g, <efthe Boa* j&ttMt KOOi* s^ parat© ed«i>«&ftB.
r f t g h * £chw s& »& l ip o n a n tbfy mmn 1 m o f
e m i M H M u & e lo w b a r * * SMfc f& ai t& u at t h i s i e » r i # a &
whicts be-«tts£©r®fcoo<*. * w* *iy *hi©h.w®»%&*
i a t s r p « i ^ d . t o i MIMP - i ^ p i » a ^ t i o a » o f t t r t * « f r r t
Kl»U«r rigiste« a g « l<mB •**&«*
*sphim% t*m * • * & * * W *** « * * < » » o f t h » * * « . . . *
B a t I t w e t o o l * t e * tm& * * * * * * i »
l B p m » i « * u p o a t t a * m w * t o f u l l « i « * _
l o s s « im I p * *S » & i» i * * * ® r y i f c « a e » *
00. it te p r t i P * * » ! * * « * to «»l » « * * p H 9 D » « » 0S S ®
of tto M * » M k l » P*rt« «f * « * « '  " •**• •P8BBtmt* £ £ » " «
a m m lr tbey iwvs M M awsptoa %y the * • partios.
 Trihiswl, *>tttbecause* ttseysre* it i* tisliawa, •
ote*»ic»2. M W of • M U a j p U c U o n of private
r im 'r' , \
 *% eo BWmUoa i* tt*t, * » * • « • » ^ * " 5 2 * . , '**' ”
* I ’t4w *« fa r I n I M t i l f t l S'
ttiAir®r&ng® p^rfeosfc&Xconduct*
r ^ r a ? J f i ^ o ^ 4 i S y - L i s otor eft t h e w M * »
t i u s d ^ rj p i f c l w is >i sx t M i i r *
fttrt.tiae job* m t m r f£ s^erciee it « *
i h o e d i t i o n * « *> « ? l i » U ‘ o * a C o * * * * * -
s s r & w s l i s t s s S s y E ^ s * ' ®
S f t » « 8 J S 8 & K S S - “ *»« 
yigrt5* '•
so pr int ed the %&»<»? •»& * «wvi»elas
' «Tter* 1® • 4 l f » » a »
K i S / S U S . w g S .
___
1) op *cii«p *
2) p ,2m .
Xlt>.
t f . r ^ &* the Sira* viaa tl*ati^ sty woitM ^
q®#«o4 10 taka out froa Qp®&%3*jU*4» a fftummfc' at'im»
•<mNrtn. tr it**if, « * «. t « #« •
^ w CC^n f ^ ? B ft* !.*** >» «! » «**ia m m ” > & i>!
:^JS f4 ol# U«it» or nratriet the rig&t tteat'has
?'.***• H | M ao%'herf#** Or %&&otimr h&tuX*
it «ul& id to $$ i^ jp#$a<t «*»x£$& afBatlAg a to®! rJU^ tw&ttt
®& aruttnc *a e m * m t » i » i * ££ 
S ht mlifk.Crw!«IfI limitation* or ra*triatia» war tbs
1 ^ 5 P»««A by tew o&Uifetioa* arid tfearefora the
f*!* 5 sy®li that li i*er £ra» <to3.jjgthat
><*
»«iJaere lo aa&a$j%$ SJUXajpanoa *•tai® one aa to
t-» r^ j ult. ifVai& t>»g real rigM* aa aa think It is*
c ^ u o t tr iiS ?**?** ***&*& ««*** thef 0 *!rs Isa th@ a&*ra&«e of the raal pUrt
In i&4& territory* aai laa« »<£$ to gr/mvn tfcs&tina *&£ t&e
rSTSaJ? J S i S * •*» « ** **•* **«»* »r*U4 ba uaa m % m w
far ifcalr -v&XMlij* raa^ lred tba aaattnt of tte ftaitad Staieat
Ja*y *N»Ud T» Im& lMt m afflaotlag Its cltlaaaa* fcat f<a»
•«&**& or to. a^itod &iaiaa*«» Qa the otto it tha
tvtii&%f oraataa a& c^ iijgdtcs^ r liiaitatiiogi3&oo& &«&&%   Vitalii*
If t m liaiteUon ot b». *wnr*igaty t* & limitation ofaata*
M ^ i w l c& Ug& Uoa* s M if la tb» astralae of t o so-
p » w %m#t, Bri ute in tot Utxtttatar mtem & l m
*M«b- w®ml>*pu %a» l%mnut of tecnroblls&iioa whlcii »a«
o^udm i& kM& odaireiot sot to i.®f •wyancfuil
®t m of ter g c w n s ^ f , r m i t t tfeie ^ i ^ i f i ® if
it caa s%o Il# to ^tr®la !»?««• * ,.,,, *
w^iald^ al Bsd <Souil>t#a® to tte l^utoiic®. of
^twe^ n p«NiitiOtt of 44» |^ .ftv«t« propri^ t^ @ad
Ite acrmreiga of at Vo aacfe -»a«i ri#its#,
but it & m m %hm%.m ottoapt m€m to shattai* tte jttri<2icsl
fooaodatiom of S^ mtor «o.ot.ftsr| s»tt. &**«. «« ssia j^ov®,
tha of tbs* defeat©d. its m r$ ob^oot*
Bm- if %tm,larldliaaX ©r^ :ra@»i of ls»A%at os to tho
® m m m of a «*aal « m i»X*so#tisasaa.eaitol*,#,thoa @o
www> t m ftravo pmabt ml &m $>ta roi&od by @roat Britain as
to tsso appliaaMIttf * withoot aa '#apmaa groot* or tbia
^oetrlite to r* iaU* w ^t. eea .t»te* « » * of ^ ^
x u .
ft#24 in this mmmct ism in % m mtxrm of m% % »rg»~
m m mj» BataraXXy, be put to tb© m m m % of tto foi^ nssi©
atmosphore*^ bat % m irntzifioiat of tbit pm*% of the
argutt&at raised l % mm of z*»i is^ oriii&Qa *$ib mm* ® to
th» do«trt»« of ln&*?a*tXaa*£ ssorvttustos, &«y® Sir ftXltaai
Babftaa* the Att&nMky <%»o»ttX*
"A stsie s^ y Mrs , for ltKtwaes with » p M to ,®milvmy*
& co'ftxract<#itti*aetb0r *t»t« gtvijag that other **«&» ©ay rights
it pXe*«** or^r it® mn ittrrltaapyfor th« oarpoM* of'tttfe
wtlxay. I *«y that tirniIs properly doas' - «ta£i It ftenFltad*
it"j<m HU®* I t yoa m w & y sail It * 8©rvit«d^# <lomot
bagi» to attaah to tlagaorM'Sti*$oall Jd.*fc$sof ooasecTJMmeas not
imt^ndea h? tb& parttea* l b®v& no complaint at s U, I think
aadfc •^r»it»a®8 ^re proper and thm M b© anoattt’*ge4««•« On®
of my ecMpX&inta of the dootriao of servitude® Is that tfa®»a?a©
its©If is oa» witUBtt &®m aot •aMuhk^ft tba grant of each rights*
1 tinink it la an unfc*rtm»tv mm * And we n if It is kept
strictly to its oarrottftatlim it it doas barn in ini&rmxtotw l
la® *.•- Ho state ought t o b a dat&vrad ft*o»$oing it by being
attkaraavda infor«®4 Um% vtaen i i hse ©one it, wtthoafe ever
iaUmdiag' to touch or offcot xta aoifcralsoty* it hm afffeoted
It* mm&re l^ufcyb»««as» of the  ton* not pat forward.®ith r.,
regard to taLarnetionaX law in tfaftraftoato solitudes*** *'
¥taa United Status ®oa04 hav© atibattutlaily @i?ai)«$2jact& 4
th&ir po&Xtlon by tax to JnetiCy itw enaXogy
«ot only by fora»l aintla-ritlafi* bustby tho moee$i&I©$ of
lBtaroatlanaX raJafclaaa* in fba aena m Great Fritsin
costing t m dao&piaa• It oesmot e&id that they
aval tad tbssm© Ives to th© fall ttxfcimt or ihli Xi m of &rgmmn%»
t m m mm not mxdh w t e c l a g force in tbs jpeepootiv© ®vgumn%
of c m » # i
1} j^ spe«iftily s^ Xaiing to tte fiofl»«xMI pride^ of the
«wt"Viftri&et*to |>p*lCS4 of tho ore! &£*£•&«#l«o ppsKK> 6 « tsathe
hlstorlooX wo3totios of ooae^ pt.
2 } Froc^ ecUjasa p,XDl£.
2*2 .
"Tmm rights im civil law go iispopta&fcthat they
«©**©• to bftrosl rights *** YtliAb th@
con tro l of Use grantos*sod of hie si&oeesBor** and whidi th»
grsmtoo ml#it protectf in Ills <pm rtgjht* agglast tho *»-
eroatihMuita of all pepaom *hoM*«nr»ir * - -hi# reason of ths
civil law ®waM app$«r to apply with ©ddfcd forco in t m Xe*
of mtio nt. ** HeftBtd there i« no rule of internetiouwi t m «
under m&loh e xurtloaKltcan b«amodesto reload in
for baeaAhts of its treaty obligation e« ttewr® is in the
jsuaicipol Is* unto? XUk» olroutatiUMft*, fh^ refaro* th&ro
is tenfold joeeeflrstt?'f«r Attacftdttg to rights grast«d by
nation®,, whfea It le powibXe con&iatently to ao so, the
rue litifcsgof fix it;? &nd eartaint>% s M of osfcsaption from
con tro l o f tho .grant or o f tha r lg h t ^ *
Tfeor« is « cXfesjsrmX© of international law that* by th»
tam ch o f & trea ty * -so in te rn a tion a l &X lft« itttOsr
i« Goa& UU>£* *hl4h lap.ofte*upon Vm tetlnqmmt
elate tba obligation to mk® reparation»
91• It is not po^slbl^ to follow Mm %'mm part* m»x& mA
the future of
of th0 oml &rgstmnt in which the t#oJmi«oX diffl- the dootrin© *
cuiXties Of m e analogy have b^ on fully brought to
1 &'Xt$ht by $ro#i BritoHa and the t r ib a l , ’ ' The
ti' bltmiaa andaubtodiy liuftrum&al in v»veal~
ing t)» gs^ st difficult i m of tmip&y with *%g©n* to
th is p&rtiml&r ooncept. Its result i* $a egrmeafe
»lth ihf- proposition put* fowwwi in t-httw
chapters i ^ U h m 0 item it sat.hing in th» nator* of
1 ) '*roflWMJing* P'* < *
2} c o » * t m%, pp*rs& $ % m%* %hu * m-, e.*. had to
•dsait'tl»t it i® aot poseib^ “to tuBN&re thi® institution
in c^err re^peot * ith ihtof itoftvtvtmt* Um of
kqk^j they &®& to &dffillthat th* prB©t2ias frm lmm i© not
th©-territory of t o I I b a t tJsus sovereignty of t o w*S*»
&ncl than tlMHNMikmM to the eoaftmtioa of Or -"'rit.
tt@t t M right in cj^ Btion dm® not odeatitut* a prsotioai*
biit.only * puz^m& i *
:u*.
international relation* which forkt$e analogy a«S
aithe$h, In the great *b&jortty or the application
or aimlour is eo^egtexifilveaith the etrengtfcening;of lb©
legal c&araeter. of international ta* there m»% aX©saysbe
examined the euea.tlon of whether there exi«te %tm foundation
otvall w i o g r identity of relatione, $t Is eepeelally
»itfcre^erd to international tervitud»» that tmm efeooiahe
strictly examined* It cannot be maintained! that the lest
'#or& has boon aaid in tale exftttlaetioa* tim tm k of the
solenee of international la# is to ««t*blish 1*efore m®rp~
thing: CaJ aheiher international servitude® mmn perwaaant
restriction* of sovereignty in gen&rel* or reatrletioaa of
territorial amrer^gaty* or of restrictions of territorial
aoRrerelgnty cue territory oniy$ ib) wither the essence of
their re*I character Is not only that they ere not affeeted
%\* changas of territory* but *l»o that they Imply the great
of e sovereign right to feeaxerelctd by the grantee In his
own n*&B« Should tbt-’.present e m m and differentiation of
 opinion on theise Qtfaatlcne eontime to v&m in unsettled* It
*0 * 1 3 certainly be letter to «ti»card.the doctrine; altogether,
the *»ar4 In Um e i0# rU » erfeitration dl* not do m * It
aeeeptjed the 4oetrfine but &*«£dM, a strict proof of an
oxpreee eontraet In fcft*ca»e of it# rulea’being lavotaad•
This certainly &om not render the ©^oept^ nee v#lml®m „
For# ahould avail tMwSevve In the future* In e
public treaty of this notion* than the Jvdgwuit of the
tribunal saaybe invoisedas one of the most suthorlt®ttve
 X*£f
£ ® r m x l & % i o n ® of the tlmixig, froa ® \ m h m
tm rntfm
In this mm in ®imo®t n il orbltrtt inn mmm% th*
Qtofttiem of iai*rpewat«tioii or *34 tb© osm*
 Q \ I
of proof 'plstytdl. tm impor%*iftpmP%1* $ »y ^ore#
 0Wffth*4o»«d try tho ouotao&iog 'ffrobte-fiiof'fl^rvitttflo##
92. Ttoo %e«iim Xndtamity C*«»t 4»e$d»d in f t w M p ^tooH&stiim
InSwm&tif
1912 by tho $isgo® Court* mm «£WMrt tim&iroly topmnfa* «
ent far Its decision upon the# app&ltetioa of priwMi
Im raZ&s* CXsisis for mmt orf or compensatory in-
terest hud otwagMtod ts»ny previovw international trl-
b«uaiiffv bat no® for ttitarfirst ttw ©a<& & claim f m M
tho esala«ftre flutter of an international di»fat*»
Ratal* ol©fee€ frem ftxriwy 1a free t for the delayed
^vyaiH&ft or tone iiadosmiiy tan provided for W the
trea ty of cionatant tnopM of M W * * The pieedtnQt on
1»oth ©idea and to© evard of .the tr lta m l thro* m f -
oxccttast light* upon the prcfol&m in eMetien*
i) a .Sir william. Fi<fe#oa,or #rg*(private eod inteimtj UneX %m
rub;® or itt^Fpanit*tioft}*
&} p,li6i {diaeueeioa beteeet* Sir tiiiiaes io^#on «»i Charles
m 5p*tricfc)j it*the n»ia th© Urthvm l hold that
"considering that on® of tha ea&ezttial etaaua&tf of eoeerelgnty
is thftt it is to 'beejcereiiMt within territorial Units #ad
s r t i r 1-
- t t p s a M M j a ; t i u f o j e t t ! * * ! * of m u *E , “ 8t * * w oa
5).I W the*auRaer? of this-#ja& other Jl&pte $*ae*#e .f'Cofct#H*gae
®o»ft Import# tp .89?«
2 is--
Sartooy eoateaded vigoroasiy that,the poaititn of The state
jfi.
-a atata is oat th@t of ordinary M t a r s msd&r privet® dabfcor*
lav, h& w $ p w # t M U t y is ilmitad by tta* assets trndar
its actual dispoaa'X and H tfaaldft* lu«lf fcha order md
Itw niflMMr of satisfy tag tins ©red! tor* A private per* a
u^ y toaeoty*bankrupt* « ataia not* It is the fiat duty of
* private pavaaik to pay tola dsbts# "but it is the first
<&uiyof a ataia too-o^ ar tha m p ® m m of adjsir&gtr&tioa
&;&& datfenoa. tl» aradltoss m&% k&o^ that the dabtor
staia sal^ it b© ua&bia* fcr a tima and from ttpgpast
T^ mo m9 to pay its debts* ?o compel a state to pay
soratory j^ td^ sti and so to fraaoiti©a doctor to a greater
exfcpnt t&aa It may haw als&ed la to expos* ft to *the risk
of ao8*pr«iai*sg it® finance® u m t&wn it® polities I
exlste&ee* **'*
Bat la all other roapaeta thar# was ao hesits*ion on
t m part of W k e y to base har arganant on private Turn*
Artiato Htife of tha Casa tivtl aaa addaoM la support of
tlM $.oota&ii0& tbat» tba treaty ooiii&itsM no mnllon
of ssaraiory intarae t* it cannot >a aoar; ffca
Cods? Uiyll aa4 tha G&rjagfito s#ara quoted in support of
tfessplaa of via isaier wkiah baftp*waata& Turkey fro® tba
puoc&ual falfllsent of tba c&li^ atlom on private law nm
X) fm CoRtra~jie»olra of Torbay fu33* (cited after ^urar*dar
rus «iacb~tt^ rkla©fta &traitfail* la Sabuaalclas* dee Mark v<a
Iaag# p*$?lt vot*9i«
Z1&.
based the contention that «*»*« Ms0 ao 1>o;,al
the pa rt or huasia, that to«.gift character of tiwsIndesi-
nlUes extapts than from too aoHWwnos t of delay so f,».
as amiory liitsraat is oanaernad, end. finally, that
Russia ««tvea, *>yan unconditional grant of eatamion*
har possible right to moratory ini-or^at ^ In
the Contra-replied, the plee 01'x«* oadicata ha* b*en
•dWKh^®J«
All theeo objecti;-«Mwe** oppose! t>yftaatia• ffar
«©pll<po- points out that tfcptteory that stat&« are
not like ordinary debtors puts forts©an& aifmr&tiomry
sill in the place of lm $ that this theory! daagaroua
^ eaa® of in$1¥ idoais belug creditora or @
state# haa certainly no ® pp lim tion whsm.the creditor
is hlwalf a ©t&.to3**
% fbe Tribunal could not reffet*to giva a legal Adoption of
decision fecauotipositive, International law B8s el- t£>
lent on Vsm QiMtion la Im m * 1% adopt©*!* m wa
©hall •«•» private law rates governing ©mlogoua re-
lations bataaon individuals, but it aasarfceg in ihe
saara that it is international public Urn that is
feeing applied - a most important pronouncesaetrjishowing
that private to rule©, V/ the wry nature of things*
l)$&urarfop«olt.ppJSW- W
S2>J "JJ#3*?©* "
W 'p.97*'je for to otter cfojeotlona a.pp.26*7,2e6 ,27&~?.
;
xn.
$n<i a@ a result of t&t legal locality 'of P(»2atlo)9i forming
the sublet miter of an international aispuio* ®r© tossaed
in such oases an iotcgr&l part of JntevmtlmX *»»•
the 'i'ri&unal £wM that fwtooy *J>*»no grounds for d#»*
m ti& lng anexmptloa to this r@9pona£blliiy (responsibility
of states) in the matter of ®amsy gttfetftby pU -M n$ its cha-
racter of public pomsr and tta»political .©sifinancial c®-
s*qVWM*s of this responsibility.*1^ fm lm f hm?m l£ $1$
not de«y th& £fen&raiprinciple of etat© rfc&ponalblliiy with
regard to thv fulfill Hi of International OfeXiga.iions • own
in relation to pfeeonlaiy Obligation®* rut, *hlU> Invoking
the Roma la® distinctions of dlffox^nt kinds of responsibility
and admitting her responsibility for compensatory interest should
the actual damage be p?o?id by Russia* eho <itai©4 such an c^>li-
gation wit& regard to moratory interest. The Tribunal* however*
refused *to perceive m m ®ilai dlfftvf^uots bfttyNMMivarious
reeponaibllites* Meatical in their origin - culpability - ifesy
ere tho ear® in their consequences* - reparation in money**. Antf,
applying a tsroadanalogy, it arrived at Urn oonluaion "that the
general principle of i)ber<a^poneibi111y of states iiepXiesa
special responsibility in the mtter of 4elsy of pffiwKt of a
&on®y debt*.unless the uclstftncp of a contrary international
custom la proven. ” But this ’Turkey«ee un&hle to prow©. Busale,
on the otter hsna, saooeeded in reinforcing h*>-rposition by
iuvdcing preoetfents in international arbitration^ •
1}’•«the award#Scott# p
2) U.a•*¥en©sue1©*1®B«; <%xico * Vl MNi Uf 10031 Columbia-
Italy,1064*
2 ^ .
following this path, of &»aM pro- iatereat*
" ' €o^en«aioiy
to c?&£in& the-form of this apoolal and Moratory
h l l t t f * *All the private Ion of tlx©*tai$a
form ing, tm ^m top&&n concert a® <£24 to rm r ly
th® nomn lm 9 th& obligation to p&y at loaot later**
eat for tfols^a p&fmnts l®g® i tn d ^ m lt f9 wmn it
la a $m8% tm of the non~£uX t1 im at of an cf>lig&tton
consisting is the payna&t p£ « sum of momy ftf** by
coweation, olear «»t «*»igibl»* a»«3&infc&roatto 1?©
paid at, from %m 4at@ or tlm <3e»M aaA« opoa
the doctor is t o form of 1 f t * *.
Ve ®ea that the tribunal adopted not only tha The formal
private form ot*r«*8ponBtbility • moratory inter-
*et ~ but sl^o o m of the m r rn l conditioa© of s&eh
reepormiblllt yi ttoe«Xjpv»asdemand on the pert of
t h o c r e d i t o r * t h & n o t Its® • Tfe© f a c t t h a t u s o s t l ^ g t a * ”
l o t i o n * f o l l o w i n g t b a e x a ia p i© o f Eossan 1 » » *
an exp*oaa d^iaa-ndin do® for® os*la*“ *©o®b4 to th©
Tribunal sufficient to ineorporttt® tem rule In inter-
national is®?. It hold that it wouia be eanfriw?
•*a&ty to sublet a debtor state to stricter
t*llity than a private dobtor*- atn® It lie® In the position
-.» . '-' <-   -v 1 } .
to boso It© opinion on international pvem m n t * "ho
divergency of ih& dltfmut ayateraaof private. las*«lth
1) a, eeerd In Orinoco Bteasj^Ms* Oeam? * Hague mo? *J. S
CbiS! 1S65* ^ root* lot* p.SSj tr*S.~ < w» « * U laeo,
Moor©, Bijgaat 3§4i«!S&67.
12%,
X )
regard to tfo for® of tkt desisM * i-.ndtbe $p€*©l**l
coaditlans of ln%®&m%±®tmX iatepootuwe nm g®m o&ms ion
for the fdr«ttl»tiaiiof tbe rule tt»% diplonftito eh®a«&lfc
fcolag to no rm l m&m of ooumttto»tlaa istoottt*t»to% 0
&#$®n& for payo^at md@ t&roagh triesis ^'regaier««£ la
duesform.** *jbA+ r*®>®U » KaasUftkCfoverai&mtfe*eexproe*ly
In absolute Xy oat»£orlo»l t«*raedte8»adod p&ymnt frm
the Bubllm Porte, of Urn priaoipftl «n& lx&orost« W th*
note of ii@ x.sbasey »t Cottrtaailnoplo** tbo tribunal tm l&
that Turk©? is |l*o*panolbld for th© iatoi’ofetfor del.afftA
psymmte from to datfeof tta®receipt, of feltcesmM la due
tors of t o •*
tin* tribunal dealt shortly with tho Turkish except*
Ions of vi* malar, of m% iodloot* «<*6of the gift ttttfoeter
of tli©i a^ mi t F && »**£ok Smerttt *wi«dottMEM9eft*It rebooted
thmc oxoeptton©* aot on the ground of legal princip le for-
bidding ttioirroooQB&tion# ftotbooottno it f^fa«o4 to
tjast its l»ao®alty Im& tho sfcoraotor of o s£f&* that tto
£ttdgaeBt« of 41ft*ocw&ooioa tab listed at t o tetlea
XribMor at fioaatsiatiaop^ fall* for the-purpose* of offcltro-
iioa* slthlo t o ooopo cf r*a luA£eftt*» or ffe*tforks? *©a
ye#} !? prwaieot W **• fulfilling W»* Obltgatloa®
ft#MpipMritHMMM*
l)» Carte CtvU pr* oorifces " to ^ wn Sa ju a i ^ J!1®
Il*4)l no re<p4r^»at of fora 1® to fca®aotio - an
Zmvim iArt *BS4)*
-•&» Stmm m m lm d ttm l*«t exception* a typically Salver
(r$nunaiatt^nj#
private im axaepiloat that or prtaucptiva and uo-
r®m iab l® salvor* of ©stoppal* Tha OttofisaaGovern-
ment snd thy justicesof this assertion
appeared claarly t rm tfcacorraa^ndanea pro$ucad
tsafora the'Court* that ©Ithougfcthe ftaaalanQamru-~
212nt dataandad*la 1891* the p a $ o f tsG&ki&taraat
and principle, Itdid not r©serv© it©
rights to Interest on the r%mip%& gtvon by th® jUflfoaeay
or in thenotas granting extension of mym satand that
the M n m «7 <3,idnot regard the received tmsssa® i«$fcera#t*
The ansarddv&ie with adfldrabitoeiearneea with,this except-
ion,,of whichit approves andon shich the finsI JudgEi&nt
of the court is based* tfcw*tribunal reeog&ieed that*,
according to tb* gewai principle* smd the cu&tom of putiHe
international to* tbtrs & similarity betveen the con-
ditions or a etate.and that of an individual $h.ichare
del?torefor at clear and exigible conventional sum* it is
editable and Juridical also to apply by am logf the prin-
ciples of private Is® common to caaee where the mmtu& for
.; •  ..; "/ '••, '•••-.-•.••' ..•- ..-'     ...•;  ;%-•:.;. _
pvpmtfa mat be constdwred m reawed end the bon®fit to
%a derived tia&reiTro©ae ©lissiaats^d• In private lea* the
afffeefcftof dewa! for paywant are eliialaat*4*k*aatha
creditor* after having siadeisjgaidejaagtdupon the debtor*
grants ossaor m&m axtanaiom for the payment of tho principal
obligation* ©ithout rseervlag the rigfrie©ccuir&d by th» legal
j
ZZ1.
gftttUMt*'1 tribunal scGordiagifr that t-ha
0it©a3&& iifnot 3Li®foi©to pay Intor^-st
desKges «a dea»si&«afcyim & lB .
v6. ihis jndgsfcntof tha Court h&$ bt*& severely CrXtlolta of
criticised by positive writers, natafc&yby fctrapp thi<sw^*d*
and Ansiloti i. Th^y **•© oi*ihs?opinion tfcfttboth
tbe rule regarding moratory Uxtm®w% and tot re-
lating to the isopliearoxmelotion of intfcr&stin
*•«* of aisunconditional ttxt&nsloa for tte pm fmnt
of « $®bt* *re vul** of private Is® cti&ttly®m e*~
elusiveiy; that no process of analog jus?titles
ttselrrtcaption into lnt&r»*ti 9»»l l«« they
twv* ’been .i&ofiM ’bylnt$ra&tion*! custom tor treaty*
% t Professor Jfear*r* in a Aet»ll«4 MmmWwgr on
i «‘ ‘i-'’ ’ n’* - ‘ ’" • * •'•vi' •• ' • • ' •   '   i ; • '* “• v ’’ - - !•i . > v ’ : ' ’ • " ’ i,-   v . . , ... ’ / . . ; • ,
ti>l»arbitration, is ctarly or the opinion that the
a*ar£ 1© 3«st and HMk&afufeito,and tbat it constitutes
;t/'.'V''-\\'V*»  i/.  ', -i".•   ;'• -/.•./'>•. *''•’ '"'f‘'-'..  • *?''••-.% • y
an isipart*nteav©nce^&iSt in the of inter-
nations I Xm ^ •
Ihs gruat arbitration css©@ «x»ly«4»d in
thi# and tls» ceding obiter ©r©s it 1® hop®4» a
confifwfcietttnot only of $h& ®mzv$mm of tfaomthod.
t»ytfeotribiinslbut also of tbe fact that it
is* on tbs whole, in agm igtmnt ^ith the s^thod® adopted
by state'® and tribanals in foransrsrfeitrations - Ihie
s&tnod is, in turn, in ecsentiai a^^oja&nt sitn tiw
i) OpmCit #
’mm ®&ittttfeo t intevn*tlon»l intercourse . £ialo©
cannot m fr&in froiami ni ng into Ug& X relations or
fro® submit ting tMsi* in th» c&$& of dispute * to a
final decision mm%y hmmm int&rm ttmm l Im *
usa^ewioped a® it is* does not «peeifioaliy regulat**
the respective Itig&lrelation. Saving once submitted
their dispute to a .Judicial deeiaian, t Mf do sot
fail to recognise that they auhjoat to.a rule of
la* precision* if not round in ti&ernational
custoai and treaties* tasy&e ©ought w&oa 33©o©s©sr;fin
the great system of Xm which regulates the relations
Mtween 0fi M3rdi»M individual® - t&e private law »
87. 0Qf3&t© might b0 eitpVMMIII m to wtether the
principle of saoratorjrinterest* si edopted *by tbe
Tribunal* is?a generally Woagai Md .rule. For it
appears tot the position ta Mn h j JBttgllatila* is
different in this r&g&rd* nIn m ®c%im for the
.mn~p&fmwfo of# debt or liquid tea d$aan& in m m f*
- . . . . ' , .... . .. , - • ) 
ttm m&%um of dsmsp&ft l» tm sum due, together with
interest* if an^ is payable* and mraina 1 damages
cun m tf be el&itaed for tlaedetention of %lm mm& f
'btif&oA the day of pa^ nt, because the special coo»«-
eaences to 13s#creditor frou want of vont? &r© not in
la* considered to b# »1thin tfe*sonttelation of the
parties**1^* '*a# althou#* interest, to run frotathe
 tiae of thttdorosnd, aay be aliened. .. if a written
»«* **«** < n ¥ W » . « i > i - f i t h t -i nnn>tfr*,-~rrrn«r>niTnnn muii^ju
1) Lfcake on contrasts p*7£3*
« -.— - . - — _____ I
Is tte prto-' |
eiple of so- j
rat cry inte-
rest a genejs
ly recognise*
ra ta l Eng liM .
lm consider
255.
or p& 'fmnt is tod* t*p«mthe debtor* giving hlsi
notice %tmt interest will be ©iai»4 from th* dat© ©if
the aonth until payis©n&**tb& poror to award inter©it
is in tft©discretion of the «oart or the 3ury^ * Th%
isxiorfst* if any# so *«&r<M Is payab 1& by m®$ of
damage© • tut it *a©ybe doubtad mhattar the EnglUh
exception affect© the g& mml rul&« it is not possible
to trace b«4$ tb* origin am! historic3. foandatlo« of
 His attitude of hng llBh l&m. But tft*tit is no n m
in ^CGord sith tbe X&g&X convict ion of Judges or autho-
rity Is clearly &!&*»&*for iaart*ne&t in the opinion® of
Lora J*C» and <)«st9l in the &&mu i>&ndm*
Cfc&fcbft®s M Bower %il*r#y Conapanyv .South Eastern Bal&say
Company*  ^ and fa Uis v •S«ith<5*# respectiwly * It hm
R im y* appeared to m *-says Loro - that the
.dootrlnb of U w i*ngiis& lev as to »on«-pays&&ntof ttanfty~
the gem m l rule‘being ttoatyou cannot reeowr dwiagtft
tioosase it ic.not paid by a certain day ~ is sootcult©
consistent with reason* A s$n ussybe-utterly rated by the
noJipayBeat of a suesof « m y os a given d*jr«tfeedamages
m y be ^ n o m w , &nd the other party m y be wealthy* Hossever*
that is our 1m.* If* hpwwr^ it »#re m t m r is*, tlw
Sbsnrdl&y wmM be apparent •**' This reffisrkrelates* of
1) z&isbary* VoJSi.p*88 ana note r.
B; (X89&) A*€*04437.
z) IOOB (Oh•&») P«S4S «t secf*
4 } fjBeif virtually i&e &&ih©»»« ihfcopinion of kord HoracesIX*
PP«4S7*-44G*
2cour m* onlj to interest && dAWkgsa* but it aeoks tti®
whole doctrine of moratory latere si in iragH»h l#i?*^,
In addition* the <&&e©ptlom to the doctrine*are so
a m i t e snd comprehensive25' that ttey mitigst© it
aofisidfersbly* It aiy b«sso^spt^d that tts©jSagud&yrsjp$
t9.»In this connection, la ftoeordtohga$ith a ^neraX
rule of is??*
98. This arbitration brings to a close the w i y * * * QtJ*r Bag®®
Case •
of the so®% important c&gtwjidecided by the?h n « « a t
Court at mg tm . l-fmy sre at the-s m tins ih& most
illustrative of the theae® pat forward in thsea ohapt*
«*»’• it is not intended to in the m m mn mv
\ o tfm r 4m m which t& m bofom the coart at Hague * Their
auT!.Jeot**s^tt#ris not tmch &® to afford dicier opportunity
for application of privet# 1** a m logy. A thorough atssdy#
however., of th$ procfeMin^ o f %imm 9* 90* mould rmmm l
Warni' In almost all of th$m ths p rm lm t to*easem lm m t in
this or other tor®. It can only %& indic&ted* In a
cursory s u m j t in sh&ch «a«*« the*application of amiogjr
w*a of isspori&nc^ ,
f M £ap»tt«i'attHouse tax m m of May 1008“ ^ is of fh« $mwmt
......  ,. .,. . .. .......... H**tia@fax
Interest* not «o fesacfewith fr*gat'd to the questions Casa.
Th$t the-position of the Xa» la not ©at1®factory in this ragard
waa lucid in tbi $&$s®ca$& by I*ordftat&oa end Lord -hand »sho
asadfcreference to the 1b® os*Scotland aftfollowing the.opposite
principle (in ©coord &iib Bmmn &nd Continental law}.
2) 9 , 8«labui7«lqc*oit * ,„ ,
3} For & short mmmx$ o€ t o c©se, o’,$«ott op.cit .p.77.
*    ' -  "'f  
2 3S-
Aecided !>yits#fribaa&X* mu *tih xmgtrd to those in
which It 7&£ue$d to proaooace sn opinion* The issue
imtom tfc©tribunal was prltaafacie aae of interpreta-
tion* ArtisJje18 of the rmrlcfA treei? of July 1894
between Japan and Orest Britain p ' W K M that eft&r &h©
foeilga cuarfcersexletlag in .T&pan©he11 h*Y* been in-
corporated la the respective ccMUNne* "the existisig
leases in pesrpetuityua&er ©tilchproperty i® nos held .
in the said aettlemifee shell be co&£4w@at no eon~
ditione nhateowr, ether th»a t&oee eoriUirad in such
exletlag 1#^ e« $h&Xl be l&poeedlin respect of such
nropepty*® The*Japanese OevMMPfMHit contended r%© juridS1
osJLnature
before the Tribunal that lands aloo* are ©xsasplfcd|IM or leases«
i
the pBjmnX of lispeeig*-1««® sad other charge®# asad
not aiso the bt*lMia®» constructed on eucftlan&ft. &e
•|i
claimed by § m s | i France- and Orest Britain* Foth,
parties based thatr *r®*i#at on their can private Is*,
TbftJape«e*e ftgwrniawafr*which ela,$«ed the right to
impose t&xu® on feoHftllMP IttlatelMA that although. the
ownership of the land m m lm veeted la the Oowr^flft*
tbe ownership of t o buildings beiootga to the holders
of perpetual leeae* who to© porohaaed or erected'build-
ings at *fe»tr osa SJEpeate^ * atreseed the tact tot
X) £he' ftdfflfHeeiws ih*> provision* of the ire& iiee eitfa O&rsaany
and siih France of 1696*
*•.,4-'-.; v.'//'!'-,Jr.V•'”••;.: }!'>; f‘-'/•'V;-'4- •-  .;,; .;.•'}.‘,\;.v.. •'•\ *
2 } m p iy Of t&w $«^es»s«e 0 O M M M to ttafcObjection® Oi‘the
, gcmvm&m® of France, Gariasnyand Or .Britain p .23.
*3I
____________________________ i
that Code of span* far from adharing to tbs civil *&§
m m m l&yprinciple of acaaealan la r^epaat of bulla ing®,
eoasecretf** tha anelani custom or 4o»3£«b of Xan$ aqd
and buildings constitute a principle of natural as well
invoked their codes,,the pandects?an& the @aner*l prinoi~
plw£ of law. natural g«a positive# in support of the con-
tentlan that accession Is © .mod®of acquiring ovnerehlp
a M that thts'building ehare* tt* legal position of the land
•Thequaation thus $u‘b®itta& to th* ttriboaal was not
one or private lam pur© ssnasimple *, nalther wm it a
problem of Internet ion®1 prlarotttlam-* It was a Question
of privata lav ssfeich*%   the fact of having b t w object
of a l&fal relation -t*i ma state© * t o baa«s a oaeation
of international public law* ^faathar csaalsare Jtera©naturae
or not* *ad stotter thay are ga&er tha rules of oanarahlp afcra
out0Ida actual poaaasaion i® a quaatlon of private laaj hat
it becoass om of intarnatlanal public law atnantha partlea to
tha dispute are 2lata©* -$hla-1* also tha eaaa in this
particular nation* court* hoMWar* <faeltna$ to enter
1) statement of (fe'Saotlon*of the l«p*3»islJapanaaa {Mpornnaat to
tha contra-«aaarolraam a&neluaiona of tha Oovarnsaent®of Or*
T*rit.f Franca # 4 Oarisanf*p*43»
£} p.aa* ibiai Articles &&3 ant 6&4 of th* Franch Ctrl* Coda suare
a4dua®$# aa well as the febsiland covenant” in «m.leh tha
prae&rv®tion of o»nar«Mp of tha land!la tha hands of the lasso*
coexists a1th the acquis Ulan of ttoeounsvKttipof the bullainfte
the laaaoofp *21* & 1
IS)J£&>ame nranena* — m»* <5tig5w««fis«8«t .Ta
building®*1^ snd it denied that th* in&lviaihilit? of land
as of general poeltlve lm k K Hat tha iM ropmn poaara
on which It la eraotad^
*“t0 P^ vb W la® B„a *»„«<, ltt ,8cl:,loa
oa tto lntcppretstiaa of u» Intention of the partis®.
But « Oirfioult prohlea 1. not solved t,y 8 refu, 8l t0
•rurnr it.
tltfe record to the tnterprst»tl: m of treat ies. tba tolas df
trCtowi rej t^sd the ar ge nt or tte a»pS ne M
00 tb* Jnule0111511««*«<« to i* ®* wtt«wl U, sn«
pressed tey J8paa i„ the folio. teg wooers t^owentaira- t o r T
*1 provisions in <5erogstion of the sovereign authority '«teSuwi
of the state mutt b* Interprets^ etrietiy, and no argu-
«mt bssea on analogy or jn-emuable intention of the
parties to Each eoaventlonsi stipulation* is to b»
admitted ***• Is often teeing tooted la in- I
terna'Cloa®! arbitration &mI the.parti©® under o'bllg®**
tion wry willingly mke use of it. It it regarded by I.
ma&y as tuples! of the;ep^cls i fcfcs&racfcerof th© re1stIons
’$»# ’ 
ooorao adopts ».» a right w . fa apscial m e a ' / ln_ I
terprotation can be admitted m s consequence 0£ the
alleged specific character of interastiowil la«, lr they
R0Uld reeuU to tto intention of tto
P»rU<»#. f« u i» , ;:« » k » u * * o iw r ly esprsae ,* to th#
U':Brd of “ * p*rB*0*nt Cc,urtof International Juttice of
Auewt Me* in the e.8« of "U^ leaon": "Thie raet (taa
pp.^1*34,36} Cmtre«m?soir^ «i conelias1am«
15 Japan. .. * * • « * of O b ^ t C T ^ S S e K
'2.^ .
limitation of Gerssany*© right oww* the Kiel
Cwal) constitutes * sufficient reaeoo for the restrictive
Interpretation, In csk © of doubt* of ih© oUtttftshtch
produce® such a limitat ion. Put the Court feels obliged
to stop at tfe©point whet*©lh<$ a©1*©ailed reatriciiw in—
 
terpretatien ©ould bo contrary to the plain terss©of th©
article «nadwould destroy what teasf>ee» clearly grasjied•"
This argument that the sovereignty of the ©tat© 1c r©#**
tristed t?y obligations aaraed in © treaty itttfcalways h©
counterh©laneed by the no A«© true fact that it la by the
conclusion and fulfUnsafe or trestle® that ©oiwrelgaty of
• 2 )
a state finds Its real e*pre*ftlo& *
99a la tto©Grisbadarna case* decided >/jthe %guo Tri~ Th« Oria-
btrnal in October 1938, judgment *aa given on ground© m m .
Prescrt^Scn
amounting virtually to a recognition of the doctrine
,-••  ;. . .../ . ... ;i|_ _ t . ... . ' •   • - ,. ‘ ' .... .  , , ' »
of pascription in interaction* lev* although the term
Itself m® not um4 h j the tribunal^'}. It awarded to
Sweden the Oris&adarna region in view of the feet "that
t v “ , • ' ; ' • . ? ' ' ' . : ' < • . V - ' ' _ . '   • > .'  I. ' ' ' ‘: . _ . - v „ . , ' / • ' i , ’ ’ , , . . • ; • . i f
Sweden has performed various ect© in the Oriebadanw
region* m p m U l l j of let©* oaing to fearconviction that
these regions ore fcee'dtah*snd in recognition or **asettled
Xt p m U 4 * 8 # »
Von ^artitzt* amlyei© of the cue© la Sehaeefcing op ; ci t -
vo I ' lX tm p « r s di&tIngulfhad in their r^pom®
beteeen the e a i * *fc©r© i t is t o ^e decided sMtner the ©ppli~
cation of a treaty provision should be ©Kten&ed to case© not
©xproealy jwafcloiaBdin .the.treaty (here th&y conceded the ©d~ I
KlaeiblUty of the ruXa of striciuss ins}* and between the
caa© o f iat©rpr©tati©& of a treaty shore the r t& l intention
of tfteperiie® is t o be e iucidatad*
3) for fcumary and award s.&eoti*e imports p .121-133.
principle Q.i th® luw of nations that a stat® of things
which a.c&uftXXyaslats s»& lias exists for & long %im
sbould fcechanfpg as Ut Ue &e possible*5 «a& it ei»?*«d
tttttstcjGKrttttgvuato,m part of the disputed
territory, to ISoraay - os*ataUar groon&s. But it U of B« coarse
tO RCMNi
special interest to sot© ho» &otfe »tsies*espcei»lXy Swe- X**.
deii, supported their cX&igi by argaffisnt«ad rules 4 r«wn
reatt private snd especUXXy from R » » law. this. is the
r»e characteristic sine-© i« both «wi&rleft tikt l&fleence
of Kqomi Xas ^&s is w i | em ll so £et» »s their tgtt&eipftl
 • ’.  -- • - •• , • , / •-  •  .'  -. .-  '  j
im is ao&mrmd* SmMn quoted Urn K m tm writers of
the sixteenth m& wwateeath century, ** ^ 4 recourse
  i ' \  . ..... ,', ,.: . ....- -, •'.’'•.-."•.
- !
to such Komxx1m notiam as potpeealo * »0 v l , mn dm *
«ec precarlo. this ami si:»iXsr feet® s»y «flt fee in eeeont
eith the theory of positive writ#?#®) * but they ere m i * -
thel&st© expressive of the legs! soarletion of states*
100® fftosseeoaS fcoandterydispute deefcst4 by the ffegae % e XeXsM
of Timor
fri^eneX i$t&Its origin in of opinion "between C&m *
the X/utdih« M Port«ijgBme 0 <weraB»ots es to the? proper in-
terpret&tion of B-om conmvxiing tm do limits-
$l\  "j
tlon of their respective possessions on the I«lsna of ?tsar*#
the eeerd of Use Tribunal is noteworthy fceeense of the fall
1 ) s »strapp*s £m-iy ®is of the esse in $ehttecking, iec.cit «voi•£*
pp. X3 S * m^ .
£;}Thsy Bh&rply u tttK ilm a by £»trupp p.XkS op.cit *
3) $to» I*lend of fiaor. Cam of Swim 19X4, s .Scott op.eit*3^4-S86*
«<*option of tlus mX© of interpretation of treaties
tat ion ©re # by «8d large* agtttls aatandtlSi those of
the interpretation of &gvmmn%® betm&n inftlvldttsla*
principles of cowmm^m^ auS zxp&rianm
t»y tte prms&eaee -of Kona *n arbitrator cites la full
the provisions; of the csfe civil (article* 1 1 6 6 * 7 of the
Garssa Civil com (article 13$) a^jdof t&f Swiss Cocteof
obligation® Urtltfte 18) * all or tfe»Kto the affect that it
ie the common intention or t o parties and not the literal
m&n ln$s of the ®or& "ahl«b &houl4 b* aimed at la the aork
of lnterpretat Ion** cad 530 a&dei **lt Is ow»l«res to die IX
on the entire coiael&enee or private and international la*
on this p o i n t ^
X) ftrlxifllp*du droit m& 0*-m 9 Vol*£v %*«157.
2 5 ;4M r c-ae©s deeldad h f tite Court at Hague 4a not thro??'m e n
light on the pr o'blesn It i t impossible to say in the ^ m nm
of pabli«h©4 reports of the proceeding® hop fur the pmrttw
avail® a thew e Ives of private law miss ani smlogtes* that
they did it occasionally my fce seen fro® tfts ferssen %moire
in the Case Blanca Case* wiser® the analogy of y-omsa la® la
inv rbm& in support of th® contention that «ho takes the
Im in his asm hands* without waiting for the help of the
la m l authority. Is precluded from Invoking afterward® the
right ht; claims (branch eonreHnfaolrs p.3S> <a>Uho«« parte
of"tfee ai*$OMBaft and of the «e»*d ehleh deal with the degrees
of cuip» of tiitpgysatt*.la $u*atl( » (cosap,oidel«1 ’arbitrage 4a
Cssahlanes* Kev .3• Dr .in*'?U0 I*f1010* p . 3 9 4 W)« the Orinoco
ei&smp®hlp Comp&nj (Scott* &2&~£M) and the?Canavaro esse
(Scott, BB4~B90) - the f w r being eonctfrnedslth tha ralas
governing the revision of an arbitral ©wardi the second, ie a
typlce 1 css© of international private l m *
m farwl»te4 by fttvlm t of treaty inte'rpre-
Qib\mm .viii
  PrI'/aiti t o as a m m m ol laferii&tioml law la tg&araat l&mX
ttl&n*
  -'-  ., .’
a$3U Tho, of arbitration aasea in ttiaa* tte&# ci&apters
  ''-L1 . . - ’ *' > • '' •' '4
does sot puEport to show that srblt^ aX t^ lta&bt » v » i M Um um lYm
of vfwrsFopportunity ttfallying a .r&ioof pHvato las* a&tfoousgh
tlmy mlow&tMiy :i24s*at&at*l$tha fact that international tribunals
private Ism «t»&0va? th»y Awm it mivis&bl®* Shut Is
intended to a&o« t&, i im t l j* that to pavtsas to thoaa arbltratlcaMi
* - ' *   'V
the states, report frequently to application of $r&$ata law nn&Xo-
gtei* .Mellon was already m&e or the v^ ry f&avaetaris&o' rote of
Mails *$&mm is 2M> pl&oa for *eiMtoaMU& of comets in th» rou$k .
jm'isprutlsne® ojTaatioisa. 1* w Siii m y b© 1-,vw, but it oartalnly
doe* not apply to states as parties to m international Maputo* *
- v•'' ".' I .... .-... ' ;;
ftoe of winleipftl mm? %& itsatro|i®»te& an& 8i&^ a&3&&
bafor* an tnt*rmtiaiml court* Use YemzutoUm $raferontial claim
tZbmtmtm tillsfact in a «txiiin$mmm* - $6® dissuasion «ill
abo»s ftaocNQOSynthat in «aaa# vANwa international tribunals i&sic&ia
«^ on qm&tifsm which ®ouM be ^ w m 4 fayprttaatete but for tiw
tact that tha ps&tteu to the dilute ark statas toy adopt aa * V
M # a eolation In eonfomity with tot gamrally okt&i&iag.in
24*.
private. X&ff* Sis® M taatty f$3ft|ai m*m In s* &3m$&
0 t %-Mb ** i t t mv&m * Umms mm 4£vt«*
»%t&m   £xm& t&la g&t& mi %mUi ® M b®* X% %km% a a&Mt$
*
sejeot# mi mfcmrm m s m ®felon of Its y^gMmnt by to
m n irn3®Zm?mM mtO&gg*} it m m m 9 m Urn otta* hand, t » v
mi te>£bmmX ®& •&i»*&jsiieali20 #»fct3*nfeD&*
s%oog*ait&m to «,privet® tor smlis of ot^ toM
thin, &&&&» iottm obXj m WMpbi&au But im it as it um»
im&msmm of srrdtr&ttoi « M fe the &ttltuf3© at
<«*& «t&te« - «t3©s$- nit Xumt ttie arg&nt m&®mlity of «»
ur#^$JsaStlo@€ oi %h&afcoXfcpz'Qltl&m* Si«sb.& treat**
ft
mat souid oeri&iBl^ o££er-m m guM&isoe to <wteU»tovs of&%n
m nTusdd lay th® oi* tba «otmX c&ao tefor^ tbasa.
&|* Usaomtioal on tfttespfrcliftB pa llia ^srao to f
of Int^mtloml i*w* - i@ ^ro<se@4sen si£t&t o o^A&imiloa
of Mm & 9 tfeougfc m& 1mm srteitratioa mm® -*
1 02* temg t&e atue& Mi azftitr&SL simr^ a &t tbe !»$gttttlQg
.v \
o f t^ 30 &mor& t/tiJS o f tfe® X9fcl«o&atn$»y# insyf&f. Vr&®»mx%to f &&
or® taos?© in m * %lm mmg&&
by to se&&te o f M ^ | m rtzitiX# » swrtdnent $2ace eo
far S8 tts&jx Jot 24& s*& is meefrod* fliinrelate» &$£&oitaXy
to the gftae&s croft*. anft ^RiJUa sad ©M tep*
In tte £roft mm {IB M } Portugal m Urn defoad-
«nt f m tn X^legtd 4©mJ^ feX of $ m t l m to Ep* C3?oft# a
Vsubject, to whom the Portuguese adsaini'steirtiwe authorities denied
a patent of registration notwithstanding a judicial decision in
M s favour, ^ It was now elate: A by the British Government
that the authorities acted illegally and that the Portuguese
Government is responsible for the consequences of the illegal
...
k•
- - 
• m*  -«***> Gtq$% 1
proceedings., Both allegations were rejected by the arbitrator ease*
 . on grounds into which it is not necessary to go in this connec-
tion* It is interesting, .however,, that one of the chief argu-
ments of Great Britain was that Portugal is estopped by its
conduct from denying the truth oi'the British allegation* It '
happened namely in November 1851 that the Portuguese Govern-
ment - acting under the influence of strong representations
p :v; '      '
on the part of Great Britain - issued adecree in which the
attitude of the administrative organs has been described as a
denial of justice, and the contested right granted to Mr* Croft*
' The
Was the tribunalprepared to admit the plea of estoppelt It was -, Pleaoj
estopp*
under certain conditions* ”l£ what wascontained in the state-
ment of the 17th November 1851 had been expressed in a not# oi*
other diplomatic communication, addressed to the British Govern-
ment bj the Portuguese Government as its view of the case, itisp-I• ;'4,}v;‘ '*» _• ’ >.•1 .i/.;4
might have been justly said, that the one government had fey
I   v . v •; '\  ’'''  
I 7 llosiee,A'r^^'^ ttoenawarci, p, 4S*/0 - 4983; Lapr&delle, of>* cit*
P. 1 - 37*
;thereby «f an * c k n m l* t^ n%'ami «&-zma im im i
I t0 * * oite3? *» ***** t o latt&r m no«7 altogether ^
-.ORMPfttaa from tbe task of p m d & g that the <mse really ':
atooi «& it was A » m a n M t b m , ”** It was held, how*
ever# ***** **1*® *oiely an adctresa from the
gs wrment to the Council of stats, marmot fc®regarded "'':
as an iatcrmtiomllj Mining declaration^ Should such
an act h a w taken # u « • » « there could fe no doubt th&t
a perfectly valid title to 8ftfcla£a«tia& or iatomifie*tion
from the Portugese state would,arise th®rs£r<»su* The
. ,\
attliM© of the tvpawmZ is clear enoughs only «n inter-
a fttbm a l a c t, no t an ia tea ra&^ jssS : om, rmjbe regarded as
*t*me.2*nt for the purpose of evidence* This solution m y
w>t be altogether satisfactory, bat it Is i^oriimt a©,the
first tetar*ee of an *3fomm ttr& Juridical of &<3-
ftSMLea (or e&toppel) by an international tribunal#
10S* Tfc0 » • • * » • £hcrtr3%e 8M Comp. - again & case of,
mis&a of $ m % t w to British «ubjecis by Port vy*mm author! *
ties ~ offers another exa# 9 2 * of recourse to Homan law in "
$rder to fill a gap In ite rules of international %m* The
tribunal rafter having &rri¥-#& at a cfeeteioE in favour of tha -
British Ql®tea, zm rather ©sb&rressed by &h# British towmd for
1).Moore,- AUb* p. 4981.
«) S.. p* 30.
-interest in the anouat of a,417 £ for a period of £2 years
the principal being „0 IKW ttan 2,589£.i} ^ ^ ;g » £ *
international law no* Statutory period of limitation for tto^iToo^!
recovery of arrears of interest. §> But the Coiosiisaionhad
no hesitation in adopting the Roman ls» rule of ultra alte- ./
'V * t4mtum* "come , d'apres la droit conaim. seul applicable
ioi, le cumul dee interets arrieres a'arrete lorsqu'ils atteignt
le prineipaKEig. ,de eond. indet.,13,6.J on a du restreindre
U * Interet de oe <*»* * ^530" .OJl’Me adoption of a rule of
one particular system of law i&y be adversely critisised-
expecially on th© part of positivist liters. But it is clear
that the analogy to Homan la??embodies in this case a princip le
recognised by all systems of private jurisprudence#
he different regulations as to whether the period of limitationdrears
ought to last five or six years* or whether tKb total amount of terert.
interest ought to be restricted to the p rin c ip a l amount, but it
Is clear that these differences in detail do not affect the
general rule which comjsendsitself from many a point of view* *
With regard to the measure of damages to be awarded £ha Commiseiaa
affirmed the principle, the general principleprivate lap/,
 ' ’  :  ' || . '''' 1  ;'v
ire^ra, p. 108| s. £aprade lie, $; p77?§^Tl8.
{ivo to French law (Art. 2277); six years in
Engliso-xlaw {Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, s, 42)
3} oroit Bwm im is the common Homan - German 2m*
iq*.
followed by the great majority of previous and subsequent
.1)
tribunals: causa proxima non remcta spect&tur* It recog-
nised, in a lucid exposition of the principle , direct
damages only, v?ithoutputting, however, a too limited con-
& ) ' ’ ’ V'.: ‘^
structIon on the ndirectness” of the damage •
HkV' /.r\w/
104. The opinion may he ventured that out of ttm gob-
She case
") flictlng practice of international tribunals rejecting and, o f uCoions3
Lloyd
recognising claims for indirect anclprospective damages, Aspinsall”.
• , £he rale ^
the rule gradually emerges - a rule of toothinternational governing
damages
and private law - that the remoteness of damages lim n for lost,
profits. 1
coupled with the fact that they are not yet actually sustained,
that they are only prospective, acts to defeat the respective > i
claim. In all other cases damages are awarded* fhis is
3)
seen clearly In the case of nColonel Lloyd Aspinwallu. Taei. >
arbitrator had here no doubts in awarding damages for pros-
pective earMngs# Be did not regard governments as entitled
to a privileged position? on the contrary - and this is of I
interest - he thought, in a rather drastic e:s&ggeration, that
11a government more even than an individual should be held to
B v.'a ..•' v'\ j\jf
1) "s."-forifiitance-'theL'ease''"o£i:L|%lliii®11 - ’Mexico 1842,
Lapradelle, vol. 1, p. 470.
B) s» Lapradelle, II. p. 1171 an mount for prospective profits
. was also included in the award.
5) Moore, Arb. pp. 1,008 - l,018j Lapradelle, II. pp. 668 - 675.
1<V7.
The
ma&e most liberal compensation for an \mwarranted interfox*©nee
with legitimate business*" and lieproceeded, on the ground of
the distinction between lucrum cessans and dannum emergens, to
define the amount of the sum to be awarded for the 114 days of pa.
interruption of trade. biani
case*
105* On the same Homan law distinction between actual and
prospective damages, as well as between the different degrees
of fault, is based the outspoken decision of the President of
the Swiss Confederation in the dispute between France and Vene«
1)
suela in the Fabiani case of 1896. The Sward, which in some
parts resembles a* dissertation and private law of damages and
which is one of th& best arbitral awards rendered in the 19th
century* is quite emphatic in awarding damages for prospective
gains, although it defines them as Indirect damages* This is
important, because under the influence of the Alabama award
international law writers began building up a theory of inad-
missability of prospective damages in claims against states*
There is no question here, says the arbitrator, that the damages
claimed are not of a merely speculative character*,and it would
be highly unjust not to take account of thegiin the present
case* More than one-third of the awarded dsa&gsS.was covered
2 )
by this head*
TF'^ooreT" Arb7"tSe^ awar^ "^pV ’4873"- 491&*
2) There ar% however, ateps backward in this evolution of a,....
weill-fixedrule sin the case, for instance, of KCanada" tree
arbitrator went very far is disallowing damages for prospective
V -
V_<-
i
wfe&t^a»i2^e tlsointerssis of one state*staud
is 50s«5oasss te the way or the recognition of a private Proscription
l^aw rulo way be seen from sons.Instances of %'m application
of tiaedootrto of prescription In %)m arbitration Isetwimn
t o UtoitedStates and CMte of 1063 {nlhe, Macedonian**)
plea of prescr ix>tion put forward by CMl^ ®as resisted .by ,•  —
t-h©United Stat®a as of doubtful applieation in intoniiitiona1
i) . ;     '   > _   ^
law# " Equally in tho ease between ?Jnite&States and Brazil
(1876# Use **Can&daH} the first took great pains to o&pport fSosaaOftw
tto^irposition toyN f t m to the Itaim of common law
O 'i
« *
’nullum tes$ms ocurrii regin * «•it©find, on U * otter A
a thorough, exposition and the adoption, of tteedotrine of
prescription by Gossslesloner Little In Williamea case in.t&e Bsn | ^
United States and Yenoxuolan eosmleaion trnlsrtl» convention
- -3)
0:f 1SS5. nQxi careful coneidoration of tbe authorities
•   ' •. .V '' • : •, . v ‘ . • . '; « V -, '  •' .•./
on the subject {it toolc14 pages to the learned arbitrator
  V - M ' r : * <;r >•.. s,
to n?Tlow th©$&)wo &m of opinion tmt by tlieirdecided
#ei$it • ®e mi^bt sey l?ymry aeeeesity * prescription M s a
place in tho international eyetem* and is to toeregarded. in •'  ,
#) ‘! / V '' '
those adju&ieatione*:? !Ej© css # » j certainly toe quoted
’-.u-fl-v;.-;•'f',-,''•   •-. .- *‘ , V ' -v
priF£ts''Hffer 'Sebo-
iossectcai’Xy in tne VGgtyp* or th© ^aspaditionmight Jie^m‘been
entlroly imsuccessfal and without profits |Moore, 1746}*
1/ Moore, pp, 1440 • 1484. 8) Moore, Arl>«pp-#1733 ~ 1747# :'
S) ibid, pp. 41S1 - 4X0®.
4} fii©ai^oitratordid not oramitto mmb&m the recent riutterfield,
;%VSi
m mm of tbg> loci elastic! of the doctrix» of proscription.
107* ; Instructive from ffiajsya point of r^losis tfe*®rbit*»
ration festeesnGroat Britain and Argentine arising out of & B^ritain
decree of the C&ovemaent of Argentine, then at war with the
republic of Uruguay prohibiting was©Is ar&ivisagfrom Monti- ^ o/0j*
_4/>{WtT^|1
vide© to outer Argentine ports. Great Britain sought w to
recover tbe losses of British subjects resulting from this
1} '!
prohibition. fissarbitrator! the President of tfeeKepublie
of Chile, August 1870) issM tbst -argentineIs not responsible
because a valid blocked; of riontivideofeasbeen officially
pro<^&?ie&toyher and that St is°& principle of universal ju-
risprudence that lassjhouses M s right offends ho <a»° . Sbe
© M principle of private laws naraiaa®lr*e<titqui suo lure ut4- nsmiiW
Xm& it
tur, is thus, ®n tbs form of a principle of universal ju- qui sue
^ .iur^isN
rispru&ence,adopted as a source of decision, m is of interest titur*
are
to note tfcattfctte/autborswho regsM this rule as belonging
primarily andlea&elusively to private law.3*- Of m Mm inte-
rest is another point raised by Argentine aMeJi, however, has
not been answered bu the arbitrator; the plea of estoppel* In
Sovember 1849 the two governments signsd a convention settling
the claim arising out of the bloeks&e. m mention Isasbeen
I
Estoppe
J i8§0»M oo ra iil8^ 31^ i5iB whichtji© ump ire re fused to repea t a
&k$M beeuase sis years have elapsea between the e ten t and the
prosecution of tbs claim* fttis short period aiaathe special
circumstances o f the ease may account for t&® decision of the uiEp ire .
1)Uoore ?pp«4916**4926j>kspradelie3II*6‘36<~667.8) awar&,Moore
3)JS«l©rDeutsche Versalt iings*ee&t,XX.p*358#rt;ferred to by
Lap rade lle , Ii.p .3 3 5 .
tto®radOueed toySmmml tm* to the that Bri-
tish.
gf**t&O 9lftil®- m m w h o t ***!**#
M t& to ho ftg*
did aot do*X .with this
s# for tm%8&m& 2s th»
il
o&s® of wGei^ s’1 or In tl» ©aa® of ilm Hudson’s Say Go®pa*
agrois.toa tstoiit ms b#ing ait^ npted to mm &%mvS&mm
v&rioa offfe&apM%form&M in ttm aouvaaIof ateiiw ss&got&a-
%$®m*
XoS* lb® Vofl$sai&is&^ rljteat lorn of 190® will, it lu
12&vod# provo of pn ?mmn% v&lae for tJn®&is«m»s£on of ®ma&
m
  - 'i
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Qmstlom of istosmtioss& law*
the V®.
aosm:
#i t&ay M i to cteelpri*
mariZj w ith Vm gmettioi* of daa&@aa for denlaX of jgiti&a#
for :t©asoaaoat&ia&d in tem coma® of riot®# it la#
isle&dod to d«s? is&3?@atteatIon to suoh <a&0$a£030
ate tiiaphobia® igasto
to the $yeatlG&& of ds*5fig®&
mwitecittgg
 vli
V l i
JBjpaatt.*aa M r constantij tMMtyffittg to % m ra$& %bm% ifcm
f»S« at oh© tiiaa 8 tjl&read |S a #aduaed aim m m c m *
$ m m $ m for the olaSiii8*the q%&&$ odious answer of
tor n&a# that after Brasil had Aea&iaa& this offor tbara aaa
&0thl3Qg 1© rogard th& 12*S# a©
6S$mM n#f* S) Moor© &&• ?•
3) C^ pi m* the axeelXoat reports ©f Bfclatsaa#Vmmzm lsm Ar~
fcliratlo&a of XS OS^ ovam. Print tr*g QigZm*?' ™*
/
r'VI
to damage® for prospective losses, the commissions seam to fol-
low a uniform Xin&* Sbay reject claims for lost profits then
onl^isfcen the? speculative, uncertain ansiindefinite. "It is
not to be supposed * sa^s for instance the umpire in the Ca-
ro ease - that during a period of destitution* plundering
and destruction of all sorts da Caro would,successfully have ••
1)
carried on any business whatsoever. rt But Wkmntlieprofits
were not entirely speculative the umpire loadno hesitation*
while quoting decisions of Municipal courts# to admit that
"If a clear jseaaure of dasa&gesexists with relation to fu-
2)
ture business, it isayinvoked* * In the question of pre-
scription the opinion of the arbitrator in the Gentini,case*
an opinion based both on international and private law pre-
cedents and.authorities# did much to strengthen the doctrine
o£ prescription much shaken as a result of the rather mis-
$}
understood award of the Hague court in the Pious Fund ease*
AXthoug in #0388 cases the plea of prescription has been re-
jected, it appears clearly from the opinion of the arbitra- ^
tor that he recognised the principle^ofprescription as such. -
iij ka^ion^reportpisiiallariy’’fiat£» cases; Valentines*,,
p.562,Orinoco Asphalt,p.586, In the Dlz case indirect damges
are rejected because “international lew as m i l as municipal
denies compensation for remote consequences* in the absence of
deliberate inteniionto injure”^. 7** s* also Kudloff case where-
speculative and contingent profits are rejected, the suspire
referring to a decision of a municipal court <p,198}©
2) Martini case,ibid*p*844. |€lso I.Koberts esse,p.145*
3}ibid•pp•724-730.
4)f.i.,Tagliaferro case.p.764.,Qi&copini case766*, Eoberts c.p.
577 and Stevenson case( in the last two cases the delay in th&
presentation of the dviaan& smajf due to tkm action of the dsfen-
dent Government^
3,09# - So give m exhausttro account of the recourse to pri-
* ' ' llieSri-**
vat© law in %kmparticular arbitration eases would mam , as tlsh-£jae»
. . - , . . Vx:: rican
already mentioned# to cover almost the entire field of in- Claims >
Arbitral
ternati.nal arbitration - a task which* naturally* cannot be firibmia“
    ;  '- v . ’ynder 4|
attested in tillsmonograph* It is being intended, therefore, the
Conventi<
to drs® attention mainly to such oases which are most illus- of 1910,
trative of the question under discussion# A considerable
number of such cases is to be found in the decisions of the
British~/uoerlean Claims Arbitral tribunal constituted under
the Convention o f 19X0» Host of them have b^en rendered in
the course of the last four*year**
ihe convention of August Idth 1910# signed between
the United Kingdom and the United States of America nfor the
settlement of certain pecuniary claims outstanding between
1) - - ’ I *
the two parties’’ provided for the settlement of four clas-
ses of claims, amongst which those based on alleged denial
of real property rights, on acts of authorities in regard to
private vessels and "on damages to the property, of either Go-
-;rV' v\. , ' .. . ...   • >    ' ; V .; I'-..., 'yVv
verxuoent or its nationals., or on personal wrongs of such na-
tionals* alleged to be due to the military or naval operations
or to negligence of civil authorities” proved to be the most :
important* According to Art* 7. of the Convention the tribu-
' , 4- - (', .. . r   r::/7:\ ] ' / : f
x l 1 ICd*#'6-^oXT• ,,
i:v:&
-. nal had to decide »ta accordance with treaty right, and with
the principles of international l*» ftnae w it r . & tJae^
of submission agreed upon subsequently to tbs eoneluaion of
the convention, two questions forraingusually « disputed point
in other arbitrations and decided generally by mseourae to
private law hav® boon settled by an agreement of the parties s
(aJ She arbitral tribunal shall take into ojoount as on© of tltm i .
equities of the claim to such extent as it shall consider Just
in aliasing or disallowing a elsiraaay admission of liability
by ths Government against s t a a claim is put forward." This
provision provided the Sribunal with a clear rule for-handling ®St0ppe
the ameh disputed question of admission, aeqliseenee and es-
toppsl. Uo shall s-.ethat the parties Bade frequent us® of
this provision (b)“She arbitral tribunal, SS it considers
•qu^tabla, aay include in its (wrd in respect of any claim
inlei^fotat a rate sot exceeding 4 per cent, per ".x~>u^ifor the
) whole or any part of the period tetseen th. date shea the ^ e s C
Olaim mm first bought to th® notis© o t the party as& that
o f the confirmation o£ the Schedule Is which it is included.”
Both rules aa?©a noteworthy contribution to \h© respective
parts o t international arbitral law, although the provision
tfel&tisgto interest seems to feestrongly influenced by th©
common 1aw rule governing the right to interest* ^
TT !rhe"iv’orkof tSlstrimmai, it mmm , is not paid sufficient
JJtteni&ianin th© literature of international, las. It would to
feeregretted, if the relative smallness, in terrasof momx* o f
the casea decided by the tribunal, should tafluenofS o u -
110# Already Ik the first case, in ?’5rheLindisfarhe’*«
 »*' - 't '"r  ' • 1 - ‘ Cases
took the trfisun&X a ground for its decision an Implied ad- of ad.r
"" • s mission :m
mission of liability on the part of the United States as $)re- and
"'Vv'---/'.<;V. •........ estoppel*
eluding them frore denying ife&ssaS liability in the course of
the orbit ration, The fact that the Congress has defrayed the
cost of the repairs of the ship damaged in the collision wag'
"Mi
regarded by the tribunal as sufficient for establishing the Lindis-
.. :r/ . •    < ." '  fame”,:.I
liability of the Hilled States. The tribunal attached so nuch
weidri to the fact of the previous admission that it dispensed >
. .. : v.--;. 2} •*
with the proof of actual pecuniary loss as a result of demurrage* _
?, In the case of nW1X1Ism hardman’*'both parties availed thesis
rably the eonsMe. ation due io^Its findings *afiits delibera-
tions,« The awards, print®s cases* memoranda of oral arguments
and - in sortieomem « the printed reports of the proceedings
before the tribunal are available in the Fry Library{London
£>cnooIof Bcononiilcs}« .
1)Cl?lm - ^his was a claim by the U,K* for one "C-da^ de-
murrage for the British steamship ftncUafarne, injured in a col-
lision with the U,?3,Army transfort Crook in"the Hew York har-
bour(May,190U), On the day following the collision the necessa-
ry repairs to the injured vessel were made by order of the ar-
raytransport officials* the costof these repairs was sub-
sequently defrayed by an appropriation of the Congress. Tloac-
tion was"f f e H M taken by the QmgmmSn order to satisfy the
claim of the shipowners for one day's demurrage, - S. award,an**
giserof the U*S* and the jseiaor,of the oral argvu&poi #r*Isr* Ip
support of the claim*“* It is of interest to note } in this as well
toin other arbitrations that both parties regard a, binding u-
pon the® ths rules Of sarifclrasla* as ;'iver> egression in their
respective municipal la»s« _ .'   .
2) *£bB decieion. Included interest on the sum asardeu* the i-.it/u-
nal did not find it necessary to t &£©r in the award vOthe con-
tention of the U.S. that according u> their public lauino inter-
est is due on State debts,, ., „ _ .w
Si claim Ro«£.- (>x',8rxt,claitaed damans from the y*-,for the
lestmetion oi t L personal property of wi^iam nardiaanduring
.. . ; , .  
7.SS'
selves of the argiamsnt of admission. W&&Counsel for Groat Bri-
tain pointed out that there was an admission of the United
States State Bepartisent to the effect that iiatt«1aim- la a m *
ritorios one ( aXthough the State departiaeiitrejected on the ground
I t ':'i 1) - ' ^ - tfA'SS*
of international Xaw }, and contended that if, therefore, the
•;>,
claim is from t&© point or vism of international law a good 1 1 am
ii&rd*
one»then theCJ.S* ought no Xongsr to contest it. tm United mm**
States relief*. ia turn# on the letter of Sir Michel Herbert .• ,
to the State Department in which be iiapliedly accepted tlie
adverse report of the Senate as correctly expressing tli©
rules of international. law* and put forward the claim as
a matter of gram* - The tribunal, however, did not m&mr
the plea of admission because it gave a decision on the m~ . '
rits of the ease. in.accordance with a recognised mm rule >:
of international law, - In the ease of the steamship
4)  . ; ,.w <-^r M  
’’Eastr^” the amr d is based wholly on admission on the «fh©
part of the United States. *’The course adopted by the 13- Eastrg* •
nited States authorities* hoth at the the injuries cor \
S ^ S F l ^ i i n ^ ^ ^ s T ^ d ^ S p i l ^ ghlle the town of tiifco*
n^v in rtn1>a was occupied by the th,u Brm&d forces, cex
tain bouses - to obs of these » s the " '
were set on fire and destroyed by the military suthot luics
in f*&nsemienee^ oi' sickneas among the troops and from iear
5 S P S S K f f « ? * * £ » ^ b». * m * h-w «* f m s
act was a necessity of war which docs not Give right to a
legal compensation and diBBllmwd the clata, .,
1) Proo<Hwlin« 9»p»8 » S)lt>id.p.«. ®) awrd»p. »• -
4)61ata' *o. S^ i Or*.Brit. elniiwd here damages grosine out
of toJurL. sustained by the “Eastry” while delivering coal
at lisnila Bay to ooslhultas belonging to the U.o.
2.$&-
curred, and in making the preliminary repairs, la wholly in-
consistent with,the contention now made that the United,states
.. . 1)
were not responsible for the damage inflicted.” - Again in
the case of uTh& King Robert" the British argument was based
on m alleged admission of the united states 9 an allegation
2 ) ..................
rejected by the tribunal.
/ * A clear instance or estoppel is given toytriecase
3)
of “Yukon Lumber” , where both the argument of the Unitea States
and the award are based on estoppel* fJLlhlswas a claim on the
part or great Britain for dues and value, alternatively, of
aornetimber out in tresspass upon Canadian territory, sold sub-
sequently to the Government of the United states an&kused by
it in the construction of certain military bridges in Alaska,*
It Is not possible to go here into the details of the case,
but it is sufficient to stat© that the following contention
of the United States ha© been fully adopted by the tribunal.
$hey contended that Great Britain, by the course taken by
her officials* , is estopped from denying that a full and
collate title to the timber has properly and legally vested
in the United States# that the Canadian land and timber agent
stood by silently and watched the Government of the United
XT award p*~¥r”~”’~~~~~ 2) Claim no,4*
SJClalm ISO,*5
»Lumber11
'X" -''';''-’
ftat&sacquire bona fide this timber aridcontinue for six months
to make full payment for it; that9accordingly, Great Britain
cannot no® be heard in a demand that "the UnitsclStates pay It
for the same timber which it thus pemlttea ths halted States
1)
to acquire under false representations. " It has been further
established in r,hecourse of the proceedings that the only
1'     ''
claim put forward subsequent I j by flreatBritain was that for Yukon
m im n t of dues. "Jbe opinion of the tribunal is* that it
is impossible: to admit that after having at the beginning ra-
tified the tresspass and claimed during thirteen years for on-
ly the paym ent of dues*.,, the British Government is entitled
that they retained ,he ownership of the said timber. ,.tt
2) *»»
‘1he cases of 14She Favourite n and 1iTlm Wsa&erer®' *
' w$he Fas-*
offer another instance of the plea of estoppel. It m s con- vourite"
' and
tended by the united States in both cases that the action of w£he
the british havtd.authorities in ±& releasing the two vessels,
seised* while in the Behring 3m , bj the United States officers
for an alleged contravention of an act of the Congress passed
la pursuance of the Behring Sea arbitral award of 1894* was in
direct violation of a diplomatic agreement between the two go-
vernments and that Oreat Britain was n therefore estopped from
S| "Ihe'¥.i."'quoted heHTabout' iweiityEnglish and American cases
on estoppel^ s.?3.S. pemormn, on the oral argument pp.l
mm?d,pp*5*6.j also “Beply of the U.S.Rp.l5.
B) Claim £o.lg. 3;Claim So.15.
.fr- •  
ivF1
asserting any liability on the part of the United States, stem,
by their own rongful act they rendered it impossible to deter-
mine in the only eorripetont nanner the legality Qf the
Xn the ease of the "s.s* He#eh»ang" P apart from the © •
gument of res iudicata, the plea of estoppel following admission
of liability on the part of the United States has been brought
forward by Ureat Britain# it is of interest to note how
stri&ingly the decision oi the tribunal resesriblosth®ttgiven fthsavig111
under similar eircumsatanees by the senate of Hamburg to the
Groft ease* v&a admission imposing an international obligation,
must,,to be considered by the fribpnal, be formal and communi-
cated through.official d&annels* .»• H«M» ’s Bov©rairientcontend r;
that this letter contains.an admission of liability which estops
the United States from denying responsibility# x t appears*
however^ »that this letter.was userely a personal or private
reQormmnda tion to the Chairman of the Ooiamittee on Claim, '  “'?
and has never been officially published, and for this reason
in the opinion of the Tribunal it cannot be regarded as an ad-
mission of liability on the p rt of the United States. *1
'% '       ' , :   -       . > -
XT Anamp rejected, on other
• grounds, this part of the argument-* 'v*v; v.-
2} Claim fJe.gl.f s. award p*7; for res’ ludieatfi s. "list of au«
thoritioa p*d @t eeti*,answer of the y.S>p. 10,award p.2*$ for es-
toppel 8. "list of &uthritHesu pp• 11 et seq*, answer of the U.S.
  p. 11* and umra p.3*
Ill* A number of oases decided by the tribunal is o f
iirjportaneeowing "to"theclear decisions of the arbitrator in
the question of the xoeeeure of dsmgss. the decisions are in
tot^al accord with the tendency of awarding damage© for pro-
I
spactivo profits 5 mid they are at the ssmb tin© illustrative
of the most recent practice of international tribunals in
this regal'd, - fi:husin the already mentioned case of M1;he
favourite?! Oreat Britain demanded damages “basedupon wa rea-
\
sonable estimate of the sums which the owners would have re-
ceived as the proceeds of the voyage, if it had been com-
pleted *1• ^he United States availed themselves, this feint*
of the argument that international law does not allow dam-
1)
ges of this nature* She tribunal* however# talcingas a ba-
sis the number iof the seal skins taken by the-vessel in the
24 da jb preceding the seisnre* considered that*’although it
does not necessarily follow that *\he Favourite " would have
continued to take skins at the dally average of the first.
24 days11 the loss of the prospective catch should toecom**
pens©ted. Similar is the decision of the tribunal in ***he
m s)
'landerer *1 and in "Tho Katef* , in the latter case the ac«
,1 ft V• - '• • .
' rr"n'T ^ ^ t
Jgjs.itexsiorandtamto the or.&rg. of the 0*S«pp«85 et,eeq. for
ample references to the practice of intern, tribunals.
3)~ClajtaiBo,S3.5 s.«however, answer of the £.&*p.l0. and
Pernor,to the or.erg.pp.18-30 .%award,pp.1»8.~ S. also “The
.Canadienn©”(Claim II© «* ) *
tual catch of another stflMMP forcing the basis of computation*
the sarm principle of awarding damages for prospective profits
is adopted in the case of the ‘"fattier% a United States
schooner seised bj the Canadian authorities for an alleged
7
contravention of the treaty of 1818. The i'ribunal admits
that Hno evidence is produced as to the certainty of this
prospective catch* lobodj can s&$ whether the vessel would
have made such a catch or whether it would have ©ncoutercd
some mishap of the sea.” But the award shows thatthis
uncertainty does not result in the exclusion of damages
for prospective earnings* as sosieauthors or even arbitrators
maintains ifctot results in a more or less considerable re-
duction of the amount claimed. So? for instance, in the
case of Bfhe E.T.Roy”4 ^ the evidence of damages ’being“in-
conclusive unsatisfactory” the amount of the awarded
consequential daisages is substantially reduced. *£h®awards
»
in tbe Fiji Land Glaims show, on the other hand, that the
purely speculative character of the prospective gains ex-
cludes altogether the damages being a w a r d e d * B u t t b e
XF'/iward'a $§7 i7^~ **'U",rr””
5) Corap«also the case of 0ociuitla?% Giaiinlo«^9*
4) Claim Mo.I f * award March* 1925,
5) See, for instance the case Of G.H.Hurt, Claim 3?o.44| se
cannot avoid the ingress ion’that tbe bill as presented
comprises a large element Of speculative valuation arid
prospective profits9 and we have reached the conclusion
that upon the ishole, just as u?ouldbe don© b^ra lump
asard of £-10,000 (Award p.l4| the tesunH clatod was
238,929 dollars )i or in tbe case of “Isaacs af»Bro®er Js
^Passing to the question of dansages;!it is plain that the
admission of damages £m prospective earnings does not iiejsessari
ly R*eanthat the 'X’riliunalrecognised all damages indirectly
consequent upon an injurious event* wXt is a well&nown
  ... ':xt. ......  
principle of the law of damages that causa proxlraanon
rernotainspifcitur” says the award in fixing the amount
of liability in the case of the "S.S.JJewchwang<!*1* 2 i
112. The cpsstion of interest has been disposed of by the
: Interest.
above mentioned provision of the arbitration treaty, and the
tribunal used its discretion in awarding or disallowing
interest whenever such a cnuse© seaiaedequitable*
ilaK^ M^ Elsr
a speculative arjdprecarious value. •••••«« In these Oir-
cumstances we consSier that,notwithstanding our conclusion
BrEisi:on the principle of liability* the United States Must
be content with an award of nominal damages n (Award^pp*®*1?*)•
1) Claim Ho.31. as _ *
2) She tribunal allowed daises for prospective proms to the
full amount dewand^d by Oreat Britain in the case of the Sidra
(GlaiiaHo.83. j. the ease,is of interest because not only
was the q^stion argued by both parties at considerable
length* but also because Oreat Britain was much at pains
to prove that the ^labai&a award by no means excluded* as
a rule 9 the admissibility of indirect damages (see tassents
upon the msnioran» of the Oral Argursentof the United States
p.9-14 with ample references to the practice of international
tribunalss award p.6*) .
3) But we see even here that* notwithstanding the clear
provision of the arbitration agreement, attempts are madd
to apply the rule of municipal public law which liberates
states froiapairing interest* l*h©U.S* invoked tor instance
in the case of n‘i1heKing Hobart" (ClaiiaUo.4i^ Federal
statutes according to which no interest should be allowed
on auy claistiagainst the $•*><,up to the tiK-eoi Judgtiient*
unless upon a contracts expressly stipulating tor the pay-
ment of interest. * ‘£heargument shows clearly how slowly
Counsel become familiar with the fact that a elate after
having been recognised as an International one, is no longer
governed by the Public Law of one state. rfheprivileged
i '
''  -'V'
11So Another group of eases decided Ijythis tribunal
Is of Interest as showing 1mm 1b m,Quit®'resent series
of arbitrations private law is freely, sometimes too '[i:,
freely, invoked by the parties, la the 2,¥ukonLumberR ,%
• j >‘ ' ..K.' I
case, for instance# the argument of Oreat Britain show-
General re-
ing that tin©U»S. could not acquire property to the course to
private law
timber cut in trespass, was based on a large number
of Homan and coimaonlaw authorities on the law of
x)
accession and tresspass* the case of the 54'%ion
Bridge Company” furnishes a clear instance of this
tendency* In this case? the ¥»&*  cla&aeti&«ages
arising out of a wrongful   interference 9 after tlie
annexation of the Orange Free State, with certain
rich laaterial which belonged to the Union Bridge % e felon
Bridge Gora-
Gonipan^ , an American firm* It was argued by the pany*
U«s, that the m®±®±®srn seizure of this bridge
material by the British authorities * with intenti*-' •• " ;  '* *  '•' • " ‘ ;’ . ’ v... .:' •• .,• •    ’’ '.1
to appropriate the saspeto their own use ,}'ifassuch
an ©soercise.of right of dominion over them as to
;:v .. * •• •. . '   / ..•.• » '- -•.,- ~^...
position of a state in relation to its subjects or indivi-
duals generally cannot be x^aintained in relation to another
state.
1), see list of authorities in support of the claim, pp*20 et* seq.
and the laeaorial of Great Britain,
constitue a convers ion Hfqr which Great Britain should
*
respond In damages * I'h© whole ease tragiconducted by both,
parties as i£ it were an action before a uminicipal tri-
bunal of areat Britain or of the U.S. Sedgwick and Pollack
and numerous English and %©rican cases were being Quoted
in ext^aso in suppo&fcof the contention that conversion
really took place | that it is not necessary Tor this
- "v
purpose that the defendents should acquire actual propers
fcyisithe thing converted! that it is temterial that
the conversion was the result of a laist&Ise,-andso on* the
oral argument was almost totally devoted to the discussion
of this private law aspect of the..case» 3?hedifference
between jesbsx an action of trover and an action of con-
version was discussed in d e t a i l * The tribunal, how-
ever* seems to have preferred a construction of the case
based on a principle of international law* for the award
says? Hhat action constitute© an international t&i?t
comiitted in respect of neutral property, and falls to be
decided not by reference to nice distinctions between
trover, tresspass and action of tb»c&8e, a£ but by reference
. •• •’ • ,\  
I) 1'tMmor, io 'the'O r a l " " A r g .r p p .1-34*
2} See especially Oral Arg* pp*3&«41#
3) Award; p*T.
to that broad w d well-recognised principle of international
lav which gives what* In all the circumstance&& is fair com-
pensation of the wrong suffered,by the neutral owner* n
fhe course taken by the %itoial is# it is subraitted,q&ite
justified# 1’hereis no% necessity to have recourse to private
law where there is a clear-cut rate,of international law#-
In the case of "William Hardman" the problem of the sources
f   "
of decision and of application of private law is discussed (
in detail by Counsel for the ®^S* in a statement containing
the views of the U.$*^ over:?a3@i3& on the scope and wani ng
of the phrase contained in the arbitration agreeisent that
the tribunal has to decide in *SK accordance with the prin-
ciples of international law and equity. In the absence of
a rule of strict international law - was the opinion oi
Counsel of the U* S. - it is the duty of the t^ribunal to
apply international private law tod the principles of
' maritime laws in the absence of rules from this source©*
the tribunal should apply "the fundasisntal principles
of the jurisprudence of the vsiifous systems oi laws*
particularly the eotmon law and principles ox
civil law* Whatever is fundmrantal to those two main
sys tem of law is properly, applicable by -this tribunal
to guide its decisions”*1 * in the absence of a clear rule
17’Troceedinisi p7§I| see also p. m.
from thdse sources the law eosoraonto both countries., and in
the last resort, the law of the deferent nation is applicable*
After these sources have failed it Is for the tribunal to apply
the mice of equity* ~ the exact order ot these sources may--
bfoa subject of discussion* but the argument itself is Ipghly
instructive from the point of view of the question under dis-
cussion in this monograph*
114* She necessity of resorting to private law in the ©vent
of international law not supplying a rule of decision is clear-
ly recognised by other recent arbitral decisions* She unplre
%rmany
in.the Missed Claims (Jomraiesion between the y*S. and tem&siteidteKt]
adopts as a source of decision in determining the pleasure of
damages not only the treaty of Berlin* international conven-
tions and international custom* but also ”rules of I m i M
to the U.S* and Germany established by either statutes or
judicial decisions and *Jtltegeneral principles of law
recognised by civilized states4** ^ In determining the
measure of damans In cases of death,, he examines laeticulous-
of
ly the respective rules of the statutory, c ® k >» t e d the German
law and of the jus11sdlot ions where the civil law is ad-
ministered»^ ) He recognises s with the consent of both
TT^SmlnistrildW^^eielon $o*l* tfov*19K$?Axmx\>3»Xtt£<B1924>p.l7&.
2) Opinion in the Misitsnia case* p*3C3, ibid*
national comiaslonars* Um t Um amounts to decedent,
feaais©not been killed* wouM probably im?B contributed to tbs
claimant ® imve to toe cos#ens©to&* Ho tarnsj^couraa to 'Is©
l**a of some American States* to tto®Go&e Civil and to otteer
systems of private law, ^
^ U r T T ^ B , ItoitF for an lEtiiestlsg contribution* by the
**saiwsuis&lre,to the Question of dlreot and indirect taaa^as
see IfeM* $$*173 at s$*
2 ), Soes© decisions of tto Btspmm Court of fc&e U.S* settling
Controversies between states of the Union beaming upon ,
the problem under discussion m j to mentioned. in tnis connec-
tion. A part of them m im ins to the q imstton of Interest to ,
be paid by states suatm on their debts ( Coop*aB£>« U•&»v* 8t*t*
of South Carolina in Scott *s tt4ttdleial Settlement of contro-
versies toetaeen states of the American Union VcLSZ# 10&$j
analysis p»«353s 9«&*v State of Itew Stork XI# X16?^ analysis
p.SIS* State of Virginia v. State of $®st Virginia Vol. XIa
1 0 0 8 1 analysis p*£08») * & all of them tlw Bw^etm Court
let Itself to guided bj the statutory rule that $out& am
States ar© not liable for Interest* unless their* consent
to pay inter® at lias M o n raanifested to set of tfoe legis*
lation or by a lawful contract of its essecut ive offloor©#
thesG decisions mm not* it is l^ ardly aMtanqr to add,
,)in «eedfd with tbs practice of International tribunals,
bitliregard to the doetrlm of juraecrl^tXon*hosaver* tba
decisions of the court ranfctogether wife ttoos®©stsb&fe&Jng
this doctrine £im&& in internetioml law ( Scott* op«elt.
Vox»IX #pp .iM& i mmXp s* p.«298.* 099^
: *
M y
m m m m *
Oonelaaiena*
I.
It-is time to raoapitalat© - chapter after ahapter - and
paragraph after paragraph - t&a ©oaoXusiona reao&ed in tbla
mos%raplxa
fMa short recapitulation wiXi not &© fiXXowad liya
dog?aatX©statement of general ralaa. .Thea&%J®at fcasfcaen
feltharto too muah aegXeotod fcyas anoritie&X xajeotio&
awn of tba of its olosar oxastinatioa, that oaa
elsoaXd1j© tempted to aaaaisethat a solution M b fcean
r®a©h&$ Whteb pemtta IliaXaying-down of Imrd ana fast
raloa.
The qaestioa of appXieatlon of private law in infcer-
aationaX pafeXi© law is, from the Ijeg&naiag, atrosgly in-
flae need by t&e poaltiviat teadonoiaa rejaotiag anj other
soaeoa of international law than oust obiand treaty (X - 3},
*E3gb®authority of private anti ©ageaiaXXy of Botaan law as a
soarc® of intern# law la ferssaXXy rajeated hy seatllis #
Sratiaa s Byokershook an$ other writer© in th® formative
period of interna tianai law (3 - 5)# I t -5# easily re-
vested in a ajatamatio p m g # » 1»y the predominant poaitl*
.'fiatschool on the Continent (&), whitih espials© the
aetaaX similarity of a great $©aX raXea and aonoeptions
in hath systems of Xaw bj the fact of the"legal aalfer-
2 U-
fhfc respective yules and conceptiona, or by She
fact that they are the expression, of the reason of the
thing or tli© embodiment of co&aaon sense (?)« Snglish,,artd»
partly, American pabllciats have, on the other hand, do
hesitation la attributing to Hornsa law the capacity of
filling tli® numerous gaps is International law (8 -9 ) *
French witere do not pay special attention to the
proxies, feat Italian publicists follow closely in tli©
footsteps of the German positivist school (10 )« Eo^ «
ever, a critical examination of the classical writers
ahowe that although they rejected formally the analogy
to private law, thay took over ita rales and conceptions
under the form of the law of nature 9 (arotius) or of
"*©aaon* of the thing (Bynkerahoolc) (10 -1®) . The modern
positivist school does the aaiae,bat it pats in the plaso
of the law of nature •or r^eason* .‘’cone^ ptior^ of general
J'arispracleace'” or ,rgeneral principle® of law” (14) which
expreaslo m prove, on closer investigation., and in the
malorlty of cases, to ha identical with general conceptions
of private law (15). - If, os one %**§, international P&b-
licists, are anal*1® to dispense in their systems with the
use of private 1«, the practice of state® 4M* not warrant
this sweeping rejection of analogy - neither in the past,
  (the patrimonial conceptions usaally resorted to being ^nita
unable to explain all cases of analogy), nor in modern times
where states hm® frequent z®ooars® ts prtv&t© law notions
and doatrinaa (16 )» Thi® Im t fm t is abundantly proved by
the Mstory of International arbitration Is tis®XIX an£ tl»
XX o®ntury (1?)•.
The problem of tfesrelation Iset^oeninternational and
private law ia s part of tSiaqsaation as to the positive
character of international law - 9 question which, in tara
represents another aspect of the dootrin® of soTOreignty.
'mm Modem international law ia, in its sphere, the expression
of that metaphysical and l d e a l l a t i o o o n o e p t io n o f a t a t e i n w h ic h
the absolute - legal anfiaorol - sapremaoy «* tlK)sta4e ia
coupled with the idee of its sovereign will aa the exclmaiTO
source of law, national sad international (18). But neither
the practice of state*, nor the positivist writers theiaaelvoa*
confirm the view that aaatoa and treat? are the exclusive
M S M of international lam It has heen submitted that
there ia a'castonary * « W of international law to the effect
y that rales of la® quite independent of anatom and treaty are
regard by atatea as binding in individual eases. on the
otter hand, oany positivist ^ritere not only actaowlods® « »
existence of.an -tobjeotive" and "necessary" international
law, but in many oases expressly exdlude the necessity of
the’espress consent of a given atate for a rale of internation-
al law becoming existent, or for the continued existence of
aush a rule (19). It ia specially this "positive" aspect of
the doctrine sovereignty that ia now rejected hy leading «ritera
rid-
 , i s l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y a n t i p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y a a r u n n in g c o a s t e r
t o tb® m vj f o a a c i a t io a s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . 5?he e o n c e p t io a
o f e q u a l s t a t e s w i t h s a f o j e a t l v e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s n e c e s s a r i l y
i s w l v e s t h e c o n c e p t io n o f a l a w s t a n d i n g a fc o v e t h e e a n d
r e g e l a t i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t& v e s c o p e s o f p o w e rf 2 o ) « !? h is
o p i n i o n i s , l am m , e x p r e s s e d i nths C l a s s i c a l E n g l i s h
d o c t r i n e - e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n g i v e n t o i t b y
B l a c k s t o n e - t h a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w i e a p a r t o f t h e l a w
o f t h e l a n d » i n t h e n o & n in g t h a t t h o s e l o t s o f P a r l i a m e n t
w h ic h a r e mde t o e n f o r c e u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l
l a w a r c o n l y o f s d e c l a r a t o r y v a l u e «i t ' i s n o t r i g h t t o s a y
t h a t t h i s d o c t r i n e h a s h e m d l s e s s d e S h y t h e r e c o n t p r a c t i c e
o f B n g l i s h c o u r t s e!? he f u n d a m e n t a l i d e a u n d e r l y i n g t h i s d o c -
trine fiestaoccasionally clear expression in the writi&gtof
modern philosophers (£*E.Green) or international publiciats
(Westlake) fsi). In an international law. freed,from the
fetters of & rigid positivist systsM, private law givea
) legal expression to those'principles of 11mamn m nm n t of
"equity aat Justice**s M of "general principle© of law" to
which the pmetiee of states an<2international puhlicista
have fr©<pently r * w m , £he application of private law,
when this is possible and necessary, emphasises, on the other
has*!* the fact that the cossffindsof International las?are
directed to Individsal non asadthat the heterogeneity of
interests protected fcyinternational law is not ao great
as the positivist school under the influence of the doc-
2 7/.
doctrine of sovereignty was reaay to sssmseC22).
So with regard to treaties th© practise of states &n&
international pablicisfcsstands "betweentwo conflicting
ten^eseiess a) to "basethe conception of treaties on the
foon$ation of a eonsensaal obligation as developed in pri-
vate law; b) to dispense with the two essential elen^nts
of the private law conception - with the free consensus of
the parties (admissibility of Caress) and with the objective-
ly binding character of the obligation Ithe claoBQla rebn®
eic stantibus}. treaties ana contracts being in strict
low identical notions the predominant opionion- frees
Orotins Kntil to-3ay has no hesitation in treating them
as identical, or analogous conceptions?23}. Although
it is an accepted rule - in theory anfipractice - that
the use of force does not vitate a treaty, there is a
parallel cnrrent of opinion fro® Grotins Vettel to
most modern writers that the respective treaty is only
then binding when force is *me# in execution of a rule
of international law* and that, in all other cases the
acteal enforcement by the stronger party 5oes not iisply
the juridical validity of the agree® nt. In general,
the laclrof analogy, which is a result of the admissib-
ility of Caress* is coextensive with the lacking legal
aevelopzsentof internalional law (£4). <rhesarseapplies
to the claosuls rebas sic stantibas as developed by the
modern theory an^er the influence of the fiootrineof sovereign-
ty In fcotheases the latest legal development reveals a tend-
ency towards assimilation to private lew (Eg). _ Analogs to con-
tracts In private lew ie farther alopteg %jrinternational pnh-
Heists in eases of fraud am& error, although no historleal
instances of reel Talae sees to justify such a step (26).
Analogy, howevers is rniB may he resorted to only when the
rales of private law to he applies are sniversally aecep$ed
in practically all systems of private jurisprudence. Shis
is seen, for instance, in the qnestAon of interpretation of
treaties and o f pasta in favorerstertii. However, reasons
connectetlwith the history the 3ev@lop®ent of international
law eansed that rules of Bo®an law are resorted to although
in many cases they no longer express a general rale now eh~
taining is private jurisprudence (%?) * 5?helegitiisateoccasion
for application of analogy arises prima facie in such eases in
which an international treaty makes ««e of a conception of
private law (38). fhis takes place* for instance, in the case
of international leases. A* part of thc©flalthough political
in natora, closely follows, in the respective conventions, the
roles of a^'.orbinary leas© enter private law (29). With regard
to the second category of leases, the "political"leases, the
predominant opinion adopts/construction which, while rejecting
all analog/ to the correspondlug conception of private law,
attempts to give a political interpretation of the new Instita*
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and to attrihote^ to the lessee to sovereignty over the leased
territory. £his explanation*however, is neither confirmedhy
the provision© of the respective treaties, nor fcythe facts of
internationallife (30). is the science of international law
1b not celled upon So give a political in te rp re ta tion $£ con-
ventional international law, t>Gtto elncidate the jiiridical
waning cl the declared intenlions of the parties, the generally
 accepted juridical meaning of the terns!!leasencannot T>eignored,
whenever is a treaty a generally accepted term of private law is
fceingasel9 the interpretation ana constract.ion of the treaty rnmt
follow the principles generally recognised as implied in this
particular term (31). 5*hosame applies to the conception of
internationalmandates and especially to the question of sovereign
ty over the mandates territory - notwithstanding the attempts of
a political Interpretation In terms of a disguised annexation (32).
the decisions of the Goanoil of the Assembly and of the Mandates
Commission of the Leagne of Hations, the decisions of nations
t o   _
voams and of the permanent ^onrt of International Justice, end
the terms of the mandates provisions themselves do not favour the
statement that fall actual sovereignty is vested in the saunaatoryf38).
Ob the other tend, a strictly juridical interprets ion of the Art.28
of the Covenant leads ~ in accordance with the rale of inierpretation
mention*® ahove - to attrihating to the league of letions the ultimate
sovereignty over the mandated territories (34). She acceptance of
the view that a conception of private law when aged in a treaty
looses its nasal meaning woold deprive international law of an
*14.
important source of development (35). The acceptance of the
alttante sovereignty of the League of nations far fromfeeing
affected fcythe fact that the League neither chose the
mandatory nor fisea the terms of the mandates, provides a
eolation for the case of the termination of the mandate(3$).
AS, however, only those rules flowing fro® the conception
of mandate can be* applied which h«ve hee-nm iversally
accepted in practically all systems of private jurisfrodenee,
the prime facie adoption of analogy in no way impedes the
development of the new conception in accordance with the
necessities of international life (37).
It is especially with regard to this part of inter-
nationallaw which relates to acquisition of territorial
sovereigntythat the influence of private law is most visibB .
there is, firstly, the princite that $he forms of acquisition
of territory are regulated toylaw; there Is, secondly,the'
principle of connection o f animus and corpus (38b Whs
I*
historical function of the last mentioned principle as an
organising element of greet legal vsIce in the period
following the discovery of the lew World is totally In-
dependent of the so-called patrimonial conception of State(39).
®his influence can he explained to a large extent by the
fact that the intrinsic analogy between territorial sovereign-
ty and property of private law cannot he ignored, althoagh the
two nations are hy no means identical (40). She influence of
iy$-
this part of private law is not confined to acquisition of
territorial sovereignty. The writings of earl;/international
lawyers,especially of Grotlas ani.B^mkershocfeshow that the
chief legal arguments in the fievelopmentof the conception of
the freedom of the sea ana of the territorial latere were#
flrawnfrom private law roles of possession ana property?41 -42)»
The recent discussions turning on the sovereignty of the air,
Iserve as a farther illustration of this point (43/. 3Jhe
principle of prescription is,on the other hand» generally
recognised in theory and practice, and denied only feythose
writers who, claiming the.special character of international
lew, assert that, in international law* e v e r y posses?ion is
;;lawful (44). With regard to geatrietions of territorial
sovereignty, international law has taken over the notion of
state servitudes without Tseingable, however, to define clear-
ly to what esses of restrictions of sovereignty the analogy
Li*
should apply. The confusion resulting of the great
latitude with which this particular analogy is applied finds
recently expression in the tendency to eliminate altogefelier
this conception (45)A 0ie theory of succession the analogy
to private law is followed hy the prevalent majority of writers
end, on the whole, hy the practice of states, notwithstanding
the attempts to has* the fact of a change in sovereignty on
the were will of the state acquiring it. Neither &o theory*
or practice follow the recent attempts of positivist writers
to dispense with the retirement of culpability ®s « condition
of the liability of states for international torts (48-49).
fith regard to allowance of interest on state debts or on
soms awarded against states the practice of states ana of
internationaltribunals clearly discards the notion that the
specialcharacter of states liberates then from pacing interest
unless expressly stlpnlatedf50)* Also the attempts to intro-
duce in international law a special measere of damages itsich
re5nees the liability of state* to direct daaages actually
sustained- with the exclusion of damages for prospective
profits - is gradually discarded by the practice of states
and international tribunals {51-5S),
2bat those principles of private 1m which are generally
accepted,ana which embody a rale of justice ana common sens©,
are accepted as principles applicable to internationallawteven
if they are of a technical and formal character, i© clearly shoim
by the fact that the notions of admission, waiver ana especially
of estoppel play an important part in international arbitration,
ana are adopted not only by states, but also by arbitral Tri-
bunals (53-54). The same applies to the principle of res indleata(£$)
and to many private law rales of eviaenc© ana proeadore (56).
It is especially with regard to the right of an arbitral court
to pass over its own jurisdiction and to the question of the
finality of an arbitral award (appeal/, revision) that private
law is being freely invoked and the final development shapei 9
Z77.
on the whole. In accordance with principles of private law (57-58).
Ie international arbitration the fact is clearly brought to light
tnrffceo oarse to private law is a practical necessity (69-60).
The great British-Aserlean arbitrations tenish a striking
example oi the inapplicability, in practice, of the strictly
positivist doctrine rejecting fefcerall recoarse to private lew (61).
In the ilabaisaaMsitration both parties to the eispote resort
i to private law for the jmrpose o f interpretation of tlaeter®
"ftae8 iligenceJ?ana the opinion of the arbitrators, largely 'based
on private an& Homan law tistinetione between different %
degrees of faalt, is in accord with She general principle of
private law in tMs question (68-65), she answer of the
fritanal* to the question of the measure of damages tune counter
to the respective rules of private law. shis deeleion, however,
mast be vieire3 in connection with the ciraamstanoee of the cases,
especially in connection with the character of the elate© for
I M i r eel aamsges pat forward by the.united states, aaS with the
fact that damages for prospective profits as well as interest
have been inelofied,eventually, in the IsE^ssm awarded toythe
TriVbnsl. Both questions - iatsagesana .interest- as those of.
the hsT ien ©f proif anilthe right of the Sfrrbimalto pass over
its own.jurisdiction • were argued toythe parties with the help
of frecent references to private law rales ana authorities (64-66).
fhe Behring See arbitration furnishes a clear ©sample of the
application of the doctrine of prescription to tbe part ef the U.S.
n f-
enfithe Am rlean members of the tribunal. She Eribsmal itself
refused to aev.isfcefro® the path of priest© law in fiefinlug the
rales of possession in &n$ property over animls ferae neturae
{67-69)* The Questions of the nesscre of Saiaagfism& of the
barren of proof were^ again fiiscueeea{70>* She British
Guiana Arbitration shows how the recoarse to private law in
the ti&estionof occupation is by no zssanea matter of the past
(71-73). fhe problem of the interpretation of a term of
private law {prescription) osed in a public tresiy {7Si, and
the application of the fioetrineof estoppel (74) receive here
a lacl* illustration both on the part of the stales in aispate
anflon the part of the fribbnal. We see, on the other hana, in
the ilaskan 3oonaary aispste that the application of analogy aoes
sot take place when there is no gap in international law, or when
the decision can be easily foanfieaon a clear provision of n
treaty (75). The same arbitration is an instructive instance
of the application by the parties of private Xaw rales oi
j evidence, antiit throws light on the respective i&por»anee of
common an£ Bonianlaw rales (76). In the Picas FnM Arbitration
the principles of res indicate is aSxaittefiby both parties to
the aiepnte (77 ) an* the decision of the tribnnal with regard
to the scope of res indicate is in neoera with the respective
general rule of private law {78}; eo is also that relating to
the competence of an international arbitral fribtmal (79). the
plea of estoppel is expressly pot forward by one party am
implicitly recognises in the award (80). It is obvious, on fehe
2other hand that the principle of prescription recognised by
both parties to the arbitration has not been rejected by the
Tribonalf81)  In the V&nesumlan Preferential Claim arbitration
recourse to private law is most frequent; both sides express-
ly recognised Homan law as'the law is?hichshonld govern the
decision of the arbitratdr© (82-83). The roles of hypothecation
ana lien, of negotiornm gestio ana of bankruptcy were £*i3tyfree-
ly Invoked by the parties (84-86). The plea of estoppel has been
^at forward with vigour sna, inspllcitly,recognised by the
Tribunal (87). Other instances of analogy to private law ocearred
in the coarse of this arbitration (#8). fI!banorth Atlantic
Fisheries ease, far from being an instance of a compromise in~
oorporated in the award, is an instance of a meticnlous application
of the rltlesof servitudes in private law to an a&ilogous conception
in international law, which the M b ansi did not reject, although it
demandedan express proof of sach a right having been granted (89-91).
In the RasssianIndemnity case rales of private law are being applied
)bythe Sribanal in a systematic way and the necessity of applying
soeh analogy explained by the identity of the respective legal
relations and by the requirement of international relations. It
refused to see any difference between the legal position of an
individualdebtor and that of a state so far as the responsibility
for delay in payment is concerned {92-94jj,.In this, as in the
proceeding eases the parties resort frequently to private law, and
the final decision of the frribnnalis based totally on the adoption
of a presumptive and onrebctable 7/aiver as given clearly by a
xw
f i .
respectiverale of private law (95-97). ffeeJapanese Bouse fax
jsge{interpretation of a tons of private law Refining pri-vate
,*ights}98), the Kiristoma ease (adoption of prescription;— 99)
m& th© Island of ^teor ossa (formation of roles of interpre-
tationin analogy to private law; 100) are farther instances
the problem In question.
«be minor arbitration cases of the last seventy years are
j
noless instructive in tM&s regard. In the oases daeidad by the
Senateof Hamburg ( Qroft; Yuile* Shortriage, srnSQomp*) recourse
60 Homan law in the question of interest, and to private lawrtth
regardto admission and.to the right to damages for prospective
profit©(101 -103 ). This last principle is also adopted in the
I
easesof *Sj)l©n*lLloyd ^eplnwall” 'and "fmbxaui*; in both eases
Horaanand private law is «esorted to Toythe arbitrators (104-105).
apartfrom other eases (106-107), the Venesoelan Arbitrations
of 1903 (103) and the British-American claims arbitral ^ri'benal
inder the Convention of 1910 (109-114) are full of instructive
ingtsncesof application of private law, this relates especially
to the nameroug awards sn$ to the deliberations of the last
aentioned Trihnnal
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